Jordanian protesters chant slogans against a government agreement to import natural gas from Israel, in Amman, Jordan, October 14, 2016. The center placard reads: “The enemy’s gas is occupation.” Muhammad Hamed/Reuters
As Israeli fighter jets and Western air-defense systems used Jordanian airspace to intercept Iranian projectiles, Jordan’s military also played a decisive role in shielding Israeli cities—even as government officials warned that Jordan would not become a battleground for adversaries. Over the same tense hours, Israel abruptly curtailed natural gas supplies to Jordan and Egypt when it shut down two major offshore gas fields in the Mediterranean, the Leviathan and the Karish. The move was preemptive: Israel feared Iranian retaliation after it had targeted one of Iran’s largest gas fields in the Gulf.
The escalation exposed the asymmetrical dynamics of Jordan’s normalization with Israel. On one hand, Jordan is expected to fulfill its obligations, such as facilitating Israel’s defense—whether through direct military coordination or logistical lifelines like the “land bridge,” a trade corridor aiming to connect Israel to the Arabian Peninsula. On the other hand, Jordan has to face the consequences of this position. Since Israel began its genocidal war on Gaza in October 2023, anti-normalization sentiment has intensified, with public outrage growing at the government’s perceived complicity in enabling Israel’s military.
But Jordan’s present bind sits atop a deeper history. In 1994, it became the second Arab state to normalize relations with Israel by signing the Wadi Araba agreement. Initially framed in terms of a shared peacekeeping agenda, this relationship has been marked by Jordan’s growing economic and political dependency on donor states and on Israel itself across a range of sectors, from security and intelligence to water, energy, agriculture, manufactured goods, technology and tourism.
Hand in hand with the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995 between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel, the Wadi Araba treaty marked a decisive shift in the region’s political economy. Oslo created the Palestinian Authority, which fragmented resistance and embedded fiscal and infrastructural dependency on Israel while relieving Israel of the direct costs of occupation. Wadi Araba extended this logic to Jordan, binding its economy into Israel’s orbit and international donor-led neoliberal frameworks. Together, these agreements transformed Israel from a regionally isolated rogue state on the margins of Arab markets into a central node of integration, advancing the Zionist project and expanding its influence under the guise of economic restructuring and so-called peace dividends.
Energy and water, in particular, have become flashpoints in Jordan’s material relationship with and dependance on Israel. These vital sectors tie the kingdom’s economy and daily life to the Zionist state, leaving trade, industry and political stability vulnerable to its leverage. The costs are not just economic: Dependence and deepening normalization, amid an ongoing genocide, fuel social unrest and widen the gap between the government and its people.
Energy Insecurity
Historically, Jordan relied on neighboring Arab states for oil and gas. From the 1960s through the 1980s, supplies came largely from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. After the first Gulf War in 1990, dependence shifted to Iraq until the 2003 US invasion. Jordan then turned to Egypt. But upheavals following the revolution in 2011 disrupted supplies. To compensate, Jordan imported crude oil from the global market at a high cost, pushing the National Electric Power Company (NEPCO, a government owned entity) into deep deficit.[1] As political ecologists Benjamin Schuetze and Hussam Hussein have noted, this trajectory reflects more than regional disruptions. It also marks a deeper structural dependency shaped by geopolitical alignments, economic liberalization and the erosion of energy sovereignty.[2]
In 2016, in a highly controversial move, NEPCO signed a purchase agreement with Israel, represented by NBL Jordan Marketing Limited (a subsidiary of Noble Energy, a US-based oil and gas company) to supply Jordan with natural gas. This gas was to be extracted from the Leviathan Gas Field in the Mediterranean, operated by the US oil giant Chevron and controlled by Israel. To date, the government has refused to release the full agreement. In the face of criticism, they cite a constitutional court ruling that parliament cannot vote on deals signed between private companies. Yet the government of Jordan is an official party to the deal, having signed supporting agreements with the Israeli government to guarantee the flow of natural gas.
The deal triggered widespread protests from the moment news leaked that the government of Jordan had signed an intent letter to buy gas from Israel. Opposition, which has flared regularly since, has been both symbolic and sustained in the streets. In 2021, for example, the local Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) group called upon Jordanians to “switch off the circuit breaker” and turn off power for one hour.
Leaked clauses from the 2016 deal underscore its inherent imbalance. In the event of war or legal changes that disrupt supply, Israel would not be in default, while legal changes in Jordan would leave Amman liable. According to these documents, the government of Jordan is also a guarantor for NEPCO, backed by the United States, leading to fears that if Jordan fails to fulfill its financial obligations to the deal, the United States would compensate Israel from Jordan’s aid allocation. Finally, the penalties for unilateral termination fall more steeply on Jordan. If Jordan were to develop its own natural gas reserves, it is only allowed to decrease its contractual purchase by 20 percent—subject to the approval of the investors.
Israel’s weaponization of water and electricity in Gaza—as documented in South Africa’s genocide case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ)—has made Jordanians even more wary of their own reliance on Israel for utilities. These fears were born out during the summer’s escalation with Iran. When Israel cut gas supplies in June 2025, the kingdom had to turn to alternative sources for electricity generation at a cost of $1.4 million per day adding strain to NEPCO’s more than $8.74 billion deficit.
Deepening Dependency
Jordan’s gas deal with Israel is emblematic of how dependency becomes embedded in normalization. Global financial institutions reinforce these dependencies, using aid and loans to lock a country like Jordan into market frameworks that prioritize the US dollar and external investors over domestic energy autonomy.
Jordan’s renewable energy sector reflects these dynamics. While the country has been active in building solar and wind projects, 84 percent of its Paris Agreement commitments rely on foreign financing.[5] Jordan’s Green Hydrogen Strategy, approved by the cabinet in mid-2025, further illustrates this trend. The target is to produce 0.59 million metric tons by 2030, with nearly 85 percent intended for export.[6] This strategy—developed in partnership with USAID and Germany’s development agency GIZ—exemplifies how renewable energy is restructured by donor-driven agendas, conditional finance and long-term offtake contracts. These efforts work to integrate Jordan into export-oriented supply chains, reinforcing dependency instead of guaranteeing Jordan’s energy sovereignty.
Jordan could, in principle, chart a more independent course. The country discovered new natural gas reserves in the east in late 2024. And given its scarcity of fossil-fuel resources, Jordan has the potential (abundant sunlight for solar generated electricity and technical expertise) to create more renewable energy. By the end of 2024, renewables accounted for about 27 percent of electricity generation. Some Jordanians argue that partnerships with East Asian countries, like China—the world leader in silica production, a key material for solar panels—could leverage Jordan’s rich silica reserves and favorable climate to expand domestic solar capacity. Others have raised social and environmental concerns, including the marginalization of local communities and the ecological toll of land use and PV solar panel disposal. But such alternatives could strengthen Jordan’s energy independence and give policymakers greater strategic flexibility.
Water Inequalities
Normalization has reshaped Jordan’s water sector much as it has electricity. The two utilities are tightly bound together: Electricity makes up more than half of the water sector’s operating costs, meaning problems in the power sector spill directly into water management. Together, the two account for about a quarter of the country’s public debt.
Imbalances between cost and revenue afflict both sectors. The state-owned electricity company, NEPCO, purchases power from producers then sells it to distributors at below-cost, government-regulated rates that guarantee private profits while locking NEPCO into chronic deficits. The water sector faces its own leakage. Nearly half of Jordan’s water is classified as “non-revenue water,” lost to theft, leaks or inefficiency, compared with around 27 percent in Morocco.[7]
Israel has long weaponized this control vis-a-vis Jordan too. In the 1970s, it took three to four times its share from the Yarmouk River—as delineated by the Johnston Plan of 1955—and blocked Jordan from carrying out projects using the river, like the Maqarin (or Wehda) Dam.
After normalization, Jordan’s share of the Yarmouk River fell sharply—from an average of 125 million cubic meters between 1961 and 1999 to just 71.5 million cubic meters between 1999 and 2018. This decline followed the construction of the Adassiyeh Weir, which diverted flows in line with the 1994 treaty’s water annex. The agreement thus became a pivotal mechanism for institutionalizing unequal access to both the Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers. Post-treaty infrastructure, such as the Adassiyeh Weir and canal diversions, consolidated Israel’s upstream control while constraining Jordan’s ability to secure even its allocated shares. As Hussam Hussein argues, this imbalance persists not only due to Israeli dominance, but also due to the treaty’s failure to incorporate equity or environmental safeguards.[8] These inequalities are now further compounded by climate stress, increased drought frequency and rigid treaty mechanisms that block adaptation.
Severe water scarcity has forced Jordan to seek alternative supplies. Most recently, the IFC along with the European Union and EU Banks, as well as individual states of the United States, France, Italy, Germany, Holland, Spain and Japan have pledged support for financing the Aqaba-Amman Water Desalination and Conveyance Project: an ambitious proposal to use renewable energy to desalinate water from the Red Sea in Aqaba and distribute it nationally through pipelines. The project claims it will provide a third of the country’s water supply by 2030. But local critics point out that the massive debt, almost 64 percent of the $3.5 billion needed to fund this project, further binds Jordan into a dependent relationship to foreign investors, rather than addressing root inequalities in water access linked to normalization and mismanagement.
Against this backdrop, the 2022 water-for-energy memorandum of understanding with Israel and the UAE provoked sharp public opposition. Under the deal, Jordan would build 600 MW of solar capacity to export to Israel, while Israel would supply Jordan with 200 million cubic meters of water annually. The UAE would finance both sides of the project. As with the gas deal, this deal, if enacted, would have deepened Jordan’s political and economic dependence on Israel. Jordan’s former prime minister, Ahmad Obeidat, questioned the benefit of the deal for Jordan by noting it covers 20 percent of Jordan’s water needs and only 3 percent of Israel’s energy needs. His opposition added to the widespread dissent against the deal across Jordan, which forced the Jordanian government to rethink its position.
Although Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi cancelled the deal upon the start of Israel’s genocide on Gaza, questions remain about whether it will be revived.
Material Resistance to Normalization
The pause on the water-for-energy deal underscores the balancing act Amman has tried to maintain since the start of Israel’s assault on Gaza. Officially, the government has condemned Israel’s genocidal acts against Palestinians—recalling its ambassador in November 2023, supporting South Africa’s genocide case before the ICJ and calling for peace and de-escalation. In practice, however, Amman has continued security cooperation, energy imports and facilitating overland trade to Israel.
Since October 2023, mass protests in the streets of Jordan have demanded the government take serious action to stop the genocide and end ties with Israel. There have been calls to nullify the Wadi Araba agreement, for the expulsion of western military bases and to take concrete steps toward economic recovery. The government has resisted these demands, while reiterating its support for the Palestinian cause and a two-state solution.
In this way, its diplomatic stance provides cover for Israel’s ongoing genocide and renders normalization ordinary. Instances that would have been unthinkable a decade ago, such as a prominent academic praising Israel on national television even as Israel faces ICJ prosecution for genocide and war crimes, reflect the cultural hegemony shaping public discourse. In recent polls, 42 percent of Jordanians oppose cancelling the Wadi Araba agreement.
Governors—appointed by the prime minister rather than elected—hold broad powers to administratively detain anyone deemed to be a “security threat.” This authority has been used against protestors, journalists and social media influencers. Many contemporary activists were born amid or after the 1989 elimination of martial law and are confronting levels of repression unfamiliar to their generation. Recent detentions have extended to party members like Issam Khawaja—a pediatric neurologist and recently elected secretary general of the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity party. Khawaja was arrested while leaving his workplace at Al-Basheer Hospital for a speech he gave in a protest in downtown Amman. Other recent arrests include students and social media influencers, like Ayman Aballi, who made a video criticizing the government for holding the Jerash music festival during Gaza’s famine, and journalists like Hiba Abu Taha, imprisoned for reporting on the movement of goods between the Gulf and Israel through a land bridge passing through Jordan.
Her case is telling. By highlighting trade with Israel during the genocide, Abu Taha directly questioned the material infrastructure of normalization. Abu Taha was sentenced under the widely-criticized cybercrime act, which was amended in August 2023. The law’s broad provisions against “threatening social harmony” serve as a ready tool against any dissent and journalism the state objects to, raising red flags for international human rights groups.
The crackdown on activists and the prevention of Gaza support marches underscore a deeper contradiction. The state’s official narrative on Gaza is at odds with the material reality of its normalization with Israel. On one hand, officials try to narrow this gap through controlled discourse—framing their position in diplomatic language that signals solidarity while avoiding actions that would disrupt economic or security ties. On the other hand, they work to sweep the contradiction under the rug by shaping media narratives and suppressing dissent. But energy, water, trade and security dependencies cannot be resolved by rhetoric alone. If these tensions are not addressed, the quantitative accumulation of contradictions could lead to a qualitative transformation in the form of a sudden social and political rupture.
The promised prosperity of peace with Israel has not materialized. Instead, Jordan’s economy has sunk deeper into debt, its policies increasingly tied to Israel’s security rather than to autonomous national development. Jordan’s experience shows how economic dependency and political entanglement erode both sovereignty and the material quality of life for citizens.
[Majd Bargash has an MA in Conflict Resolution from the University of Jordan and is a practicing engineer with 10 years of experience in the energy sector.]
Endnotes
[1] Asmaa Mohammad Amin, “The Energy Sector in Jordan: Crises Caused by Dysfunctional and Unjust Policies,” in Dismantling Green Colonialism: Energy and Climate Justice in the Arab Region, ed. Hamza Hamouchene and Katie Sandwell (London: Pluto Press, 2023), 175–199.
[2] Benjamin Schuetze and Hussam Hussein, “The Geopolitical Economy of an Undermined Energy Transition: The Case of Jordan,” Energy Policy 180 (2023): 113655.
[3] “Annual Report 2024,” Amman, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2024, p. 18.
[4] “Energy Balance 2024,” Amman, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2024, p. 5.
[5] Ministry of Environment, Updated Submission of Jordan’s 1st Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): Updated Version (Amman: Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, October 2021), p. 26.
[6] “Draft National Green Hydrogen Strategy for Jordan,” (Amman: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, October 2023), p. 23, 50.
[7] Jordan Water Sector: Facts and Figures 2022 (Amman: Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 2022), p. 14. Iyad Dahiyat, “Sustaining Jordan’s water sector,” nature middle east, June 14, 2022.
[8] Hussam Hussein, “Yarmouk Treaty Could Ease Jordan’s Water Crisis,” Science, August 21, 2025.
