The End of the Axis of Resistance?

Analysts have been quick to view the swift collapse of Bashar al-Asad’s regime in Syria as a fatal and final blow to the so-called Axis of Resistance: the network of Iranian proxies spanning from Lebanon to Yemen. But such premature post-mortems underestimate what the Axis of Resistance achieved, misrepresent what it is and misdiagnose the implications for the future actions of its members. Even if their capabilities are now diminished because a notable patron has fled to Russia and Iran is weakened, the various factions of the Axis will not simply evaporate or drastically change their outlook or conduct.

The Axis of Resistance (as the pieces in this issue illustrate) is not a tightly structured hierarchical network of proxies always following direct marching orders from Tehran. It is a consortium of actors that rely on Iranian ideological, financial, military and technological support to different degrees in order to bolster their domestic agendas and, at times, their international standing. The level of direct support and allegiance varies, from Hizballah in Lebanon at one end of the spectrum to the Houthis in Yemen at the other.

With the fall of the Asad regime, the prospects of its members will change. A key thoroughfare for weapons transfers and a potential staging ground for any military training and facilities is likely lost. It also spells the end of a stalwart ally that allowed Iran to practice forward defense in its clash with Israel on the country’s northern border. But this security doctrine was already faltering due to Israel’s incursion into Lebanon and the recent decapitation of Hizballah’s leadership.

The resulting reputational damage to Iran’s image within the Axis of Resistance will be immense as the country proved incapable of adequately protecting its allies and assets. The Axis might also prove less useful as a valued rhetorical device and framing mechanism championed by the Islamic Republic in light of Iran’s acute internal security threats after October 7, 2023 and the depleted strategic and military options to counter Israel.

But these crucial setbacks are unlikely to fully change the motivations and actions of the groups belonging to the Axis of Resistance. To believe otherwise is to nullify their agency and agendas and misread some of the deeper underpinnings capable of loosely uniting such a diverse group of actors, beyond Iranian support and patronage.

The Iranian-aligned elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq are unlikely to end their displeasure—often backed by military actions—with US infringements on Iraq’s territorial sovereignty. Indeed, in their stance they are aligned with some non-Shi’a militias, government officials and segments of the population in Iraq. The Houthis are unlikely to end their support for the Palestinian people, even if their disruptions to shipping and sea lanes end because of a ceasefire in Gaza, to say nothing of the long history of Yemeni solidarity with Palestine. The sense of precarity among the region’s Shi’a population, which led Afghans and Pakistanis to travel to Syria to fight ISIS—not only due to recruitment, enforcement and false financial promises from Iran but for religious motivations as well—might be heightened with the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria and the unknown future sway of Sunni militant groups there. Even in Tehran, where government expenditures on foreign policy has come at the expense of the population—who have never been bashful in expressing their displeasure with it—the situation is not so clear-cut. As an October 2024 survey of Iranian public opinion highlighted, while nearly half the respondents disapproved of Iran’s financing of regional proxies, 61 percent approved of supporting these groups militarily.[1]

Axis of Resistance or not, these attitudes, concerns and outlooks will not disappear overnight. Nor will groups like Hizballah, Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, the Houthis or Hamas cease to challenge the regional status quo of a US-led security architecture with unrelenting support for Israel at its center—just because Iranian money and weapons may now prove harder to acquire.

Apprentices, if members of the Axis can be considered as such, are always meant to outlast the instruction of their masters and persist beyond the years of training, tutelage and support. Whatever these groups may now stand to lose, they have gained over the years in capacity building, military training, weapons use and technology transfer. Whatever ideological commitment to Iran and its geostrategic interests they may hold does not compare to the pursuit of their own, which would always outlive Iranian support anyway.

The Axis of Resistance may no longer prove to be what it once was following Asad’s fall in Syria, but its long-term success as a strategy and the benefits provided to Iran and its members will be measured and determined in the years, not days, to come.

 

This article appears in MER issue 313 “Resistance—The Axis and Beyond.”

 

[Kevin L. Schwartz is Deputy Director of the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences in Prague, Czech Republic, where he also serves as a research fellow.]

 

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Endnotes

[1] Arash Ghafouri, “New polling highlights Iranians’ views on Iran’s foreign policy and regional role,” Middle East Institute, October 17, 2024.