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Resistance and Culture



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Middle East Research & Information Project

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Notes on contributors: Ken Whittingham is writing a thesis on Egyptian theater; Guy Hennebelle writes regularly for *Afrique-Asie* on cinema, and has written a number of books on Third World cinema.

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
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CULTURE and



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INTRODUCTION

From the literary renaissance of the late nineteenth century to the politically engaged cinema of today, cultural development in the Middle East has been closely linked to political struggle. In this issue, we begin to explore the politics of culture, focussing especially on the two dramatic arts—cinema and theater. In future issues we will consider other elements of culture including literature, language, graphic arts, music and other oral traditions, as well as the interface between culture and ideology.

Guy Hennebelle's essay on Arab cinema gives us a sense of the partial awakening of this cultural form under the inspiration and shock of the great struggles of the day. Ken Whittingham's article on Egyptian theater complements Hennebelle's by providing a longer historical perspective on an older art form and a more detailed analysis of particular contemporary examples.

Two short pieces are included: Lofti Maherzi's essay contrasts with Hennebelle's by providing a critical view of Algerian cultural production. The interview with Palestinian film makers provides a sense of urgency to the political struggles in determining the content of their cinema art—a classic case of the tension between propaganda and art.

Arab Cinema

by Guy Hennebelle

In the piece that follows French film critic Guy Hennebelle provides a summary of the development of cinema in the Arab world. Extracted from a book on Third World cinema, this piece is necessarily schematic. Nonetheless it is an excellent overview of Arab cinematic history. In theoretical sections we are not able to include here, Hennebelle discusses the role of cinema in contemporary imperialism. The domination of production and distribution by American Hollywood companies parallels in the cultural-ideological sphere the imperialist hegemony of American capital.

Cinematic production in the Arab world, Hennebelle argues, has been held back by the traumatic effects of colonialism. One of the most lasting and pernicious results of colonialism was a rejection of Arab culture by the intellectuals. They became convinced that only an imitation of the culture of the colonizers would overcome national decline and backwardness. The result was a shallow and imitative cultural production.

Unable to propose an effective political response to colonialism, Arab film makers inclined to exaggerated Hollywood devices. They preyed upon the oppression felt by their audiences by offering escapism, catharsis and other types of emotional compensation. The dominant filmic form was the romantic, tear-jerking melodrama.

This situation, Hennebelle argues, was transformed by the great political turning points of contemporary Arab history: the Egyptian revolution of 1952, the defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967, the Palestinian resistance, and the Algerian liberation struggle.

The coup d'état of the Free Officers ushered in the Nasserite revolution in 1952. The decadent rule of a feudalism in the pay of English imperialism and incarnated by King Farouk was replaced by the rule of a nationalist bureaucratic bourgeoisie represented by the *Rais* (the President).

"The influence of the new regime showed itself very rapidly" wrote the critic Samir Farid in a remarkable study on "The six generations of Egyptian cinema."¹ The trend of 'social realism' foreshadowed by Kamal Selim in the 1940s, reappeared. It was developed in more and more films which were increasingly serious, notably in a series of films by Salah Abou Seif which began with *Master Hassan* in 1952. This film evoked class struggle among the population of Cairo through the

symbolism of a small bridge linking the popular quarter of Boulak to the residential quarter of Zamalek. The best-known of the other films of this series (which can be called neorealist) were *The Musclem* (1957) and *Beginning and End* (1960). The first unmasked the nature of capitalist power and denounced the way in which it was exercised in the marketplace, while the second is the best expression of the contradictions and crises of the Egyptian petit-bourgeoisie. This latter film was adapted from a novel by Naguib Mahfouz who also wrote the scenario of *The Musclem* and had a hand in other 'social realism' films by Salah Abou Seif. The 'social realism' current reached its height with Youssef Shahine's *Heaven of Hell* (1953) and Tewfik Salah's *Struggle of Heroes* (1962), which both dealt with the situation in villages under the yoke of feudalism, as well as Halim Barakat's *Song of the Curlew* (1959)—from a novel by Taha Hussein—which exposed "the immobilism of traditions in Upper Egypt."

The influence of the 1952 revolution extended into commercial productions but as Tewfik Salah notes:

If dance and song became less important, this was often to the advantage of melodrama. It can be said that in this period out of forty full length films a year there were at least thirty-six melodramas. Their presence was neither fortuitous nor their function innocent: they constituted an echo to the famous speeches of Gamal Abdel Nasser. All this was a result of an extremely clever policy! Perhaps the new government was sincere when it announced its desire to change the cinema, but it did such foolish things that the people, the public, did not change. . . .

'Egyptian neorealism' was distantly inspired by Italian neorealism* (compare the style of Barakat's *Sin* made in 1965 with that of de Sica's films), but it was not as coherent. The films it inspired were far fewer and real masterpieces were rare.

*In *Afrique-Asie*, no. 52, Salah Abou Seif expresses a different opinion: "I don't think that neorealism in Egypt was the fruit of Italian influence. In fact, this style was already begun in the film *The Wish* (Al Azima) which Kamal Selim made in 1939 and of which I was producer and assistant. In addition, I remember very well that Kamal Selim sold a certain Stolof the synopsis of a film which related the misadventures of a poor man who had lost a cow which was his only breadwinner. In my view it was this synopsis which formed the basis of the film *Bicycle Thief* that de Sica made in Italy in 1948. The cow was replaced by the bicycle, given the difference between Egypt and Italy. I could give other examples: it is clear that *La Sfida* of Francesco Rosi, made in 1958, was inspired by a scenario analogous to that of *The Musclem* which was shown at the Berlin Festival. The dramatic moments are the same, only the characters have been changed." In conclusion, Salah Abou Seif thinks that neorealism corresponds to a more general moment of cinema throughout the world.

The reason for this half-success and half-failure (however you like to look at it) are two: on the one hand, as Youssef Shalhine himself states,² the political formation of film makers left much to be desired; on the other hand, the regime was not disposed to tolerate a candid analysis of its social nature (most critical films took their subject from the time of Farouk).

During this period Tewfik Salah had the most advanced ideas and showed the most grim intransigence. In 1955, in *Street of Madmen* he tried to break radically with the archaic or rigid forms of traditional Egyptian cinema, but it was a total failure commercially. His example shows the difficulty of forming a political and artistic avant-garde when the regime thwarts efforts at a dialogue with the masses. Tewfik Salah's 1967 film *The Rebels* is a masterly fable baring the contradictions of Nasserism. He even foretold, with astonishing premonition, the defeat of 1967. In certain ways, this merciless film (which was unfortunately mutilated by the censor) is the equivalent at the level of fiction of *Hour of the Furnaces* (a film on Argentina and Peronism).

THE DEFEAT OF 1967

Under Nasser the Egyptian intelligentsia was for the most part sunk in populism, folklore and money making. To be radical, said Marx, is to get to the root of things. However, those who were in charge of the fate of Egyptian culture refused to see the arrival of "the night of counting the years," the essential meaning of the alternative title of Shadi Abdel Salam's *The Mummy*. For a long time they were reassured with evasions. But the night came brutally one June 5, 1967. Then with much beating of war drums, radios across the Arab world, from the Atlantic to the Gulf, from the Maghreb to the Mashrek boomed out: "This morning, Israel supported by American imperialism attacked the Arab nation." Alas, after the outbursts of rage and despite a leap in self-respect came the bellows of anguish and then the depression of humiliation. After the lies and the blusterings, came the stunned awakening.

This national drama led to an examination by the most sincere and informed intellectuals. They questioned, they analyzed. An Association of New Cinema (*Gama'at al cinema al gedida*) was formed around the *Review of Angry Young Men*. This current was sometimes also called 'chabab cinema' (*chabab* = young people). In 1968 this group of 40 to 400 film makers, technicians, critics and artists in general published a manifesto which laid out the orientations of the movement.

TOWARDS A 'CHABAB CINEMA'?

At the Damascus film festival in 1972 several representatives of *Gama'at al cinema al gedida* told me about their aims:

"The 1952 generation had its merits. It took risks and tried to give Egyptian cinema a new direction. But it was mistaken to act in an unorganized fashion. Everyone struggled on their own. The only thing they shared was . . . repression. As for us, we feel the need to work collectively. Compared with our elders, we are also more interested in the political factor. We know that we need to start with a correct analysis of the situation of our society. We are trying to define clear positions. With other groups we are posing the fundamental problem of American imperialism, essential support of Zionism. Out of these interpretations and this research was born what we call 'the 1968 manifesto.' There we denounce the hybrid character and absence of real personality in Egyptian cinema. We call for the emergence of a new cinema with deep roots in contemporary Egypt. It is necessary to establish a real dialogue within Egyptian culture in order to create new forms. Forms which will not be forever copied from foreign examples. We have for too long sought to imitate the West. Our position is a position of struggle founded on a series of refusals: a refusal of the former direction of Egyptian cinema, a refusal of old methods, a refusal of compromises. What we want is to reawaken the public and bring it to share our fight. To this end,

The Wish



we call on film makers for the present not to fall back on unnecessarily complicated forms of expression. It is not a position of principle but a tactical position based on the immediate circumstances in which we find ourselves.

"We have arrived at a position of combatting three erroneous tendencies in 'modernist' Egyptian cinema:

Gratuitous aestheticism: this is one of the forms of recuperation by the system. Certain people, such as Mamdouh Choukry in *The Illusions of Love* (1969) have made films which were beautiful but devoid of content. These films are built around an individual's drama through which the film maker describes Egyptian society and its failings: in fact the satire is superficial. Pretending to work at two levels, this type of cinema is ultimately neither truly social nor truly intimate.

Mediocrity of form: as opposed to art for art's sake which *in toto* is what the first tendency amounts to, another line has appeared which, under the pretext of attaching importance only to content, underestimates form. That is the mistake Shafik Shamia for example made in *An Affair of Honor*.

Prostitution of great themes: this third tendency is found in the film makers of the preceding generation in particular who tried to deal with Egypt's problems by treating them in a superficial manner. Their hidden intention was to convince the people that, ultimately, the defeat at the hands of Israel and the underdevelopment of the country were natural evils about which they could do nothing. Two films are typical of this deceitful method: *The Fear* by Said Marzouk and *Gossip on the Nile* by Hussein Kamal (which unfortunately was a great success: spoilt and frustrated, the public was easily satisfied by a false settling of accounts, and by pin-pricks of no real importance). These films serve as safety valves because they create only a partial awakening.

"To defeat the liquidation of the public sector (as much as possible) we proposed coproduction with the state. Two films appeared as a result of this: *Singing on the Road* by Ali Abdel Khalek and *Shadows on the Other Bank* by Ghaleb Chaas. At the level of principles we started with the view that form and content are dialectically linked. We believe that a new content determines equally new forms. However we can't define exactly this new aesthetic we are calling for in Arab cinema in general and Egyptian cinema in particular. It is only *a posteriori* that we can analyze the impact of a new content on form. What needs underlining is that our action is taking place within the context of a much larger awakening of consciousness in Egyptian society. We believe ourselves to be answerable to the people who deserve something better than the opium-cinema they have been intoxicated with up until now."

In 1974, Egyptian 'chabab cinema' was richer in potentiality than in actual results. The regime of Anwar Sadat has dismantled *Gama'at al cinema al gedida*. Its members were pre-occupied with two main themes: analyzing the causes of the June 1967 defeat, and the defense and depiction of the Palestinian cause. They did not please those in power. As a result efforts were made to limit the distribution of Ali Abdel Khalek's film *Singing on the Road* which showed a far-from-complacent Egypt before the third Arab-Israeli war. The film was makeshift at the aesthetic level but it at least had the merit of broaching this crucial problem of complacency. *The*



Singing on the Road

Dawn Visitor by Mamdouh Choukry, a somewhat oversubtle parable on the role of the police, was equally disliked by the authorities.

Youssef Shahine's *The Sparrow* makes a penetrating analysis of the way in which the Egyptian people were fooled in 1967 by the ruling class of feudal relics and bureaucrats from the state bourgeoisie. He was violently criticized by certain sections of the press who, as usual, accused him of being in the pay of foreigners.

The new Egyptian cinema remains dominated to this day by the solitary grandeur of Shaid Abdel Salam's masterpiece *The Mummy*. This spellbinding tale has the charming beauty of a popular story. It is an admirable work which for the first time analyzes the relation between Pharaonic civilization and Arab civilization, through historical anecdote. It is also a profound reflection on the destiny of a national culture too long buried in underdevelopment, as well as an invitation (not without some idealism for the author is not a Marxist) to a cultural revolution. This progressive interpretation is not, however, shared by all Egyptian critics.

Whatever the outcome of the fourth Arab-Israeli war of 1973 (a comedian called it "the best melodrama in Egyptian cinema"), it is doubtful whether the conditions for a cultural blooming will be present in Egypt for some time. However, it seems that the elements of an avant-garde exist. It would be surprising if they do not end up breaking taboos and restrictions.



THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE

The theme of the Palestinian resistance has obsessed Arab cinema since 1948. But the more than twenty Egyptian or Lebanese full-length films devoted to the subject are nearly all wretched as they were meant to be commercial successes.

Since 1967 and "the fortunate defeat" (an audacious expression of Anouar Abdel Malek in *La Pensee Arabe Contemporaine*), the Palestinian resistance has been disruptive in a positive way, a factor of hope, and a visible element in Arab cinema.

In 1967 in Syria, Tewfik Salah made *The Dupes*. It was adapted from a novel by Ghassan Kanafani, a spokesman of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) who was killed in 1972 when his boobytrapped car exploded in Beirut. Through the allegorical story of the attempt of three impoverished Palestinians to get into Kuwait, the false eldorado, it virulently denounces the betrayal of Arab governments and the inability of the leadership of the resistance to give the struggle a correct strategy. The book was written in 1965 when the Palestinian resistance appeared to be definitively destroyed, thus the film suffers from a certain political distortion, but it has, even today, great merit as a warning "for all

the people of the Third World in general," as Tewfik Salah notes.

Around 1968, on the other hand, groups such as Al Fateh, the PFLP, and the PDFLP began making short agit-prop films like those made by the Vietnamese NLF. There were several dozen of these.

In 1972 an Association of Palestinian Cinema was formed with the aim of bringing together film makers attached to one or another of the movements who until then had been working separately. It was inspired in particular by the film maker Mustapha Abu Ali and the critic Hassan Abu Ghanima. It proposed channeling the energies of all Arab film makers, Palestinian or not, who were working to depict the Palestinian cause.

This association published a manifesto which analyzed and denounced the mediocrity of Arab cinema:

The Arab cinema has for too long delighted in dealing with subjects having no connection to reality or dealing with it in a superficial manner. Based on stereotypes, this approach has created detestable habits among the Arab viewers for whom the cinema has become a kind of opium. It has led the public away from the real problems, dimming its lucidity and conscience.

At times throughout the history of Arab cinema, of course, there have been serious attempts to express

INTERVIEW WITH PALESTINIAN CINEMA ASSOCIATION

How do you see the role of cinema today?

When one observes the current situation of the cinema, one notices first that it is dominated by the American cinema which has imposed on the whole world its aesthetics, its genres and its heroes. In other countries as well, such as Italy, West Germany and France, one sees clearly that cinema is employed in servitude to the capitalist monopolies. And these are the cinemas that for the most part inundate Africa, Asia and Latin America with their production. Most of the Western films distributed in our countries have noxious effects because they generally exalt violence, crime, sex, etc. Progressive films exist but they are less numerous.

What do you see as the nature and tasks of revolutionary cinema today?

As regards the nature of revolutionary cinematic work, it could be a question of a film which responds to the immediate needs of the current situation or it could be a film which complies with a more long-range strategy. But in both cases the criterion must be its utility.

From another point of view, revolutionary cinema must meet four requirements:

—The justness of the inspiration—the film maker must obey the revolutionary ideology and devote himself to putting it into practice.

—The subject must be treated seriously—toward this end one must resolve to put an end to the traditional methods of Hollywood cinema and to substitute for them methods adapted to the needs of the people in struggle in order to express as accurately as possible their hopes and aspirations.

—The message must be transmitted correctly—the language must be simple, the aesthetic clear; one must refuse cinematic extravagances and stylistic pyrotechnics. Generally, one must avoid complications and strive for clarity so that the masses will understand the revolutionary content of the film. One must examine closely the question of the relation between the film and the masses, starting from the actual conception which people have of cinema in order to change it. Currently... the cinema in its totality exerts a negative influence. Why? Because it is considered as a pastime, even an opium, a drug. It is only with the exchanges between the masses and the film-makers that a new conception of cinema will be established.

—The mission of revolutionary cinema must above all be to treat the local and most crucial problems, dealing with the living reality in all its dimensions—political, social, economic and cultural. The description of this reality should also unveil the profound and fundamental causes of the ills from which the people suffer and clearly define and condemn those responsible. Finally, one must exhort the masses to change that which doesn't work.

In this perspective, revolutionary film-makers, whoever they are, must not forget that the main target must be the military, economic and cultural imperialism which enslaves and plunders Africa, Asia and Latin America. The ignorance, poverty and underdevelopment of these areas have their origins in the politics of imperialism.

It goes without saying that we are looking for contact with all foreign friends in order to discuss these problems and, together, to define a new type of cinema in all the countries of the world, but principally in the Third World which needs to liberate itself from the cultural enslavement of Western imperialism. We want a popular cinema in which the people find themselves in the process of making history.

Source: *Cineaste*, vol. 6, no. 3.

the reality of our world and its problematic, but they have been rapidly smothered by the supporters of reaction who fought ferociously against any emergence of a new cinema.

While recognizing the concern of those attempts, it should nevertheless be made clear that in terms of content they were usually poorly developed and on a formal level were always inadequate. It seemed one could never escape the cumbersome heritage of the conventional cinema.

The defeat of June '67, however, was a jarring experience and it raised some fundamental questions. There also appeared, at long last, young talents committed to creating a completely new cinema in the Arab world, film-makers convinced that a complete change must affect the form as well as the content.

These new films raise questions about the reasons for our defeat and take courageous stands in favor of the resistance. It is important, in fact, to develop a Palestinian cinema capable of supporting with dignity the struggle of our people, revealing the actual facts of our situation and describing the stages of our Arab and Palestinian struggle to liberate our land...

The Association of Palestinian Cinema, which was succeeded by Palestine Films in 1974, could be a determinant pole in the evolution of Arab cinema. By questioning the existence of Israel, the Palestinian issue is a fundamental dimension of the contemporary Arab world, as much from a political point of view as from a cultural point of view. It is the present symbol (just as the Algerian war was previously) of the uncertainties and anguishes of a hundred million Arabs, the inheritors of a civilization which at its height was one of the most advanced. Will they wipe out all the traces of aggression they have undergone during their long night of decadence, leave their seats where they watch, impotent, the representation of History, and become once again autonomous actors on the world scene? This is the question that is being raised by all artists, including film makers.

Lebanon Long burdened by the bad example of Egypt for years, Lebanese cinema (born in 1930) has been questioning the nature of its some 150 full length films. This questioning began with the aborted neorealist experiment of Georges Nasser's two films made in 1958: in *Toward the Unknown* and *The Little Stranger*. A young team of filmmakers denounced the cosmopolitanism and the comprador mentality of the Lebanese bourgeoisie. Borhan Alaouye, maker of a great and beautiful film on *Kafr Kassem* (a Palestinian village whose inhabitants were massacred by Zionists in 1956) declared: "It is the Palestinian struggle, avantgarde of the Arab liberation movement, that has led me to make committed films (*cinema engage*)." Christian Ghazi, director of a full length but little known film also devoted to Palestine, *A Hundred Faces For One Day*, expressed himself in a similar vein.

Syria In 1968 Syrian cinema took a positive turn under the prompting of Hamid Merai who as director of the state firm has produced films linked to problems of the Palestinian and Arab cause. In addition to Tewfik Salah's *The Dupes* mentioned above, he produced *Men in the Sun* by Nabile el Maleh, Marouane al Mouazene and Mohamed Chahine, *The Leopard* by Nabile el Maleh, *The Man* by Faycal Yasri, *To the Last Man*



Kafr Kassem

by Amine el Bounni, *El Yazerli* by Kaiss Zoubaidi, and in particular Omar Amiralay's *Everyday Life in a Syrian Village*, a virulent questioning of the Baathist regime by a Marxist film maker.

Iraq and Kuwait Iraqi cinema is still finding its way. Khalil Shawki attempted an uncertain neorealist experiment in 1966 with *The Night Watchman*. Tewfik Salah's teaching at the Cinema Institute in Baghdad will perhaps bear fruit in the future.

It was in Kuwait that young talent such as Khaled es Seddik emerged. *The Cruel Sea* (1971), the story of a pearl fisher, shows the living conditions of the inhabitants of this country before the discovery of petrol. The film has great quality despite an ideological perspective that is limited and even disputable.

The Arabian Peninsula In the south of the Arabian Peninsula the first Arab Marxist-Leninist national liberation movement has arisen: the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). Heiny Srour, a Lebanese film maker, went there in 1972 to make an hour long documentary called *The Hour of Liberation has Sounded*, which is the first Arab film to be guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology:

What interested me was the radical character of the PFLO's struggle, as radical as that of the Vietnamese. It seemed exemplary to me. As an Arab woman, I was excited by the fact that this revolution put forward the principle that there could be no true liberation for men without a conjoint and simultaneous liberation of women. My film is centered on two main points: the importance of a correct line for leading a successful national and social revolution, and the importance of the complete emancipation of women for that revolution to achieve its full meaning.

The quality of the film lies particularly in the fact that Heiny Srour was able to combine a very clear and coherent political didacticism with a human feeling that gave the work a remarkable tone and feeling.

THE MAGHREB

Algeria: National Liberation Struggle to Agrarian Revolution Although the Maghreb is different from the Mashrek, it is undoubtedly part of the same Arab world. In this region, Algeria is dominant in cinema because its socialist orientation facilitates the establishment of suitable structures.

It was the war of national liberation (lasting seven years with a million dead) which gave Algerian film makers the decisive ideological impetus. During the first stage which lasted ten years (from 1962 to 1972), they brought to the screen the most outstanding facts of the heroic deed of liberation during which the people sacrificed 10% of their population. 'War cinema' or *moudjahid* cinema has come prestigious titles: *Wind from the Aures* by Lakhdar-Hamina, *The Battle of Algiers* by Gillo Pontecorvo and produced by Yasef Saadi, *The Dawn of the Damned* by Ahmed Rachedi, *The Way* by Slim Riad, *Ten Years of Hell*, a collective work....

Moudjahid cinema indisputably gave to Algeria films of a quality rivaling international productions. Aesthetically, however, it was heteroclit. There is little originality in the *mise en scene*, which was strongly influenced by foreign examples. In particular, films often fell into the trap of imitating the western or adventure film (e.g., *Opium and the Stick* by Rachedi, *Night Fears the Sun* by Mustapha Baide, *The Outlaws* by Tewfik Fares, *December* by Lakhdar-Hamina).

In the shadows of this first generation there were other slightly younger film makers, who noted that the political analysis of certain films left a lot to be desired. They deplored the practice of big budgets and the absolute monopoly of the theme of the war of liberation. They wanted to make films on contemporary Algerian reality. They repeated that the conquest of national independence was not the end of the road, but that it was necessary to go forward to social and economic liberation.

Would the war film become a lullaby, like it has in certain East European countries?

Mostefa Lacheraf, a theoretician and author of the remarkable work, *Algeria, Nation and Society*, warned of this danger in 1970 at a colloquy in Tunisia:


Heroism in its individual and destructive conception and its frequently gratuitous and romantic finality is increasingly invading the Maghrebin literary (cinematographic) space. This tendency perpetuates an anachronistic nationalism which diverts people from new realities and the struggle necessary to transform society on a concrete basis. Its pseudo-patriotic exploitation is deliberately, or nearly so, a distraction with no end result proposed for intellectuals and workers by the new commercial and exploiting bourgeoisie.

The launching of the agrarian revolution on November 8, 1971, allowed Algerian cinema to enter a new phase: *djdid* (new) cinema. In January 1972 Algerian film makers working for Algerian television were asked to make films to depict the tenth anniversary of independence from French colonialism. Without any pressure from above, twenty of them made full length (16mm, black and white) on the same subject: the agrarian revolution.

Rarely have young film makers appeared with such coherence and force. The most characteristic films of this movement are: Mohamed Bouamari's *The Charcoal Burner*, Abdelaziz Tolbi's *Noua*, Moussa Haddad's *Under the Poplar*, Lamine

Merbah's *The Despoilers*, Djaffar Damardji's *Good Families*, el Hachemi Cherif's *The Rope*, and *The Dogs*, Mohamed Chouikh's *The Mouthpiece* and *The Lost*, Mohamed Ifticene's *Gorine* and *Diary of a Young Worker*, Farouk Beloufa's *War of Liberation*, Sid Ali Mazif's *Black Sweat*.

The new Algerian cinema is one of the best contemporary examples of 'agitational cinema.' The makers are less concerned with producing spectacle which is pleasant to watch but forgotten as soon as people leave the theater and more concerned with giving the spectators knowledge which will enable them to take part in the agrarian revolution as well as its equivalents in the industrial and cultural sphere. "Our role" says Abdelaziz Tolbi "is to go beyond events to hasten them along."



The Charcoal Burner

CINEMA WITH A HOLD ON REALITY

The films of *djdid* cinema have two characteristics:

—A reinterpretation of the war of national liberation. They obviously do not entirely jettison this theme. They continue to recall these facts from the past and to exalt the great sacrifices of the *chouhada* (martyrs), and to evoke different facets of the struggle. Independence is no longer considered an end in itself, but is shown as one step along a much longer road.

—A social analysis based, at least implicitly, on class struggle. All the films brand the feudalists as having collaborated with the occupier and as exploiters of the people. In addition, certain other films attack the bureaucratic phenomenon. Some films insist on the necessity to revolutionize the judicial system.

At the artistic level, *djdid* cinema shows enough similarities that it is possible to speak of a new 'school.' It is reminiscent of the great films of the golden age of Soviet cinema, although in general the authors prefer intimacy (for example, evoking the life of an individual in his immediate surroundings) to collective lyricism.

A CLOSED IDEOLOGICAL MESSAGE

The Golden Palm award at last year's Cannes Film Festival to Lakhdar-Hamina's *Chronicle of the Years of Ashes*, and this year's selection of S. Mazif's *The Nomads* for showing at the same festival, seems to indicate a revival of Algerian cinema.

In fact, this achievement—important as it may be—does not reflect the real state of Algerian cinema. We should treat its productions and their appropriation critically and with caution. Far from playing a mobilizing role and achieving the aim of cultural innovation, the films produced have been constantly obsessed with the war of liberation, big budgets, and a language borrowed from Hollywood. The product is put forward as a 'revolutionary mural' but in reality is intended to show a profit. Of course, there has been the revolt of the 'angry' young generation of *djdid* cinema. But we should remember that most of these films were made outside the normal channels of film production. They were full-length films made for Algerian television (hemmed in and with obligations) celebrating the second anniversary of the charter of the agrarian revolution.

The full-length films made today, unlike these latter fine and ephemeral productions, do not carry the same political and cultural meaning, although the subject of both women and agrarian revolution have been dealt with in two recent films (*The Nomads*; *Wind from the South*).

The crisis in film making is not specific to the cinema. It extends to the cultural and superstructural sectors. Most artists are aware of this cultural stagnation, even if certain of those in charge of these sectors continue to come out with the ritual self-satisfied praise.

After fifteen years of independence, Algeria is in an era of democracy and self-criticism. The extraordinary debate over the proposed National Charter has allowed Algerians to express vocally this malaise.

Their concern over the cultural and ideological void, over freedom of speech, the denunciation of corruption, bureaucracy and the mediocrity of works of art, invalidates the presumptions of those in charge of culture.

Many of those taking part in the debate have denounced the media for not fulfilling their original function. Programmes in the cinema are essentially undemanding and



Night Fears the Sun

The aesthetic choices are the following:

- The refusal of the neo-western and ostentatious spectacularization.

- The desire to make films from a personal point of view which also seek a dialogue with the largest possible audience.

- The refusal of populism and wretchedness, tendencies which often encapsulate the distorted tastes of a public influenced by bad western or Egyptian cinema. These dangers have not always been avoided.

- The desire to tell an authentic story directly related to the daily experience of the public.

- A clear desire for didacticism which obviously determines the form of the films. This didacticism is often combined with borrowings from the best of Italian neorealism.

- A more theoretical concern able to draw on national cultural traditions and release them from their folkloric matrix

and to give them the vigor they have lost because of decadence and colonialism.

- Modern montage and flexible writing.

- Seeing film not as a work closed in on itself but as the first element in the pursuit of aesthetic research and political analysis.

Djdid cinema has certain limits. It doubtless has certain faults. For example, numerous films only obliquely denounce the absence of the party (the NLF) in the agrarian revolution. The new bureaucratic bourgeoisie is rarely attacked with the ferocity found in *Good Families*. The aesthetic of the films often reflects these ideological hesitations.

Nonetheless *djdid* cinema is in large measure exemplary. It distinguishes itself from first or Hollywood cinema by refusing to exalt artificial heroes situated in the luxurious decors of the bourgeois way of life. It refuses to appeal to the worn

great spectacles, which are encouraged by the communes. Some workers in a cinema in Oran have asked why not "openly integrate the film industry with the Ministry of Finance?"

A similar view about television was expressed in the Algerian press: "The interminable serials and Lebanese, Egyptian and American films whose contents do not conceal their ideology, put the viewer to sleep."

.....
This controversial and democratic debate puts the finger on the origin of the malaise of Algerian culture. It shows the solution to the crisis is not in the conceptual, organizational or linguistic area, but at the level of doctrine and ideology.

As long as a narrow and frozen nationalism dominates ideological discourse and as long as class collaboration exists, and the party is lacking, culture will inevitably be a closed ideological message, separated from contemporary Algerian reality.

Cinema, theater, television, books, the elements of culture, will continue to perpetuate the constant and repeated themes of heroism and the past. These themes have become

sacred ideas reflecting a self-satisfaction exempt from contradiction.

The facts of history tell us something else. Algerian nationalism united against colonial domination and still has its contradictions and betrayals. Reflecting on these anti-monies would bring new and fruitful ideas to the 'ideological extension' talked about in the draft of the National Charter. We are sure this would establish the premises of a cultural revolution. This alone will allow a more conscious and critical commitment of Algerians to socialism. This commitment will make them citizens who are convinced enough to cast their 'vote' for a revolutionary democracy, not just consuming and passive objects.

For artistic creation, for a blossoming of culture, for socialist democracy we will paraphrase someone from Blida: "The democracy which exists in Algeria today must be extended to the life of the nation and become the major characteristic of socialist society."


Source—Excerpts from an article by Lofti Maherzi which appeared in *Le Monde* August 26, 1976. Lofti Maherzi is writing a thesis on Algerian cinema.

out ideas of a spectacular *mise en scene* which tells stories which have nothing to do with popular reality. It distinguishes itself from second cinema by its refusal to practice an 'auteurist cinema' as in western cinema, where the personal phantasms of the maker conceived as a little genius put on earth by heaven generally take precedence over a message with a more collective value. It also distinguishes itself by its refusal to devote miles of film to harping on the 'existential spleen' and the delicious unrest of intellectuals who delight in the *mise en scene* of their subtle upheavals and the void in their soul.

For all these reasons I would place *djdid* cinema in the avantgarde of new contemporary cinemas. Unfortunately, after a propitious start, it seems to be marking time. In an article in *Ecran 74*, no. 30, the Algerian critic Mohand Ben Salama even questions the chances of its surviving.

TUNISIA AND MOROCCO: GROPINGS

The other Maghrebin cinemas are behind Algerian cinema. Tunisia has seen the appearance of a dozen film makers. Since the first full length film *Dawn* made in 1965, there have been two tendencies: the first, represented by Omar Khelifi and Ahmed Khechine and others can be called *populist*. It is characterized by forms of expression destined to please a public conditioned by western and Egyptian cinema. The second, *intellectualist*, is the work of film makers such as Sadok Ben Aicha, Abdellatif Ben Ammar, Ferid Boughhedir, Rachid Ferchou, who evoke problems particular to a cultivated and cultured bourgeoisie (mixed marriage, for example). 1972 saw a relative movement beyond this false alternative: several film makers from the two tendencies understood the limits of the forms they initially chose. Their themes came closer to the real aspirations of the people: the situation of women in Khelifi's *Picnic*, the exodus from the countryside in Brahim Babai's *And Tomorrow* or Taieb Louchichi's *My Village, A Village Among So Many Others*. It was also the year that Ridna Beni exploded a bomb called *Forbidden Thresholds*: this short film denounces equally the sexual frustration of the



Forbidden Thresholds

young and the alienation of the country; it troubled many consciences and censors.

1974 saw the second full-length film of Abdellatif Ammar, *Sejnane*, a very rigorous film. Through the story of the awakening of consciousness of anti-colonialism in a schoolboy in 1952 it subtly questions some aspects of the present regime. Perhaps this swallow announces the coming of a new Tunisian cinema.

Moroccan cinema has not yet freed itself from the iron collar of feudalism which weighs down on the country. The first three films were failures. The fourth, Hamid Benani's *Wechma*, revealed a film maker with a very competent talent which draws on the depths of Arab-Islamic culture. His denunciation of its reactionary components sometimes makes people think, although in a very different cultural context, of Bunuel. This masterpiece was followed by a violent lampoon by Souhel Ben Barka, *A Thousand and One Hands*, which with less depth but more evidence, less austerity but more noise, denounces the social structure of a country. . . where a thousand hands work for the exclusive benefit of one.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Ecran 73 no. 15; cf Positif no. 151

² L'Afrique litteraire et artistique nos. 8 and 15; Cinema 3 no. 3

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Egyptian Drama

by Ken Whittingham

Drama has been an important part of contemporary Arabic culture since the 1950s. As each Arab country, beginning with Egypt in the 1950s, has found a real measure of independence from colonial domination, it has given increasing attention to promoting national culture. Drama has attracted more attention than any other artistic genre with the possible exception of cinema. Yet it has often been suggested by academics, both Arab and European, that Arabic drama is technically weak and unable to fulfill a serious cultural role in the Arab world. By examining the process of development of Egyptian drama, which has been the forerunner of the Arabic theatre movement, I hope to demonstrate the extent to which drama has become integrated into the national culture and has an important role to play in a newly awakened cultural environment.


There was no theatre in the Arab world before the nineteenth century. It was introduced as a result of increased contact between the Middle East and the West, and came almost as a spin-off from the search for modern European technology initiated by Muhammad Ali. The form has been borrowed from European culture, and was not inherent to any of the previously dominant forms of Arabic cultural expression. This has often been interpreted as an essential weakness. Some dramatists and critics have expended considerable energy in a futile attempt to prove that the dramatic structures they employ developed from local folk arts. Cross-fertilization of cultural forms is a logical result of contact between different societies. Many of the forms of modern European culture have been influenced by non-European sources. The crucial factor is not that the drama as a form is borrowed, but how it is used in the Arab context.

Although the first attempt to introduce drama to the Arab world in 1847 by a Beirut intellectual, Marun al-Naqqash coincided with the increase in colonialist activity in the area, its relationship to the local reaction to colonialism was more important. The decline of Ottoman control had marked the emergence of a new national consciousness; an awareness of the potential of a united Arab world to resist alien domination. This consciousness provided the motivation for the revival of Arabic literary production. Intellectuals sought new means of expression suitable for a modernizing society. Journalism took advantage of the introduction of the printing

press to provide a growing literate audience with new ideas. Drama was seen by its promoters as another important vehicle. Al-Naqqash had observed how European drama concentrates on exposing the flaws in society, and felt that this critical use of art, lacking in his own society, could be of great benefit. Europeanized by education and by his own commercial links with Europe, and faced by a lack of knowledge of the fundamental techniques of drama, it was not to be expected that he and his successors should have achieved more than an imitation of what they had observed in European capitals. Al-Naqqash's experiment did not carry more than a vague hint of the new nationalism. The second innovative experiment by Abu Khalil al Qabbani in Damascus in a decade spanning the 1860s and 1870s was more explicitly nationalist. While again rudimentary in form, Qabbani's plays were distinctly Arab in content, many of them based on stories and legends from Arab history. More importantly, his activity coincided with a constant struggle taking place in Damascus between local reformers seeking independence from Ottoman domination, and reactionary forces supporting the *status quo*. This struggle, exacerbated by French attempts to seize control of Syria, led to Ottoman massacres of the Muslim population. Nationalism in these circumstances was inevitably a more vital force than the earlier intellectual movement in Beirut. Qabbani's theatre was very much involved in the struggle, since it flourished under the more liberal of the rapid succession of Governors. It was eventually banned, ostensibly on religious grounds, by order of the Ottoman Sultan.

The first short-lived Egyptian experiment occurred at the same time, but independently of the Damascus experiment. Ya'qub Sannua, a strongly nationalist journalist, produced a number of short social satires, loosely modelled on Moliere and Goldoni. The Khedive was initially amused at this local attempt to imitate the European culture which flourished in the Egyptian court. But when he realized that the plays were more than mere entertainment, the experiment was abruptly stopped and Sannua exiled.

Because of severe repression which led many artists and intellectuals to leave Syria and Lebanon at the end of the nineteenth century, all significant development thereafter, until recently, took place in Egypt, which offered marginally better opportunities and freedom. The two immigrant theatre



DRAMA AND THE 1919 REVOLUTION

movements in Egypt created two quite different trends as a result of their different origins. There was no Egyptian involvement until intellectuals became seriously involved in the nationalist movement at the turn of the century. The Syrians were not involved in Egyptian political movements, and consequently their theatrical activities became pure commercial enterprises. The Beirut movement offered Arabic translations of European "high culture"—Shakespeare, Corneille, Racine, etc. This was welcomed by the Europeanized social elite. Qabbani's theatre developed the musical, in which the play is only a vehicle for the star singer.

The commercial trend established by the Syrian companies was to become a permanent feature of Cairo cultural life, heavily exploited by liberal elements in the nascent capitalist class until the cinema was available as a more profitable enterprise in the 1930s. The initial political motivation was lost, and the commercial theatres stood largely opposed to any re-introduction of committed drama. In the Egyptian phase beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, all developments in drama have to be seen in the context of struggle against the anaesthetic of commercially profitable entertainment.

The struggle for committed art against commercial entertainment is of great importance in the context of political struggle. Commercial entertainment is usually escapist, diverting the audience from their cares and worries by presenting fantasies of an unachievable spectacular world. As such it can clearly be a useful weapon in stifling discontent among its middle class audiences. The lower middle class is extremely important to movements in a country like Egypt. In addition, theatre is by definition a public art form. Where a potential reading public is small, and publishing opportunities limited, theatre gives the writer a much larger potential audience. For the committed artist this allows the transfer of ideas in a group context, where the communal effect of political agitation is likely to be greater than at an individual level. At the state level, theatre can be used as a showcase, internationally. For these reasons I am starting with a more detailed consideration of the development of Arabic drama beginning at the turn of the century so that the political ramifications of current interest in the drama can be understood in a historical context.

When the nationalist movement led to the uprising of 1881-2 the Syrian-led theatre simply closed down until the uprising was defeated. But the British military invasion which ended the rebellion gave a new impetus to the nationalist movement. Young intellectuals joined the movement and there was a general awareness on the part of leading figures of the role that cultural factors could play in raising consciousness. Theatre, which was increasingly dependent on Egyptian performers from the end of the nineteenth century, received special attention. Egyptian nationalist leaders Abdullah il Nadim, Mustafa Kamil and Muhammed Farid were all drawn to the possibility of a committed theatre. Inevitably their efforts as dramatists were rudimentary. In the years leading up to the 1919 revolution a number of young writers tried their hand at drama. Although there were no major achievements, original writing was posed as a credible alternative to translation and adaptation..

The techniques of dramatic writing were not as yet sufficiently understood for the *content* of performances to be of great importance in the nationalist movement, but the actual *event* of a performance was extremely important. In the early years of the twentieth century, numerous small groups in Cairo and Alexandria performed plays of distinctly nationalist sentiment, drawn either from French or Turkish sources. The performance was used as a political rally with political speeches being made in the intervals.

Much of this activity came to an end with the outbreak of the First World War, which was an excuse for the imposition of strict censorship. But after the war, and especially after the bloody repression of the 1919 revolution, the committed elements in the theatre continued on the same road. The most famous result of the continuing search to express nationalism on the stage came in 1920 with the production of *Al Ashara al Taysiba* (The Good Ten), adapted from an obscure French play by Muhammad Taymur. The music was written by Sayyid Darwish, who had become Egypt's most popular singer, especially with his anti-British songs and songs based on everyday life. The work is significant in the development of Egyptian drama because Darwish was able to make the musical score an integrated part of the dramatic structure for the first time.

Darwish's compositions allowed the words of the song equal importance with the melody, a departure from the normal practice. Unfortunately, the two young artists both died shortly after this production, and their experiments were not continued.

In the early 1920s a new major company was set up by Yusif Wahbi. His Ramses troupe began by presenting nationalist inspired works of young writers, in competition with the classical trend and the increasingly popular light comedy theatre of Neguib al Rihani. But the gradual entrenchment of the Egyptian aristocracy and the nascent capitalist class who had risen to power on the popular movement of 1919 pushed the theatre once more into commercialism and isolation from the real currents in Egyptian society.

POLITICAL COMPROMISE AND INTELLECTUAL LIBERALISM

It is ironic that the first major steps in the creation of dramatic literature were taken at a period when the theatre as an art form was isolated from the real problems facing the society. Symbolic of this isolation was the setting up in 1935 of a national theatre which was to perform only works in classical Arabic and of high literary merit. This isolation had an important effect on the kind of literature produced. As the political elite, beneficiaries of the popular movement, began to distance themselves from that movement, they inevitably drew with them the literary establishment, which retreated into a defense of high culture designed for an elite.

This attempt at rarification of literary culture operated in two ways. It took the form of insistence on the highly stylized classical language as the only suitable vehicle for literary production. An Academy of the Arabic Language was set up, and the National Theatre Company established. Use of the vernacular language was received with open hostility by the establishment as was any experiment with that most sacred of classical Arabic art forms—poetry. Bairam al Tunisi, pioneer of popular verse, and the romantic poets searching for new forms to express a new reality, found themselves under constant harassment. Bairam al Tunisi was exiled.

The second aspect of this rarification was the desire for rapprochement with European culture, a part of the liberal make-up of such literary leaders as Taha Husayn. What they were seeking, consciously or otherwise, was the adoption of certain art forms stripped of their European social connotations, which they could fuse with an anachronistic vehicle of expression, the classical language. Semi-autobiographical and diaristic novels appeared, frequently set in the countryside, describing the abject poverty of the peasants. But they drew a romantic veil over reality, rather than becoming involved in it. Theatre was conceived in even more refined terms than the novel. It was an ethereal haven of civilization. It is in this context that the first "literary" texts of Arabic drama were produced by such writers as Ahmad Shawqi and Tawfiq al Hakim. Ahmad Shawqi and Tawfiq al Hakim had been involved in the theatre movement before they turned to dramatic literature. Both turned to writing dramatic texts with serious literary intent after studying in Paris. Shawqi was the poet of the establishment. He wrote five verse tragedies and one social comedy between 1927 and his death in 1932. Ironically the

only play which met with any great enthusiasm at the box office was the social comedy. His tragedies were not successful plays, although they did contain some good lines of verse. Given the ideological and political situation he was writing in, Shawqi was obliged to write in classical Arabic. The meters of classical Arabic poetry are not the rhythms of natural speech and do not easily meet with the demands of performance. While his plays sang the glory of Egypt as a historical entity and the ability of the people to survive under all difficulties, he used periods of defeat for the Egyptians at the hands of foreigners as subject matter. In view of the rather hollow independence that the former nationalist leadership had accepted from the British, Shawqi's plays seemed to be a call for submission with honor, which did not reflect the mood of the population aside from the elite.

Tawfiq al Hakim's work requires closer attention. He is recognized as the pioneer and father-figure of Arabic dramatic literature. He is probably the only Arab playwright to have achieved any kind of international recognition largely because little academic attention has been paid to his younger contemporaries. He is a curiously ambiguous figure, whether assessed by his plays or his many other writings. Every new work he publishes arouses furious debate, usually at the political rather than the literary level.



Tawfiq al Hakim

Any writer in Egypt is subject to hasty condemnation as an adherent of the right or left of the political spectrum, whatever his real views. Al Hakim is unusual in that he has been placed firmly in *both camps* by critics of similar ideological persuasion. He has also been accused of isolating himself in an "ivory tower." Following the failure of his first major play, *The Cave People*, which opened the first National Theatre Company season in 1935, he turned his back on drama as a performed art, and devoted himself to writing plays for a reading public. He ostensibly believed that the performers were not capable of dealing with a literary text, and that therefore the literary standard of Arabic drama could only be

through the printed word, not the performance. Although al Hakim blamed the performers for his failure, there are other reasons for his tendency toward the printed word.

The Cave People is based on a Koranic source. Two Christian ministers and a shepherd hide in a cave fleeing the pogroms of a pagan emperor. When they awake they think only one night has passed but soon discover 300 years have passed and the country is Christian. They find they do not belong in this new world they had dreamed of, and they go back to the cave to die. The play is a philosophical discussion on the nature of time and history, resurrection, eternity, etc. It was presented to an audience accustomed either to farce or melodrama, while this play is static. The idea that these men fled from oppression and then fled from the new society as well seems like cowardice, a retreat from reality justified by neat philosophical platitudes. Many of his major plays deal with similar philosophical themes at a safe intellectual distance. His characters are always engaged in delicate balancing acts, often seeming to be on the brink of taking decisive action, but usually retreating to safety behind philosophical generalities. The content of al Hakim's plays reflects his own position as a dramatist and writer; a position which prevented him playing the active role he aspired to in developing Arabic theatre.

Given the attitude of the literary establishment, without whose support the writer's opportunities were severely limited, al Hakim with his self-confessed aim of providing Arab theatre with a literary basis, had the alternative of compromising his artistic role to satisfy the demands of the ruling elite; or he could remain in oblivion until a radical change took place in society. Al Hakim chose compromise. The first stricture this entailed was the use of the classical language, which al Hakim used until he "invented" a "third language," a kind of "Arabic Esperanto" in 1954. This limited the possibility of success on the stage. The extent to which he compromised with the establishment is shown by the fact that al Hakim's liveliest piece of writing *The Diary of a County Prosecutor* is in colloquial Egyptian.

The second stricture was an inevitable caution on the artistic level. There is no reason to doubt al Hakim's sincerity as a believer in the nationalist cause. But with the volte-face of the ruling elite in favor of the colonialist forces, he could not have written plays attacking the corrupt regimes, while seeking to maintain a position in the literary establishment. While other writers such as Taha Husayn and al Aqqad retreated into a defense of art for art's sake, al Hakim transferred an undoubted concern with real social questions to an obscure plane, couched in a language and symbols which were only partly understood and frequently misinterpreted. Hence al Hakim's ambiguity.

It is significant that a recurrent theme in al Hakim's work is the question of the commitment of artists. This is at its clearest in his play *Pygmalion*. Although he rejects the aesthete's position, he fails to accept total commitment to life and society. This tendency to adopt vague philosophical positions has allowed al Hakim the room to manoeuvre and compromise with succeeding changes in the ruling political and ideological structure. The fact that he began his writing career in such a difficult political period in Egypt's modern history has negated the potential of one of the Arab world's best dramatic talents. Al Hakim's inability to develop his own dramatic writing beyond a "scholastic exercise" has led Western scholars to believe that there is no successful Arabic drama.



THE 1952 REVOLUTION

As Egypt staggered from crisis to crisis through the 1930s and 1940s, officially acceptable cultural production remained blissfully removed from the turmoil. By the time the Free Officers' coup came to absorb the energies of the opposition forces in 1952, that nationalist opposition was no longer the vague amorphous entity of the past. It had divided into distinctive movements with clear ideological positions. The increasing tensions in the society, although unable to destroy the literary establishment, were having an effect on the theatrical profession. In the state theatre troupes the younger generation of trained actors were in serious conflict with the self-taught stars of the old melodramatic school. The new generation were looking for a higher level of technical skill, and a greater degree of relevance to society in the kind of material presented.

Between the mid-1950s and 1970 Egyptian theatre and Egyptian dramatic literature had its golden age, playing an active part in the whole process of political and social debate. In that short period well over a hundred plays were written and performed, and a dozen writers emerged as competent dramatists. Clearly such a large output varied enormously in standard and in style. For the most part plays dealt with themes of immediate social relevance, from national liberation (Palestine and the war with Israel) through internal class struggle, to methods of government (typically represented as a good Sultan, i.e., Abdul Nasser, surrounded by bad ministers, i.e., the security services, corrupt ministers, etc.). Styles have ranged from socialist realism (Nu'man Ashur) to theatre of the absurd (Shawki abd al Hakim). Some works are clearly outstanding and there is sufficient evidence in the works to refute the charges that are constantly being made—that the Arab world has no theatre, and the "young writers can continue to make

carbon copies of universal masterpieces, but they will never produce anything but pale imitations devoid of soul and substance."²

This attitude has made it possible for Arabic drama, which absorbs a great deal of energy and attention in the Arab world, to be totally ignored in the West. These assertions can be shown to be false by examining some of the forms of drama, and some of the writers, from post-1952 Egypt. It should be remembered that there had been no successful dramatic literature prior to the 1950s. So the first step taken by writers such as Nu'man Ashur and Yusif Idris was to sweep away the fantasy of "high culture" theatre and bring everyday life onto the stage. For the first time workers and peasants were depicted with understanding and respect instead of contempt and buffonery. Many plays of the late 1950s and early 1960s followed this pattern by depicting the effect of pre-revolutionary society on the lower classes. It was not until the 1960s that the search for new styles that could be a useful form of artistic expression began in earnest.

THE ABSENCE OF TRAGEDY

To those nurtured on Western theatrical tradition, tragedy is the highest form of drama. But tragic literature and drama does not exist in the Arab world despite its traumatic history. The literary establishment of the 1930s and 1940s were content to translate European tragedy. But even after the revolution, Luis Awad and other writers and artists felt that the vacuum had to be filled, ignoring the fact that tragedy requires a specific ideology which relates to particular socio-economic formations which largely disappeared with the decline of the aristocracy in Europe, and never existed in the Arab world. Modern Arabic drama is no more likely to produce grand tragedy than is English contemporary drama. But Luis Awad set himself the task of writing a tragedy, and so did poet-dramatist Abd al Rahman al Sharqawi.

Al Sharqawi in each of his five major plays aims at producing a tragic hero. Each time he has failed, although the plays are still successful and interesting in other ways. The basis of his failure lies in his subject matter. Like most of his contemporaries, his main theme is resistance and revolution, themes which can be treated at many levels. Looking for suitable tragic revolutionary material he turned to the Algerian war of liberation (*The Tragedy of Jamila*), a national popular struggle against the Mamelukes of Egypt in the Middle Ages (*The Outlaw*), the massacre of Hussein ibn Ali and his followers (*The Revenge of God*), etc. In accordance with a revolutionary content, his heroes come from the oppressed classes in most cases (Jasir—a working class cadre; Mahran—peasant turned Robin Hood-style outlaw). But revolutionary logic and the logic from which tragedy is born are entirely different. Revolution depends on the community, not the individual, and on the struggle to change society in order to remove oppression. Tragedy on the other hand derives from a situation in which the maintenance of society is believed to depend on acceptance of and acquiescence to an externally imposed social order. The tragic hero is doomed because of the social necessity of expiating a violation committed unwittingly. The individual is cast aside to preserve the community even though he

is a superman—the face that he is a king or a demi-god reinforces the ideological message.

But if the tragic concept arises out of defense of the community, where is the difference in the revolutionary concept? The revolutionary hero is not a superman, he is an ordinary mortal whose strength comes from his belief in justice and freedom; the revolutionary is part of a community in struggle. The revolution does not sacrifice its members, great or small, to appease the enemy; there is no need for expiation. Either the revolutionary gives his life in the struggle, which is quite the reverse of tragic, or else he loses everything by abandoning the principles he has fought for; again it is not a cathartic situation. Al Sharqawi's plays constantly face this contradiction, and the result is a lack of dramatic impact.

In *The Tragedy of Jamila* the tragic figure is really Jasir, the revolutionary cell leader, not the young woman Jamila of the title who is no more than a patriotic heroine. Jasir is captured by the French in a reckless and futile individualistic attempt to rescue the girl. Throughout the play this cadre is preaching the need for selflessness and commitment to collective responsibility. Yet he sacrifices himself because he falls in love with a young recruit. The action contradicts the logic of the play. Similarly in *The Outlaw Mahran* the hero dies after apparently compromising with the enemy and alienating himself from the real base of the struggle, the poor peasants, and seems to have earned his death by betraying the cause.

Ahmad Sawqi, Tawfiq al Hakim and Abd al Rahman al Sharqawi all failed to produce a tragic hero, not because of any lack of skill, but because the conceptual framework from which they developed their dramatic structures could not allow the possibility of tragedy. However much they imitated European classical tragedy, the essential underlying feeling was absent. The absence of tragedy from Arabic drama is logical, whereas its presence would be hard to explain. And its absence is not reflection on the success or failure of Arab drama in general.

COMEDY

While tragedy developed from religious models in Europe, comedy is more diverse in origin and development. In most of its present-day literary forms it is built on popular models which emerged historically when "high culture" and "popular culture" became autonomous entities. It is not surprising that comedy has gained far more popularity in the Arab world; tragedy is not so much entertaining as morally uplifting. Comedy is a more direct way of momentarily easing the pressures of life. It demands from the audience a response to grotesque, abnormal behavior, and nothing more. But to take the art of the comedian or clown, and build on it a systematic and thoughtful criticism of society, transcending the clever contrivances of a well made farce, is no easy task.

Several writers have tried to use the comedy genre for serious ends, with varying degrees of success. Nu'man Ashur, pioneer of the new theatre, has consistently employed realist situational comedy using sketchily drawn characters to portray the stock attitudes of different social classes. After his early successful plays which attacked the aristocracy as the source of injustice, and proclaimed optimism for an undefined road to the future, his plays tended to portray a disillusioned cynicism with the entire "new" society. The cynicism became too heavy for the comedy to bear.

²Abdullah Laroui, *L'ideologie Arabe Contemporaine*, Maspero, Paris: 1970.

In Ali Salem's plays situations and actions take priority over characterization. Imaginative plots and deft, witty dialogue gave Ali Salem considerable box-office success, but his plays are more than just entertainment. Each play is a merciless attack on a political or social target, so thinly disguised that the author has had frequent problems with the censors. Ridicule is a powerful weapon, and Salem handles it well, although the political immediacy of his plays give them a short life. An example of this is his play *Oedipus*.

Although the author explains the connection between his play and the Greek myth in a long preface to the published edition, there is no apparent connection. An ancient Egyptian town is besieged by a monster, which kills anyone entering or leaving the town. The siege will only end when someone answers a riddle set by the monster. Oedipus apparently does so, and becomes king, and immediately fills the city with technology, but in order to protect his achievements has to employ repressive methods. Eventually the monster returns, and we find that Oedipus had not answered the question: he wanders off in the dark to learn the answer.

The allegory works on many levels. The central issue is the liberation of the people from oppression. But when the liberator begins to use oppression to defend the changes he has introduced, the monster of oppression returns. Ali Salem's message is that the people must free themselves, and not depend on an individual (Nasser). The play was performed in 1970 shortly before Nasser's death.

The play is no literary masterpiece, and shows some weakness in sustaining the balance between humor and the more serious undertone through three acts. In fact most of Ali Salem's works decline after the first act. But it was successful in performance and has proved beyond all doubt that comedy is a useful and workable form.

FROM THE GENERAL TO THE SPECIFIC

While many of the writers dealt with general social and political questions through a group of characters representing the broad span of society, it is the writers who tried to study the society through the individual who have developed Arabic drama to a higher level of sensitivity. In the works of Mahmud Diyab, Mikha'il Ruman, and above all Alfred Farag, we are made aware not only of the obvious conflicts in the society, but of the underlying tensions and currents. The works of these writers, even when they use European models, are not pale imitations of European classics, but evidence of Arabic drama reaching maturity.

Mikha'il Ruman's first play *Smoke* was performed in the 1962-63 season provoking a furious debate among critics. Luis Awad began his review in *Al Ahram*: "There's something called *Smoke* in the National Theatre" and went on to say how disgraceful it was that a play about a drug addict should sully the stage where great works of art had been presented. Others hailed it as a great first play. Perhaps the problem was that rather than use crude and obvious symbols to represent reality, Ruman used the entire structure of the play. Hamdi, the drug addict, is in a state of social and moral paralysis, unable to act in any constructive way against the things that oppress him represented by drugs, the pusher, etc. His great discovery which allows his resurrection is that those who seem to be intent on helping him (friends, relatives) are the very ones who encourage his addiction and dependence on them.

Man is rendered ineffective and loses his humanity, his faith and sense of purpose, corrupted by the pleasures and the routines of life. If in *Smoke* it is a question of shaking off opium addiction, the message is even clearer in Ruman's interesting experiment in form *The Night Guevara Died*. Those who imagine they can escape responsibility by sitting in a bar drinking whisky, should know they are as guilty as the executioner whom they assist with their apathy and silence.

Ruman began writing plays in his mid-forties, and for much of the time was suffering from a terminal disease. His plays doubtless grew partially out of his own personal situation, but they carry wider social concern with a burning passion and urgency which has been rare in Egyptian drama.

Mahmud Diyab, like Mikha'il Ruman, makes no attempt to conceal his own experience in his plays. Again we find the individual under attack, besieged, but this time the plays are largely set in the village rather than the city. The enemy is not the suffocating opiates of ritual existence leading to apathy, as in Ruman. Here fear lies at the heart of the problem. People who are afraid will conspire against truth and innocence in order to protect themselves. Such fear is easily disseminated among illiterate people who have no chance of education. This leads us to the second main theme in Diyab's work, which is the attempt of the wielders of power to keep knowledge from the masses. Myth and rumor are more readily manipulated than the truth. In *The Book of Conquests* Osama, a revolutionary armed not with a sword but a book of knowledge, is trying to reach Sallah ad Din so that he may learn from the book and rule wisely. A circle of tyrants surrounds the ruler, desperate to destroy the threat of knowledge. But even though all copies of the book are burnt and Osama's disciples captured, a clerk has memorized the book and will transmit it. The play uses a dual time structure, placing the events in the past and discussing the events in the present. The play has been banned in Egypt, although it is performed in Baghdad, Damascus and Algiers.

Mahmud Diyab's ability to develop the structure of a play from the content makes his work fascinating technically as well as ideologically. But it is in a one act play *The Strangers Don't Drink Coffee* that all his ideas come together most neatly in an imaginative presentation of the plight of the Palestinian people. A friendly old man reads his horoscope: "You'll meet an old friend. . . a fair deal. . . Divine providence is with you." But the old man does not have any old friends. Perhaps, he muses, the signs have got confused: Pisces (a whale in Arabic) might have been put in Aries' (Lamb) place by mistake. As the play proceeds one, then two, then six masked strangers confront him, measure his house, ignoring him, except to reject his hospitality, saying "We don't drink coffee." They tear up every piece of documentary evidence of his existence, from his birth certificate to his title deeds, and leave laughing. But the old man knows that they cannot remove the traces of his childhood in the house—he cables his sons to return from Europe carrying a gun. The play is cold, harsh and full of tension, and the actions of the strangers no doubt raise other specters in the minds of the Egyptian audience, even closer to their own experience.

The Palestine issue understandably looms large in modern Arabic literature, and the theatre is no exception. In the aftermath of the June 1967 disaster, and more particularly with the rapid growth of the Palestine Liberation Movement, most Egyptian dramatists gave some attention to the problem. Sa'd

ad Din Wahba tried to expose the reasons for Egypt's defeat in his play (*7 Commandos*) while al Sharqawi and the Lebanese author Suhail Idris wrote in praise of the fortitude of the guerrilla units and martyrs. Alfred Farag, the last but perhaps most accomplished of this trio of leading dramatists, found himself faced with a dilemma: how could he convey the whole question to the audience, rather than concentrating on the heroic exploits of an individual? He found his solution by creating the first political revue in Arabic drama—a melee of song, dance, and rapid sketches, in which the author attempts to put before the audience the historical and ideological dimensions of the Palestine question.

It is this ability to experiment with very different types of dramatic structures and to use them successfully which has made Alfred Farag an outstanding figure in modern Arabic drama. He has produced literary texts built firmly on principles of dramatic performance, ranging from historical drama to fantastic comedy based on the *Thousand and One Nights*, to political revue, etc. He is sometimes described as the "thinking man's playwright," and in a sense the description is accurate in that his plays are thought provoking. But while his plays sometimes deal with abstract problems, every play poses simple questions in dramatic rather than intellectual terms, unlike the philosophical plays of Tawfiq al Hakim. A situation of patent social injustice exists, the sensitive individual will seek to redress the wrong, but can only decide on a course of action after understanding the truth of the situation. However the individual alone cannot create the change without support from the mass of the people, he/she can only sacrifice himself/herself to the cause of truth and freedom. Through varied imaginative workings of this theme Farag is able to expose numerous social problems and evils and to question the role and responsibility of the progressive member of society. In this way he is genuinely fulfilling the role of the artist within the community, as is demonstrated by his attitude to the treatment of women in Egyptian society.

Farag's concern for the low status, and indeed waste of the human resources of half the population emerged in his early work. In a patriotic play, written for performance during the tripartite aggression of 1956 (*The Voice of Egypt*) the following exchange occurs:

- Sa'd: People who fight follow orders. It's wrong to disobey orders...and you're a girl!
- Fatima: A girl! You're the one who makes me a girl even in battle. Instead of giving me a gun like any soldier you give me cotton and cloth. I wasn't made like that...you're the one who's made Fatima a downtrodden woman...that's not the real me.

Some sixteen years later *Marriage by Decree Nisi* came to the stage. The play, experimental in form, is perhaps the most perceptive study of the gross inequality and class differences in Egyptian society. A young student from a rich family but full of socialist idealism of early 1952 is in love with the daughter of a garage mechanic. When he returns from studying in Europe, nationalization has begun, and he gets a managerial post. His former sweetheart is a worker in the factory. He seduces her and when she becomes pregnant he marries her quietly to avoid a scandal, but forces her to have an abortion. She knows that the class pressures on their marriage make it impossible, a charade. She demands a divorce. Eventually he agrees to a divorce to end their "shotgun marriage" on condition that

they remarry for "love." As the wedding guests assemble, the woman commits suicide, the only solution to an intractable problem. Much of the play concentrates on the couple's search for self-knowledge and understanding of reality. The woman with her working class background is able to understand the truth that such a marriage cannot work in a class-ridden society. The man in his privileged position is able to delude himself with illusion and idealism. The play is forceful in its exposure of the position of Egyptian women and all the more effective as it is situated within the framework of a satirical attack on the traditional love-story of stage and screen, all too familiar to Egyptian audiences.



CONCLUSION

Since the death of Nasser in 1970 and the new political and economic directions of the Sadat regime, there has been a gradual decline in state support for theatre in Egypt. Although the state still finances a very large theatre organization, the commercial theatres have received encouragement. The number of productions and the quality of texts selected in the state theatres has seriously declined. In the mid-1960s, the National Theatre, the most prestigious of the state theatres, would offer about twelve major productions a year; in 1975 it presented only one. And significantly most of the state productions carried elements of the musical, the staple diet of commercial theatre. Among both writers and performers there is an apparent sense of frustration, especially as state control of the arts is probably greater now than ever. While the state theatres stand as monuments to what was the most important Egyptian art form of the 1960s, the commercial theatres offering slapstick comedy at exorbitant prices flourish. The current decline of the theatre is positive proof of the political role of this art form. However repressive the regime of Nasser may have been, there was room for political debate and involvement. Now the dramatist, together with exponents of other genre is forced into silence or compromise. Once men of theatre emigrated from Syria to Egypt, now they go from Egypt to other Arab countries. For the moment, the future of Arab drama rests in the other Arab people. To most of them, drama is a comparatively new art, but the results of a decade or so in Iraq, Syria and the North African states show great promise. If the historical pattern of development continues, it will not be long before theatre is again a vital force in Egypt.

CURRENT EVENTS

RIYADH AGREEMENT RATIFIES SYRIAN INVASION

Elias Sarkis was inaugurated President of Lebanon on September 23, in Chtaura, a town situated within the Syrian-occupied zone, in the presence of 67 of the 98 members of the chamber of deputies. PLO leader Yasser Arafat proclaimed a unilateral ceasefire to expedite a political solution to the civil war that the progressives hoped would remove the Syrians. But Sarkis was able only to hold a two-hour meeting with leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt before renewed fighting halted further talks. The seizure of hostages at Damascus' Semiramis Hotel by four commandos of the previously unheard-of "Black June" group provided the pretext for a new Syrian offensive two days later in the mountains north of the Beirut-Damascus highway. This strategic zone controls an important road connecting Junieh (the rightists' capital) with the Beka'a Valley and Damascus, and had been captured by the leftist-Palestinian alliance in their spring offensive. A rightist assault had been expected since the fall of Tel Za'atar on August 12. Syrian infantry, involved for the first time in full force, backed by tanks and heavy artillery and with the assistance of rightist militia and the Syrian backed "Lebanese Vanguard Arab Army," was able to take the sector in two days. The capture was followed by massacres by the right in the Druze towns of Salima and Arsoun. As the offensive ended the rightists launched an attack on Aley, but denied Syrian support, they were beaten back with heavy losses. [*Afrique-Asie* 10/18]

A relative lull in fighting took effect as diplomatic maneuvering continued. The Syrians insisted on a Palestinian withdrawal to the camps in accordance with the 1969 Cairo Agreements [see *SWASIA*, 3/19] and a change in the Arafat leadership; the Palestinians rejected any leadership changes and insisted upon a Syrian troop withdrawal from Lebanese territory as a precondition to any Palestinian move to the camps. Saudi Arabia, as an apparent gesture of disapproval of Syrian attempts to impose a military solution on Lebanon, decided on October 3 to withdraw its forces from the Golan, to encourage Syrian moves toward a negotiated settlement in Lebanon and an end to Assad's bitter dispute with Sadat over the Sinai Accords.

An indication of the desperate situation of the leftist-Palestinian alliance was Kamal Jumblatt's visit to Paris in the company of Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi and his request that the French government pressure Syria and send troops into Lebanon to relieve the situation. In the spring Jumblatt had rejected a similar offer by the French government. He explained this abrupt about-face none too deftly, saying, "A French presence is acceptable only if it emanates from a European will and not from the United States. We want to reintroduce France to the Levant to avoid being at the mercy of the superpowers." [*FBIS* 10/13] France declined to intervene on behalf of the Palestinians and the left. Jumblatt also conferred with French progressive leaders and later proceeded to Algeria and Iraq to drum up more support, all without noticeable success. Jumblatt praised the aid given by Libya and especially Iraq, although he said the latter was "paralyzed" from ineffective action "by the threat of Iran. . .

If Baghdad were to intervene in Lebanon, the Shah would not hesitate to revive the flames of [the Kurd's] civil war in the north of Iraq." [*Le Monde*, in *FBIS*, 10/13] Algeria's passivity he attributed to its preoccupation with Western Sahara; DFLP's Nayef Hawatmeh, in an earlier *Le Monde* interview, termed Algerian silence "inexcusable. We cannot think of any valid explanation for it at a time when the Palestinian people are being murdered and the resistance is being physically liquidated." [*FBIS*, 9/30]

Meanwhile in South Lebanon Israel redoubled its attempts to create a *cordon sanitaire* to prevent any future Palestinian incursions. Until recently the south had been the calmest area in Lebanon as the fighting had centered further north. But Israel's much-publicized "humanitarian" aid to Maronites living in a string of villages along the border, its arming of villagers against the "terrorists," and its transportation of over 1800 rightist fighters, some veterans of the siege of Tel Za'atar, there from Junieh via Haifa [*NYT*, 10/8] has increasingly polarized the region. Israel has provided rightist forces with uniforms, M-16s, and Sherman tanks; has set up a radio communications network between Christian villages; and has provided training for rightist fighters inside Israel. Thus pressure was being put on the Palestinian-progressive alliance from a new front.

On October 6, the third anniversary of the October War, the National Command of the Syrian Baath Party issued a call for the confederation of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the PLO. The Voice of Palestine immediately denounced the proposal. The following day, as the usual prelude to attack, Syria began broadcasting messages from Lebanese officials in areas as yet unoccupied requesting Syrian intervention to restore "security." The progressives' response was to call for a general mobilization in the mountains and impose virtual martial law, restricting civilian movement out of the leftist-controlled areas. On October 11, yet another ceasefire was worked out in Chtaura, but on the same day "Black June" commandos attacked Syrian missions in Rome and Islamabad, Pakistan. Provided with yet another pretext for attack, on the 12th, the Syrians launched an offensive out of Jezzine westward toward Sidon and toward Nabatiye in the south. They attacked Bhamdoun and Aley, the last two leftist-held towns on the Damascus road, the next day.

An Arab summit conference on Lebanon scheduled for October 18 in Cairo was postponed. Saudi Arabia, in its first real initiative on the Lebanese crisis, called for a meeting in Riyadh. The summit commenced on October 16, Syria calling off the battle as it was closing in on Aley after taking Bhamdoun, shelling Sidon from the mountains a few miles above, and preparing to open a third front against Tripoli. The Riyadh meeting brought together Saudi King Khalid, Kuwait Sheikh Sabah, Yasser Arafat, President Sarkis, and, for the first time in months, Egypt's Sadat and Syria's Assad.

The agreement announced from Riyadh on October 18 entailed certain concessions on the part of Syria but it did not require withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon, which had been a key demand of the leftists and Palestinians. The Arab peacekeeping force in Lebanon was to be reactivated and increased from 2300 to 30,000, mainly by the addition of the




Assad, Khaled, Sadat:
Why are these men smiling?

Syrian troops already there, and put under President Sarkis' command. The PLO, on the other hand, managed to extricate itself from a precarious military situation, and the continued leadership of Arafat was accepted by Assad. However, the PLO did agree to a return to the 1969 Cairo Agreement (which had never been fully carried out in the past) and were given 90 days in which to implement it. This entailed a return of Palestinian armed forces to the refugee camps and bases in the south, a limit on heavy military equipment in the camps, and a promise of non-intervention in Lebanese internal affairs, in return for the Arab states' agreement not to interfere in Palestinian internal affairs. The Riyadh conference failed to deal with the disputes between the right and left in Lebanon which had brought about the conflict, only calling for a withdrawal to the original April 13, 1975 battle lines.

The Riyadh agreement will obviously be difficult to implement, and it is doubtful that all parties to the Lebanese conflict will accept it. Rightist leaders Franjeh, Chamoun and Gemayel have all criticized it without actually rejecting it. Given the present balance of forces, the right, especially the more extreme elements, may be unwilling to accept anything less than total Palestinian surrender. A return to the original battle lines, as the agreement provides, would negate some rightist victories. Bashir Gemayel, Phalangist militia commander, has stated, "We refuse anything that takes us back to before April 13, 1975, because that means all the destruction and death will have been in vain." The right will almost certainly not allow an armed Palestinian presence back into the Tel Za'atar, Jisr al-Basha and Dbayeh camps captured earlier. Furthermore, the rightists have so far been unwilling to permit Arab League forces into their territory, so there remains some question where to post the 30,000 member peacekeeping force.

Leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt criticized the Riyadh agreement for not requiring the withdrawal of Syrian troops. The progressive forces' military strength would be greatly diminished if the Palestinians were to withdraw to the camps; progressive acceptance of the Riyadh agreement is also unlikely because it fails to provide for any of the left's reforms.

A final problem has been that as the ceasefire has held in the rest of the country fierce fighting continued in the south between the progressives and the Israeli-backed "army," formed by the right to drive out the Palestinians. The progressives accused Israeli troops of intervening and shelling leftist positions. Frogmen, presumably Israeli, sunk a freighter unloading arms at Tyre on October 23. The leftist-Palestinian alliance warned it would remain fighting all over Lebanon if the rightist offensive in the south continued. How signatories of the Riyadh accords would solve the problem of a Palestin-



ian return to southern bases now in the hands of the Israeli-backed rightist forces remains another immense problem.

Despite all these obstacles Arab leaders seemed pleased with the agreement. Saudi Arabia was able to reconcile Assad and Sadat, a necessary first step in a US-sponsored Middle East peace plan. Only Iraq of all the Arab states refused to approve the Riyadh agreement at the Cairo summit on the 24th. Even Libya gave its nod of approval, an indication, some speculate, of a pending rapprochement between Qaddafi and Sadat. The oil-rich Gulf states are backing the agreement to the hilt: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar will provide 65% of the \$90 million six-month budget of the Arab peacekeeping force. Sarkis will have personal control over the budget and the force, will include troops from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, PDRY, Sudan, Libya and the United Arab Emirates. According to Arab League Secretary General Mahmoud Riad, PLO units were "willing" to participate but Sarkis will have final say on whether to use them. Sadat said he will provide Sarkis with all the arms he needs, including tanks and missiles [CSM, 9/24], and according to Beirut's leftist paper *al-Muharrer* the US has offered to help reorganize the Lebanese army and reconstitute its internal security forces. [SWASIA, 9/17] The Cairo summit also agreed to create a reconstruction fund for Lebanon, for which Sarkis has asked \$3 billion. The state department has expressed US willingness to play a major role in reconstruction, and Congress would be able to appropriate a quarter of the total finances, estimated at between \$300 and \$500 million.

The Riyadh Agreement and the Cairo summit signal the acquiescence of both reactionary and avowedly "socialist" leaders to the Syrian military intervention and their agreement to support Syria financially and militarily. The apparent purpose of the peacekeeping force is to ease reunification of the country under Sarkis, the rebuilding of Lebanon's state and military apparatus and the taming of "recalcitrant" elements from both sides. The reconstruction funds would permit Lebanon to rebuild its economic infrastructure and regain its status as comprador emporium for the region. Some modest reforms might be thrown in to placate Muslims and the progressives. The Palestinians would be moved back to the camps

where they would hopefully remain quiescent until a comprehensive peace settlement is reached. The overall aim of the Arab rulers does not differ much from that of the Syrians and the (rightist) Christians, who, Israeli Defence Minister Peres proclaimed, "are just like us. They would not like to see Lebanon turn into a PLO country, ruled by Soviet arms and mired in terrorist [sic] actions." [FBIS, 9/30]

These moves should be seen in the larger context of recent Soviet calls for a reconvening of a Geneva peace conference, the US presidential elections, and meetings in Paris in September between PLO "moderate" Said Hammami and Israeli "doves" Arie Eliav and Matti Peled of the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace. [SWASIA, 10/1] Further meetings took place over the October 16 weekend. Secretary Kissinger expressed his satisfaction with the recent developments, stating that his step-by-step diplomacy in the Middle East has "brought us to a point where comprehensive approaches are the logical next step. . . . The decision before us now is not whether but how the next phase of negotiations should be launched" for a settlement. He also asserted that the "capacity of outside countries to exacerbate tensions has been reduced." [JTA Daily News Bulletin, 10/21; emphasis added]

Yet despite the pleasure seen in the now unified ruling circles in the Arab world and in the West, there remain enormous practical obstacles to the achievement of the agreement worked out in Riyadh. It may be these obstacles that persuaded the Palestinian-leftist alliance to submit to it to buy much needed time. A PFLP spokesperson explained, "We want to make use of a peaceful period. We were under real military pressure and we need time to rebuild." [WP, 10/29] They are banking on their ability to persuade Sarkis to assert his independence from Syria and force the removal of Syrian troops. They may also be still counting on some change from within Syria, possibly even the fall of Assad, to halt the present trend of events. Arafat has, however, visited Assad in Damascus for the first time in six months. The meeting resulted in the beginning of the return of a few Palestinians to the Arqoub (south Lebanon.) It is doubtful that they will either have the force or be permitted by Syria to engage in confrontation with Israel. Whatever happens, the days ahead will not be easy for the Palestinian-progressive alliance. The pressure is temporarily lifted, but could easily be reapplied.

ISRAELI SETTLEMENT PLANS SPARK RENEWED PALESTINIAN PROTESTS

Once again, Israeli expansionist schemes in the occupied West Bank and Galilee area have sparked a series of strikes by municipal workers and shopkeepers; spurred on student confrontations with Israeli security forces; and caused a general upheaval in activity by Palestinians. Two events, the release of the Koenig Report and the escalation of provocative activity by the right wing Gush Emunim group, resulted in a renewed upsurge of militancy from Nazareth to Hebron.

In Nazareth the release of the Koenig Report was met with a call for the author's resignation from his post as administrator of the Galilee area. On September 28, a two hour strike of municipal workers was staged to call domestic and international attention to the racist content of the Koenig Report. Sympathy strikes in solidarity with the Nazareth strike closed shops in Nablus, Tulkarim, the Gaza Strip, and in some 40 other towns throughout Israel and the occupied territories. In Nablus and Hebron Palestinian school children threw up barricades and confronted Israeli forces with stones. Meanwhile Prime Minister Rabin denied that the Koenig Report was official Israeli policy and defended Koenig's right as a government official to state his own opinion. Nazareth's Mayor Taw-

fiq Zayyad, on a speaking tour in the US, sharply disagreed: ". . . what Koenig said is executed in reality. He speaks of an iron fist against the Arab and we have seen this fist." At the same time Deputy Mayor Jarjouran warned the Israeli government that if Koenig was not removed "there may be hot demonstrations" and a general strike of a half million Arabs.

In Hebron violence erupted between Arabs and Jews when religious artifacts at the Cave of Makhpelah were desecrated. The shrine, venerated by both Jews and Muslims, became the focal point in the struggle for physical control of the Arab town of Hebron. The right wing Gush Emunim movement led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger insists that the occupied West Bank belongs to Israel by divine right. Levinger and some two dozen Gush Emunim settlers moved into the Hebron area right after the 1967 war and established the settlement of Kiryat Arba in defiance of a government ban on settlements in the occupied territories. Since that time, Levinger and his supporters have been demanding permanent rights to settlement in Hebron and have been claiming the right to total control of the Makhpelah Cave. Various attempts at renovating Jewish buildings abandoned after the disturbances of 1929 have been a source of constant irritation for the Arab community of Hebron. For the Gush Emunim colonists, these renovations are but the first steps of an attempt to Judaize Hebron.

This situation reached the breaking point when, after months of continual harassment of the Arab community, members of the Gush Emunim raided the mosque located in the shrine, desecrating Korans. This event provoked a retaliatory occupation of the cave by some 300 Palestinian students the next day, the eve of the Day of Atonement. A number of Jewish artifacts were destroyed. The following day, a clash between Palestinians and security forces at the shrine resulted in the wounding of 55 Arabs and 60 arrests. Consequently, the Arab area was put under a military curfew from October 4 to October 20.

On October 6, the third anniversary of the October War, an unprecedented state funeral, heavily guarded by the Israeli military and attended by 2-3,000 Israelis, was held for the damaged Torah scrolls and religious artifacts. A curfew was imposed on Hebron's 60,000 Arabs. After the funeral, Rabbi Levinger attempted to incite the crowd, stating, "Hebron is ours, Nablus is ours, Jerusalem is ours. . . . We should look above us to the heavens and see that these cities are ours. . . ." Leaflets were distributed which advocated the relocation of the Arab population as the only possible remedy for the present troubles of Palestine.

Throughout the West Bank, support for the Palestinians in Hebron was instantaneous—students in Nablus walked out of their classes and clashed with Israeli troops. In Tulkarim, Jenin, Ramallah and the Balata refugee camp near Nablus, the reaction was the same: burning tires were used to block the roads and militant Arab youths confronted the authorities. In Ramallah and Jericho students staged sit-in demonstrations in their schools to protest Israeli occupation. Shopkeepers in Nablus and Tulkarim closed their shops in a show of solidarity with the people of Hebron.

Compared with the Land Day protests in the spring, casualties were light. In Halhoul near Hebron, seven children were wounded when Israeli civilians (probably Gush Emunim) in a passing car machine-gunned the village market place. At Balata camp three young Arabs were wounded when police opened fire on a crowd. Throughout the West Bank arrests were in the hundreds; in Hebron over 100 were arrested and scores face prosecution.

For the Gush Emunim the penalties were less severe. No curfew was imposed on the Jewish community. While the Arab residents of Hebron were excluded from worshipping at the shrine, Jews were allowed to observe Yom Kippur there. Only three Jews were arrested and Rabbi Levinger was charged only

with violating military orders to stay out of Hebron. The government's punishment of the Kiryat Arba community amounted to nothing more than a slap on the wrist. This is due, in part, to the Rabin government's unwillingness to alienate the National Religious Party, which comprises part of the present coalition government. The NRP has been a solid supporter of the Gush Emunim.

The Gush Emunim and the Hebron incident have become hot political issues in the contest between Rabin and Defence Minister Shimon Peres for control of the Labor Party. Peres, who hopes to take over leadership of the ruling Labor Party and to eventually replace Rabin as prime minister, has found himself under attack for his handling of the affair. Peres, who is in charge of the administration of the occupied territories, has been accused by Rabin of "softness" toward extremists on both sides, which according to the prime minister has led to the present crisis.

Both Rabin, who has called the Gush Emunim "dangerous," and Peres, who accused the Kiryat Arba settlers of "outright provocation," seek to lay the blame on religious extremist elements in both communities, thus avoiding the larger issues involved in the disturbances; that is, Israeli expansionist imperatives in the occupied territories and Palestinian resistance to such moves. Seeking to exploit the religious significance of the incident at the shrine, the Israeli government has been trying to direct public attention away from the primary cause of the strife—Israeli colonization of the occupied territories. The Israeli government, in the meantime, pursues expansionist policies: Efrat, a new settlement, is soon to be built in the Hebron region, while the World Zionist Congress intends to submit plans for 55 new settlements (27 within the occupied territories) in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Sources: Christian Science Monitor October 7, 13, 1976; Foreign Broadcast Information Service September 28, 29, 1976; Israleft October 20, 1976; Jewish Telegraphic Agency October 5, 6, 13, 15, 22, 30, 1976; New York Times October 7, 1976.

SHAH OF IRAN ADMITS TO POLICE OPERATIONS IN US

Members of the Iranian secret police are in the United States "checking up on anybody who becomes affiliated with circles, or organizations hostile to my country," the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, admitted in an interview aired on the CBS news program "60 Minutes," October 24.

SAVAK "checking up" activities in the US, Iranians here told LNS, include photographic surveillance of Iranians attending political meetings as occurred recently in Austin, Texas and San Jose, California, and even murder.

This past summer, SAVAK "hit squads" entered the United States to assassinate Iranian citizens opposed to the Shah's repressive government, according to Richard Cottam, a University of Pittsburgh professor and author of several books on Iran.

Cottam says that a State Department source told him that SAVAK agents planned to work with organized crime figures to arrange assassinations of outspoken Iranians here, making the deaths appear to be a result of ordinary street violence.

The main target of SAVAK surveillance is the Iranian student population in the US, numbering over 25,000. The Iranian Student Association has chapters in most colleges attended by Iranian students, and has been vocal in its denunciation of the Shah's repressive policies.

When asked by CBS if his agents operate within the US with the "knowledge and consent of the US government," the Shah answered, "I think it is," adding that he wanted SAVAK agents, "I hope everywhere (in the world) to gather these informations."

In the CBS interview, the Shah claimed no torture took place in Iranian jails, or at least not "torture in the old sense of torturing people—twisting their arms and doing this and that. But there are intelligent ways of questioning now," the Shah qualified.

Virtually every international body that has investigated charges of widespread torture of political dissidents in Iran—including the United Nations Panel on Human Rights, the International Commission of Jurists, and Amnesty International—dispute the Shah's claim to modernity in the tools of Iranian repression.

Source: Liberation News Service, October 27, 1976

Editor's note: since this article was written it has been revealed that Henry Kissinger has ordered an inquiry into the activities of the SAVAK in the United States as part of the wider inquiry into activities of foreign intelligence services in the United States.

socialist revolution

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Immanuel Wallerstein *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York and London: Academic Press, 1974. xiv + 410pp. Index and bibliography. \$16.50. Paperback, 1976. xviii + 244pp. \$4.95. (Citations to the book will be parenthetical in the text. The first citation refers to the hardcover, the second to the paperback.)

Western scholars in the field of social change and development have, for the most part, managed to avoid the central insight of dependency theory: that development and underdevelopment are dialectically related aspects of one process—the development of capitalism. Thus, sociologist Charles Tilly, in a recent review of the field, encountered

impressively little discussion of the way the structure of world markets, the operation of economic imperialism, and the characteristics of the international state system affect the patterns of political change within countries in different parts of the world.*

These topics are central to Immanuel Wallerstein's *Modern World-System*, a major contribution to the study of capitalist development. Wallerstein, a sociologist and expert on Africa, portrays capitalism as a world-system which emerged in the sixteenth century. Publication of the paperback edition (without footnotes, regrettably) should ensure the book the wide readership it deserves.

That readership should include those interested in social and political transformations in the contemporary Middle East. Those processes are inextricably tied to developments in the capitalist world order. The present functioning and contradictory tendencies of world capitalism can only be understood in the context of the historical development of capitalism. This point is one that Marxists, in particular, should realize, for, as Pierre Vilar puts it: "to think everything historically, that is Marxism."[†]

Immanuel Wallerstein is making a significant attempt to "think capitalism historically." The present book is a first step, with three volumes to follow. Behind this effort lies Wallerstein's conviction that

we are facing the need to rethink and restate the conceptual frameworks we have inherited from the 19th century in order to understand and contribute meaningfully to the long world-systemic transition to socialism which has begun and in which we are living.⁺

*Charles Tilly ed. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) p. 620.

[†]"Marxist History: A History in the Making" *New Left Review*, 80 (1973) p. 105. Emphasis in original

⁺"American Slavery and the Capitalist World Economy" *American Journal of Sociology* (1976) p. 1200. This is one of a series of articles in which Wallerstein has amplified and developed his position. I will draw on several of these.

These are the terms on which his project should be judged. I will argue that, despite the impressive nature of his work, substantial flaws render his analysis suspect and vitiate its fruitfulness for the task he has set himself.

Wallerstein identifies the unit of analysis as the crucial methodological problem in analyzing capitalism. Some scholars studying non-Western societies focus on units such as tribes, while national societies have been the primary units of analysis for many others. For Wallerstein, social change means large-scale structural change which can only occur in social systems:

We take the defining characteristic of a social system to be the existence within it of a division of labor, such that the various sectors or areas within it are dependent upon economic exchange with others for the smooth and continuous provisioning of the needs of the area. Such economic exchange can clearly exist without a common political structure and even more obviously without sharing the same culture.*

Two types of social systems have existed. First are mini-systems, "an entity that has within it a complete division of labor and a single cultural framework."[†] Since these no longer exist, the second type, the world-system, is the only extant type of social system. A world-system need not encompass the world, rather it is a single division of labor with multiple cultural systems. There are two types of world-system. A world-empire with one political authority, or a world-economy with more than one political entity.

Here we reach a crucial point in Wallerstein's argument. There were world-economies before the sixteenth century (Braudel's 'long' sixteenth century—1450-1640), but these always lapsed into world-empires. The inordinate expense of maintaining the political structure of a world-empire sets definite limits to the economic growth possible in such an entity. In the sixteenth century, however, a world-economy emerged which was based on the capitalist mode of production. The distinctive nature of the capitalist world-economy lay in the circumstance that

economic decisions are oriented primarily to the arena of the world-economy, while political decisions are oriented primarily to the smaller structures that have legal control, the states. (p. 67) (p. 51)

This was also the key to the strength of the emerging world-economy. The states do not incur the huge losses and strains that accompany the administration of a world-empire. Furthermore, the states can compete against each other in securing comparative advantages within the single economic framework.

The Portuguese voyages East and the conquest of the Americas led to the expansion of the world in question, which

*"The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 16 (1974) p. 390 [†]ibid

Wallerstein identifies as the first of three crucial developments in the sixteenth century. The other two were the development of variegated methods of labor control for different products and different zones of the world-economy, and the creation of relatively strong state machineries in core states of the world-economy. These were the basis for the two key institutions of the emerging capitalist world-economy: 1) a "world" wide division of labor, and 2) bureaucratic state machineries in certain areas. (p.63) (p. 47)

The emerging international division of labor is a three-tiered system. The three zones—the core, the semiperiphery, and periphery—"were assigned specific economic roles, developed different class structures, used consequently different modes of labor control, and profited unequally from the workings of the system." (p. 162) (p.111) Since the productive tasks for each zone were different, the methods of labor control varied accordingly. Productive activity refers here primarily to agriculture. "[T]he trend in the core was toward variety and specialization, while the trend in the periphery was toward monoculture." (p. 102) (p. 73) (Emphasis in the original) In the core, wage-labor and self-employment predominated, while slavery and the "second serfdom" held sway in the periphery. Slavery was, of course, the mode of labor control used in the Americas. The "second serfdom" refers to Eastern Europe and is similar to the *encomienda* system used in Hispanic America.

Thus, in the geo-economically peripheral areas of the emerging world-economy, there were two primary activities: mines, principally for bullion; and agriculture, principally for certain foods. In the sixteenth century, Hispanic America provided the former while eastern Europe...the latter....The surplus went overall disproportionately to supply the needs of the population of the core areas. (p. 100) (p. 72)

Between the core and periphery was the semiperiphery. For Wallerstein this zone is akin to the middle man or middle class in a capitalist economy. "On a number of economic criteria (but not all), the semiperiphery represents a midway point on a continuum running from the core to the periphery." (pp. 102-3) (p. 74) While the "periphery (eastern Europe and Hispanic America) used forced labor (slavery and coerced cash-crop labor)" and the core increasingly used free labor, the "semiperiphery (former core areas turning in the direction of peripheral structures) developed an inbetween form, sharecropping." (p. 103) (p. 74) Politically the semiperiphery acts as a buffer between the other two zones.

The strength of state structures also runs in a continuum from core to periphery.

In the sixteenth century, some monarchs achieved great strength by means of venal bureaucracies, mercenary armies, the divine right of kings, and religious uniformity....Others failed. This is closely related....to the role of the area in the division of labor within the world-economy. The different roles led to different class structures which led to different politics. (p. 157) (p. 108)

Wallerstein develops his argument with a staggering wealth of historical detail. In three chapters he deals successively with the semiperiphery, core and periphery, showing the concrete processes leading to the emergence of the world-economy and the specific form it took. 1556 was the turning point in the development of capitalism. In that year the attempt of the Spanish Hapsburg empire to create a world-empire failed decisively. Antwerp, the trading center of the Hapsburgs, fell several years later, and the years 1557 to 1640 mark the rise of northwestern Europe, with Amsterdam its commercial cen-

ter, as the core of the world-economy. These years were marked by internal reorganization and external maneuverings of European states to improve their position in the world-economy. Spain and Northern Italy move from the core to the semi-periphery.

We have said that the division of labor is three-tiered. In fact, there is fourth area which figures importantly in Wallerstein's analysis, but which is outside the European world-economy itself. This is the external arena. While

the periphery of a world-economy is that geographical sector of it wherein production is primarily of lower-ranking goods ...but which is an integral part of the overall system of division of labor, because the commodities involved are essential for daily use....the external arena of a world-economy...consists of those other world-systems with which a given world-economy has some kind of trade relationship, based primarily on the exchange of preciousities.... (pp. 301-2) (pp. 199-200)

I will return to these distinctions below.

Wallerstein sees the different zones and the differing methods of labor control, productive tasks, and class and state structures as the basis for the emergence of the capitalist world-economy. These phenomena assured "the kind of flow of surplus which enabled the capitalist system to come into existence." (p. 87) (p. 66)

Expansion also involves unequal development and therefore differential rewards, and unequal development in a multi-layered format of layers within layers, each one polarized in terms of a bimodal distribution of rewards. Thus, concretely, in the sixteenth century, there was the differential of core of the European world-economy versus its peripheral areas, within the European core between states, within states between regions and strata, within regions between city and country, and ultimately within more local units. (p. 86) (p. 64)

Furthermore, this

system of multiple layers of social status and social reward is roughly correlated with a complex system of distribution of productive tasks: crudely, those who breed manpower sustain those who grow food who sustain those who grow other raw materials who sustain those involved in industrial production. (p. 86) (p. 65)

While a summary cannot convey the rightly detailed subtlety of the *Modern World-System* perhaps it is enough to make the basic arguments clear. Wallerstein has thrown much light on the processes of unequal exchange and development that provided much of the resources for the primitive accumulation of capital. Whether he has succeeded in other tasks, such as demonstrating the continuity of the capitalist mode of production from the sixteenth century is another question.

Wallerstein fails to establish many of his basic points. His weaknesses derive from his theoretical framework. There is much to be learned from the book, but it falls short of explaining social change. Ellen Kay Trimberger points out that "all of Wallerstein's explanations of social change...are ad hoc, nonanalytic, and often contradictory, or else they are functional explanations."*

This major weakness stems from the conceptual and theoretical frameworks that Wallerstein uses. The concepts of core, periphery, and semiperiphery; the world-system as social system and unit of analysis; and what Wallerstein chooses to call a capitalist mode of production coexist uneasily and rather sloppily within the book. Taking each set of elements in turn enables one to grasp the problems in his approach.

*"Review Essay: Development as History." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, no. 10 (1975), p. 126.

Wallerstein's capitalist world-system is not fortuitously three-tiered, but must be so. As noted above, the existence of middle strata provides a buffer between core and periphery. Moreover,

these three tiers can be located repetitively throughout all the institutions of the capitalist world-economy....and the class struggle centers politically around the attempt of the dominant classes to create and sustain a third tier, against the attempt of the oppressed classes to polarize both the reality and the perception of the reality.*

The concept of semiperiphery enables one to deal with the phenomenon of sub-imperialism and is clearly important. Notwithstanding Wallerstein's denial of the point, however, it seems to be a residual category. No rigorous definition of it is given.

Periphery and external arena are both defined clearly by Wallerstein and yet here too problems arise. Most basic is that Wallerstein does not discuss the social formations of the periphery. Class formation in the colonized areas is not dealt with in a systematic manner. Wallerstein could not be expected to do everything in one book, but this problem can not even be dealt with within his problematic. There is also some difficulty with the specification of particular areas as periphery or external arena. Africa in the period of this volume is considered an external arena to the capitalist world-economy. This is important, because taking slaves from an area within the system would have serious political repercussions. Were not slaves necessities for the world-system? Could it have functioned without them? The point is minor, but it is an example of the general looseness of Wallerstein's formulations. On balance, his use of the core, periphery, semiperiphery, and external arena concepts is a useful contribution. Questions arise, however, in regard to the totality of which they are parts.

Each area performs functions which help maintain the system as a whole. As Trimberger points out, the social system model used is an equilibrium type so beloved by functionalist sociologists. The very use of the concept of social system introduces basic weaknesses. Where, for instance, do contradictions come in? In a system model they do not. This gets at the root of Wallerstein's inability to explain social change systematically and analytically. In Gordon Welty's apt phrase, the world-system model remains at "the surface phenomenal level of discussion."[†]

To get below the surface, one must consider

Marx's theoretical object, his central concept and coherent whole....the mode of production....⁺

Wallerstein's use of this concept is completely lacking in rigor and it is, in fact, impossible to specify exactly what he means by it. "The capitalist world-system dating from the sixteenth century was a world-economy whose mode of production was capitalist."^{**} We get some idea of the boundaries and dimensions of the mode of production for Wallerstein through his discussion of the "second serfdom" in Eastern Europe. This was not a reconstitution of the feudal mode of production, but a "new form of social organization [for] it is not the case that two forms of social organization, capitalist and feudal, existed side by side, or could ever so exist." (p. 92) (p. 69) (Emphasis in original) Aside from the dogmatic character of

the assertion, it represents a crude understanding of mode of production.

Far from understanding that any social formation is characterized by the articulation of heterogeneous modes of production with one dominant mode, Wallerstein tries to establish a world-systemic mode of production which subordinates all other modes so that there is only capitalism. This mode is essentially based on international exchange relations.. Gunder Frank's earliest and least developed formulations are at the basis of this view. This is unfortunate given the current renaissance in Marxist social science. Rather than dealing seriously with the complex nature of modes of production and social formations, and the crucial questions which arise in relation to them, Wallerstein is content to use his concepts in a rather loose manner. He is aware that his work represents a decided shift from orthodox Marxist analyses. The shift in itself is of little consequence. If by breaking away from more traditional perspectives Wallerstein can make a real breakthrough, only dogmatists can object.

This is not what he has done. While his use of an international perspective is valuable his essentially economist emphasis on exchange relations, his over reliance on the economic history which leads him into a crude economic determinism that the best Marxist social science has left behind, and the sloppy conceptualization that mars his work all combine to severely undermine his contribution, and taken together, compel a healthy scepticism in regard to his theoretical framework and specific historical judgements.

These caveats are not academic. Crucial issues simply can not be addressed within Wallerstein's problematic. The question of periodization and the changing forms of capitalist penetration of non-capitalist social formations are such issues. For instance, Wallerstein regards the distinction between mercantile and industrial capitalism as "unfortunate terminology."^{*} Yet this distinction "precisely allows a grasp of periodization, structural contradictions and crisis in the process of original accumulation."[†] In order to understand why and how capitalism itself changes historically, and the corresponding differences this produces in class formation in the penetrated social formations, one must come to terms with and not evade key distinctions. Any comprehension of political possibilities in the world today must build on this type of analysis.

In terms of Wallerstein's basic historical argument that the capitalist world-system emerged in the sixteenth century, Sternberg's position seems reasonable.

It could be agreed that mercantile capitalists helped shape the development of the Third World countries from first contact. The existence and importance of mercantile capitalists, however, do not imply that the capitalist mode of production...had gained predominance.⁺

Notwithstanding the criticism made here of Wallerstein, we still owe him much. His insistence on a unified historical social science is compelling. Moreover, whatever the eventual evaluation of this particular contribution, he has initiated a fruitful and positive line of work. The next volume of his work is an event worth waiting for.

—Walter Carroll

*"Class-Formation in the Capitalist World Economy." *Politics and Society*, no. 5 (1975), pp. 368-9.

[†]"A note on the World-System and Income Inequality." *Mimeo*, p. 1.

⁺Vilar, "Marxist History," p. 76.

^{**}Wallerstein, "American Slavery and the Capitalist World-Economy," p. 1212.

*Wallerstein, "Rise and Demise," p. 399

[†]John Merrington, "Town and Country in the Transition to Capitalism," *New Left Review*, no. 93 (1975), p. 85

⁺Marvin Sternberg, "Dependency, Imperialism and the Relations of Production," *Latin American Perspectives*, no. 1 (1974), p. 78

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