Iran
“We Started to Feel Cold Sweat on Our Brows”
Ali Reza Nobari studied mathematics in France and was finishing a Ph.D. in operations research at Stanford University in California when the Iranian revolution occurred. He helped to fund the newspaper Enqelab-e Islami and served as governor of Iran's Central Bank during Bani-Sadr’s presidency. Eric Hooglund and Joe Stork spoke with him in Washington, DC in December 1981.
If you could have seen where the revolution stands now, would you have participated in it three and four years ago?
“The Americans Played a Disgusting Role”
Shahpour Bakhtiar served as prime minister in the last weeks of the Shah’s regime. Since escaping from Iran after February 1979 he has been living in exile. Fred Halliday spoke with him in Paris in August 1981.
Mr. Bakhtiar, what is your estimation of the current strength of the Iranian regime?
“We Are the Only Real Threat to Khomeini”
Masoud Rajavi was the only one of the original leadership of the Mojahedin-e Khalq to escape execution by the Shah. Imprisoned from 1971 until December 1978, he emerged to reorganize the Mojahedin. He ran for president in the election of January 1980 but Khomeini declared him ineligible. He escaped from Iran with former president Bani-Sadr on July 28, 1971. He is the prime minister in Bani-Sadr’s government in exile, and is active in the Council of National Resistance. Fred Halliday interviewed him outside Paris in August 1981.
“I Defeated the Ideology of the Regime”
Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr was elected president of the Islamic Republic of Iran in January 1980, but was subsequently impeached in June 1981. Fred Halliday interviewed him in France in August 1981, several weeks after he escaped from Iran. He has formed a government in exile, and is part of the Council of National Resistance.
You are living here in France to organize opposition to the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. But Khomeini still has some popular support, and he is prepared to be more repressive than the Shah ever was. Won’t these differences make it very difficult to oust him?
Year Three of the Iranian Revolution
The third year of the Iranian revolution saw the final breakup of the political coalition that initially brought Khomeini to power, and the emergence in exile of an opposition that groups together many of those who played a part in the overthrow of the monarchical dictatorship. On the basis of evidence available, it would seem that the Khomeini regime has been able, through massive repression already greater than that of the Shah, to contain the opposition forces for the time being. The Islamic forces now in power have apparently gained a second breath after the crises of mid-1981. Appearances may, however, be deceptive and the Iranian revolution could be preparing another one of those sudden convulsions which has marked its agonized course to date.
From the Editors (March/April 1982)
When the history of the Iranian revolution is compiled, the third year of the Islamic Republic may stand out as particularly decisive. The alliance of left-leaning lay political elements with the Islamic Republican Party ruptured completely. Iranian forces scored important gains on the battlefield with Iraq. The regime secured its grip on the state apparatus and dominated the political arena through massive repression and widespread executions.
Approaching the Islamic Revolution
Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980).
Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).
Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution
Westerners commonly perceive the Iranian Revolution as an atavistic and xenophobic movement that rejects all things modern and non-Muslim, a view reinforced by the present leaders of Iran. They claim that the revolution spearheads the resurgence of Islam, and that the revolutionary movement is an authentic phenomena uncorrupted by any alien ideas and inspired solely by the teachings of the Prophet and the Shi‘i imams. This conventional wisdom, however, ignores the contributions of ‘Ali Shari‘ati, the main ideologue of the Iranian Revolution.
Religious Ritual and Political Struggle in an Iranian Village
The villagers of Aliabad do not presume political stability. They were not especially surprised at the fall of the Shah, nor at the demise of the most powerful person in the village, Seyyid Ibn Ali Askari, some months after the Iranian revolution. “One day the saddle is on the horse, the next day the horse is on the saddle,” they said. “Families become scattered. Families come and go. Ezzat va zellat. Honor and ruin.”
Capitalism in Rural Iran
Parvin Ghorayshi: Fred Halliday has suggested in the chapter on agricultural development in the first edition of his book, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, that the Iranian state successfully imposed capitalist relations on the rural areas by means of a land reform. While I agree that rural Iran experienced a growth of capitalist relations as a result of land reform, I cannot agree that these relations became predominant, as Halliday claims: “In general, one can say that the Iranian countryside is now a capitalist one. Pre-capitalist features must certainly survive: Old cultivation methods, old attitudes and old unreformed ownership patterns do not disappear at once.
Government’s Nabavi on Inflation and Labor Unrest
Edited text of Tehran Radio interview with Behzad Nabavi, minister of state for executive affairs and chief government spokesman, February 23, 1981:
What practical steps has the government taken to combat inflation?
What you mean in fact is the high cost of living. Incidentally, we have been following this very issue closely in the economic mobilization headquarters for a week now. We have discovered its roots and causes and we are trying to eliminate them.
Khomeini Workers’ Day Message
Text of message by Ayatollah Khomeini on the occasion of Workers’ Day, May 1, 1981, as read by announcer on Tehran Radio:
In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Blessed be Workers Day for the ranks of the valuable workers, for the nation in general and for the oppressed the world over, lt is a national, Islamic and universal duty to mark Workers Day, this backbone of the country’s independence, this [word indistinct] that determines destiny and promotes liberation from dependence and affiliations.
Mojahed: “At the Beginning of the Third Year”
Edited text of lead article in Mojahed (February 12, 1981), the organ of the Mojahedin-e Khalq:
Having celebrated the second anniversary of the revolution, we are at the brink of the third year. The anniversary of the revolution and the days of Bahman remind us of…the days of great victories and finally the days of the magnificent armed uprising of the masses and the eventual overthrow of the mercenary and puppet regime of the Shah and the shameful and sinister system of monarchy…. But looking back to the events and changes of the past two years, present conditions bring a feeling of pity and show how great hopes have widely turned into hopelessness….
Exonerating US Policy
Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
“Tudeh’s Policy Is a Betrayal of the Working Class”
Fereidun Keshavarz was elected to the Tudeh politburo at the Party’s first congress in 1942. He was elected to the Iranian parliament in 1944 and in 1946 served as minister of in the short-lived government of Prime Minister Qavam. In 1958 he resigned from the Tudeh politburo and central committee. He met with Fred Halliday in Geneva on March 14, 1980 for this interview.
How do you evaluate the strength of the Tudeh Party in the 1940s, and how do you account for its popularity at that time?
“The Clergy Have Confiscated the Revolution”
Abdulrahman Qassemlu is secretary-general of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in Iran. He is the author of Kurdistan and the Kurds (7965) and Problems of Economic Growth in the Developing Countries (1969). From 1960 to 1975 he taught at the Ecole Superieure d’Economie in Prague. He met with Fred Halliday in Europe in February 1981 for this interview.
The Islamic authorities now ruling Iran insist that they, and they alone, made the revolution which overthrew the Shah. What role, in your view, did the Kurdish people of Iran play in the revolution of 1978-1979?
Economic Sanctions and Iranian Trade
Former President Jimmy Carter’s announcement of economic sanctions against Iran on April 7, 1980 aroused little enthusiasm except in Tehran, where crowds roared their approval of a formal break in ties with the “great Satan.” At home, hadn’t the freeze of Iranian assets, the longshoremen’s refusal to load Iran-bound goods, and the November ban on Iranian oil imports already reduced trade between the two countries to a trickle? In Europe, foreign ministers meeting in Lisbon on April 10 declined to heed Carter’s call. The Europeans, and the Japanese, had a stake in maintaining economic ties to the new regime. Western Europe as a whole was importing 650,000 barrels of Iranian oil a day.
Iran’s Economy
Workers, bazaar merchants and artisans, farmers, salaried officials and professionals — all expected that the departure of the Shah would mean better economic conditions for themselves and the Iranian people. At the very least, funds that had been diverted into corruption or used to purchase expensive and extravagant weapons systems and showcase projects would be made available to meet real needs. As things now stand, the government of the Islamic Republic faces considerable popular dissatisfaction because these expectations have not been fulfilled, and the standard of living of many Iranians has, in fact, fallen since the revolution.
“Signs of Civil War”
Shirin Tehrani is an independent Iranian socialist who has lived most of the post-revolutionary period inside Iran and spoke with Fred Halliday in Europe in late April 1981.
There has been much attention here on the dispute within the regime between the faction around President Bani-Sadr, and that around Prime Minister Raja’i and the Islamic Republican Party (IRP). lt is very difficult to gauge the course of this contest from the outside. How has it developed in recent months?
The War and the Struggle for the State
“Was it not your KGB which indirectly passed on to us the secret plan for the Iraqi offensive?” President Bani-Sadr’s point-blank question clearly embarrassed the Soviet ambassador. Vladimir Vinogradov lapsed into an embarrassed silence but his face was lit by a smile which was as broad as it was enigmatic. The Iranian head of state had pointed out that the invasion of the Islamic Republic, which had begun more than 36 hours before his conversation with the diplomat, followed a scenario described in detail in a report given to him weeks previously. Who but the Kremlin, he wondered, could have access to the plans of Baghdad’s general staff?
