Yemen’s Ansar Allah

Until it fired missiles and drones against Israel in October 2023, the Yemeni Houthi movement, officially known as Ansar Allah, remained largely unknown in the Global North.

In the year since, in support of the Palestinians under siege and genocide in Gaza, Ansar Allah have fired multiple projectiles against Israel, one of which successfully evaded Israeli air defenses in July 2024 and reached Tel Aviv, killing one person. Later attacks wounded some and damaged infrastructure, including Ben Gurion airport on September 15. The majority of their attacks have been on maritime trade in the Gulf and the Red Sea, significantly impacting international trade through the Suez Canal as well as traffic in Israel’s ports: Eilat has almost ceased operations, and in July 2024, the port declared bankruptcy.

Their actions contrast sharply with the passivity, not to say complicity, of the Arab states in the Arabian Peninsula and beyond, which, although making various tepid statements about Israel’s war, are helping get imports to Israel by facilitating overland transit from UAE ports through Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.

The Houthi movement has achieved worldwide prominence (and significant global popularity) as a key actor in the resistance to Israeli aggression and a member of the Axis of Resistance. Ansar Allah’s relationship with Iran, meanwhile, has been subject to widespread disinformation by international media and US and British policymakers, who tend to deny Houthi agency by describing them as mere Iranian proxies, in the narrowest sense of that word.

Both international support for and opposition to Houthi interventions in the Red Sea are largely based on ignorance of the nature of their rule in Yemen. Writing in these pages in 2023, Stacey Philbrick Yadav noted this tendency toward oversimplification in discussions of the Houthis and offered a short analysis of Ansar Allah’s relationship to Palestine. Below is a more detailed outline of the movement’s roots, the nature of their governance over millions of Yemenis and an analysis of Ansar Allah’s developing role in the Resistance Axis in light of shifting regional dynamics over the last year.

 

The Houthi Movement’s Oppositional Roots

 

Ansar Allah has its roots in the Sa‘ada governorate in the northwest of Yemen.

The region is the heartland of the Zaydi branch of Shi’a Islam, which historically dominated politics in northern Yemen. Until the 1962 revolution that created the Yemen Arab Republic, the ruling imams were Zaydis, who claimed descent from the Prophet and are part of the social group that Yemenis call sada. After the revolution, tribesmen dominated, and the sada—though retaining social status and influence—were politically marginalized.

When President Ali Abdullah Salih came to power in July 1978, one of the mechanisms he used to control the country was to encourage social and political conflict at the local level. In Sa’ada, these efforts took the form of allowing the rise of Sunni Salafism. Muqbil al-Wadi’i, a Zaydi who converted to Salafism during his years in Saudi Arabia, established the Dar al-Hadith (House of Hadith) religious community in the early 1980s in a village close to Sa’ada city, the regional capital.[1] The community attracted thousands of Yemenis and foreigners who lived there and proselytized, building a strong Salafi movement which remains politically significant throughout Yemen today.

In response to this threat, Hussain al-Houthi started the Zaydi al-Shabab al-Mu’min (Believing Youth) movement in 1992. Al-Houthi’s movement was a “catalyst which could unite the interests of all those in Sa‘ada and beyond who felt economically neglected, politically ostracized and religiously marginalized.”[2] In the following decade, the revivalist movement grew, forming an active opposition to the rising Salafi movement in the same area. While Hussain al-Houthi was a member of the Yemeni Parliament from 1993 to 1997, later disagreements with the Salih government led to the first military uprising in 2004.

The Believing Youth formed the core of the movement opposing the Salih government. It increased in strength and membership during the six wars that followed between Salih and the opposition—in part due to Salih’s indiscriminate destructive tactics and generalized aggression against the northwest, which alienated thousands of tribesmen and others who did not necessarily support Houthi ideology but were infuriated by the exactions of the regime. By the time a shaky ceasefire was reached in early 2010, the Houthis controlled an area well beyond the original heartland around Sa‘ada. The fighting would probably have resumed had the 2011 uprisings not taken place at the national level.

The Houthis joined the 2011 uprisings, though they acted largely independently, maintaining tents in Sana’a’s Change Square for two years, even when most others had left. They were not a party to the 2011 GCC Agreement that created a two-year transitional government, prompting them to begin cooperating with former president Salih to undermine the transition.

In September 2014—as a result of the weakness of the transitional regime and their earlier expansion of territorial control southwards—the Houthis were able to take over the national capital, Sana’a. By early 2015 the transitional government was on the run. Over the following two years, the Houthi movement, which had gradually gained strength at the expense of its alliance with Salih, assassinated him in December 2017, thus achieving full control of about a third of the country’s land and two-thirds of its population.

From 2015 to 2022, the civil war was aggravated by the involvement of a Saudi-led coalition of nine states, including all GCC states except Oman. The key decision-makers in this coalition were Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and their increasing rivalry and support for competing factions within the internationally recognized government of Yemen (IRG) contributed to its weakness and inability to effectively confront Houthi forces.

With the 2022 UN mediated truce, lasting from April to October of that year, Saudi Arabia and the UAE stopped their airstrikes, which had caused massive destruction throughout the country. Since then, small-scale fighting between the different Yemeni forces has taken place on most fronts, though clashes increased in significance in 2024.

 

Houthi Governance

 

Politically, the Houthis exercise a highly authoritarian and oppressive rule. Their control of the capital has enabled them to take over all government ministries, where they have ensured that Ansar Allah loyalists determine decision making and control funds. Ansar Allah claims not to want to re-instate the Imamate, but its political actions suggest a vision close to that prevailing in Iran, with a religious leader dominating a government that claims to be democratic. The sada currently hold the majority of senior positions in all institutions.

Although the Ansar Allah government formally includes sections of the General People’s Congress (GPC)—Salih’s former ruling organization—as well as other smaller parties, signs of dissent or of alternative positions have been met with imprisonment and torture. Journalists and civil society activists have been heavily targeted. In June 2024, the Houthis arrested and imprisoned more than 60 humanitarian workers, including 13  United Nations staff, accusing them of being US and Israeli spies. The movement has been particularly combative toward the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, briefly occupying its Sana’a office in early August 2024 after having held a senior staff member in detention since 2021.

Socially, the Houthi government has instituted policies severely restricting women’s mobility and other freedoms, forcing them to be escorted by a mahram (a male relative) when moving within and outside of the country and imposing strict conservative dress codes.

Among Ansar Allah’s problems when it comes to governance is finance. Before the war, Yemen was dependent on two primary sources of income: hydrocarbon exports and international assistance. The first has completely dried up since October 2022, when the Houthis prevented oil and gas exports by attacking the relevant ports. Meanwhile, limited international development aid has been replaced by far larger amounts of humanitarian aid, which is a major source of friction: On the one hand, humanitarian agencies try to prevent Ansar Allah’s influence over distribution mechanisms and the selection of beneficiaries. On the other, the Houthis impose restrictive rules governing the activities of international and national humanitarian organizations. This tug of war between Ansar Allah and the UN unfolds in the absence of representatives of the funding states, as most embassies closed in 2015.

Houthi finances also depend on taxation, port fees and customs duties on imports. Given that most basic commodities—wheat and other staples, medication, etc.—are imported, Houthi success in diverting most shipping to the Red Sea ports under its authority in 2023 was significant. Recently, however, this success has been partly undermined by the reduction in Red Sea maritime traffic since their intervention in Israel’s war.

Moreover, the reduction of humanitarian aid since the blockade began has also affected Houthi finances. The World Food Programme ceased its distributions in the areas under Houthi control in December 2023, with only two minor exceptional distributions in some areas benefiting 1.4 million people—a drastic reduction when compared with the 9.5 million who received regular support up to that time. In addition, the UN’s annual Humanitarian Response Plan in 2024 was 60 percent smaller than the previous year and, by the end of the year, had only been financed at 50 percent—worsening the humanitarian crisis throughout the country.

 

Houthi Foreign Policy

 

The Houthi’s basic slogan, “al-Sarkha” (the Scream), points to how issues beyond Yemen are at the core of Ansar Allah’s ideology. “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews” are three of its five points, the other two being “God is the greatest” and “Victory to Islam.” Palestine is mentioned frequently at all levels, with the movement’s opposition to Israel, at times, taking the form of antisemitic slogans and chants. But until Israel’s war on Gaza started in October 2023, the scream was an ideological assertion without much practical implementation. Even the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 provoked little response beyond accusations of betrayal of the Palestinian cause.

The current war in Gaza has given the Houthis an opportunity to live up to their slogan by engaging in direct military action against Israel. Within Yemen, their prestige has risen dramatically as the overwhelming majority of Yemenis, whether under IRG or Houthi rule, are sympathetic to Palestinians, horrified by the ongoing genocide and willing to tolerate the consequences of this support, at least up to now. In Houthi-controlled areas, their actions against Israel have boosted the movement’s popularity, which was deteriorating as their oppressive rule had alienated the majority, who were frustrated by the exactions and other demands on their household finances.

The maritime war has also increased Ansar Allah’s public image worldwide, in particular in majority Arab and Muslim states, where most of the population supports the Palestinian people and deplores what they see as their own leaders’ shameful inaction. In the Global North, Houthi actions in support of Palestinians have given them a positive image among many, particularly on the left.

Moreover, as a result of the US and British attacks on Yemen this past year, Houthis can now claim to be directly fighting the United States, the main imperialist enemy. To date, while these strikes have been limited and have degraded Houthi ability to attack shipping, they have not had a significant impact. Between the launch of Operation Poseidon Archer in January and November 2024, the United States and Britain have used  601 munitions in 279 air strikes to minimal effect. In that period the Houthis successfully sunk two ships and damaged more than 80 others.

 

Relationship with Iran and the Axis of Resistance

 

Houthis have had meaningful relations with Iranian religious leaders for decades, with many members of Ansar Allah having spent time studying in Iranian religious institutions.[3] Badr al-Din al Houthi, father of Hussain al-Houthi and the current leader, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, studied in Iran’s Qom. He was deeply influenced by Ayatollah Khomeini—an influence evident in the Scream. He returned home with political ambitions and reforms intended to create a body of followers distinct from mainstream Zaydism. Though the movement remains Zaydi, it has institutionalized a number of religious and secular ritual celebrations, which were previously largely ignored in Yemen, including Scream Day, Popular Revolution Day, Resilience Day, Martyr’s Day and the Prophet’s birthday.

Salih accused Iran of supporting the Houthis as early as the Sa’ada wars (2004–2010), a claim the United States dismissed at the time as a “disingenuous attempt to garner Western and Sunni Arab support.”[4] But since 2015, with the internationalization of the civil war, Iranian practical support for the Houthis has become more active and increased. It now includes political and financial support in the form of free fuel deliveries to the Houthis.

Militarily, in recent years the Houthis have exhibited a greater competence, in terms of strategy, tactics and equipment. Much of the latter is now manufactured locally. In September 2022, for instance, they held a three hour military parade in Sana’a, with tens of thousands of soldiers and a wide variety of missiles and other weapons.

The most sophisticated drone and missile components undoubtedly come from Iran, either directly or indirectly. Most smuggled items land in the far east of Yemen, in al-Mahra governorate, and then must cross more than a thousand kilometers of IRG-controlled territory before reaching Houthi territory across multiple checkpoints that cover the country (indicating either incompetence, corruption or both among the internationally recognized government). Some components also arrive by sea, thanks to assistance from smugglers and others in the Horn of Africa, who access the Yemeni Red Sea coast, despite the vast deployment of naval forces in the area. There have also been rumors of a few advisors from the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and from Lebanon’s Hizballah helping to train Ansar Allah’s armed forces. But reliable publicly available evidence for these claims is largely absent.

With its numerous successful interventions in the Red Sea and attacks on Israel, Ansar Allah, over the past 15 months, has become a leading member of the Axis of Resistance, whose main participants are Hamas and Hizballah. Its other members, various Iraqi and Syrian militias, play a lesser role. In June 2024, Houthi military spokesperson, Yahya Saree, claimed the first joint operation with the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which hit two cement tankers and two cargo ships in Israel’s Haifa port. Other attacks have followed.

 

Looking Ahead

 

Ansar Allah has been clear that its attacks on Israel and shipping are in support of Gazan, Palestinian and now Lebanese resistance and would stop when Israel ceases its genocide and opens Gaza to humanitarian aid. Following the implementation of the first phase of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, agreed to in January 2025, the Houthis have released the crew of a siezed ship and halted their campaign. But they have been clear that they will resume their actions if Israel reneges on the ceasefire.

At the same time, however, support for the Houthis in Yemen over their domestic policy is dwindling, as living conditions continue to deteriorate.

The impact of Houthi actions on the Arabian Peninsula is particularly notable, evidenced by the deafening Saudi silence: In the face of its population’s support for Palestinians, and as a side-effect of Houthi actions, the Saudi regime has bowed to Houthi demands in its financial war against Yemen’s internationally recognized government. In July 2024, Saudi Arabia pressured the IRG to withdraw its attempt to cut off Sana’a based banks from the international SWIFT system. This step further weakened an already weak and divided entity. These developments are unwelcome for many Yemenis, for whom a stronger Houthi rule means increased repression of the population and a closing down of civil society and dissent.

 

This article appears in MER issue 313 “Resistance—The Axis and Beyond.”

 

[Helen Lackner is the author of Yemen in Crisis (Saqi Books, 2023).]

 

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Endnotes

 

[1] Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen, Transnationalism and Religious Identity (London: Hurst, 2011).

[2] Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, a History of the Houthi Conflict (London: Hurst, 2017), p. 37.

[3] Walter Posch, “Iran’s relations with Yemen; Ideological and strategic aspects,” in Stephan Reiner, Alexander Weissenburger, eds., Yemen at a crossroads, What remains of Arabia Felix?  (Vienna: National Defence Academy, 2024), pp. 90–91.

[4]  Quoted in Helen Lackner, Yemen in Crisis, Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope (London: Saqi Books, 2023), p. 188.