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Iraq 2012
Chris Toensing
Caterwaul Quarterly (Summer 2008)
Spring in Baghdad saw stadiums open to shelter yet another wave
of refugees, displaced from the capital's eastern slums by the combined
assault of the US military and its proxy Iraqi forces upon the Mahdi
Army loyal to the young Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The fresh
attempt to “root out” the Mahdi Army from its birthplace of Sadr
City was the latest battle in Iraq's complex and ever shifting civil
war—a war in which the US military, in a sense, is but the largest
and most heavily armored militia. At the very least, the fighting
in Sadr City shows that the relative calm of late 2007 and early
2008 was indeed “fragile and reversible,” in the words of Gen. David
Petraeus. More likely, it demonstrates that the winter's decline
in violence was only a lull in chaos with no end in sight. Yet in
the United States, one might be forgiven for thinking the war in
Iraq is over.
Though deeply unpopular, the war has
steadily receded from public consciousness, thanks to economic woes,
the exhausting Democratic presidential primary and an easily gulled
mainstream media. While Iraq still ranks high on the list of voters'
concerns, the bursting of the housing bubble and skyrocketing gas
and food prices have focused most Americans' minds on their wallets.
The Hillary Clinton campaign's decision in January to race-bait
Barack Obama drove the Democratic primary away from the issues into
a downward spiral of identity politics and desperate appeals to
the ugly side of American political consciousness, culminating in
Clinton's suggestion that Obama might be assassinated, as Bobby
Kennedy was in 1968. Clinton's long flameout completely absorbed
the media's attention during the April testimony of Petraeus and
Ambassador Ryan Crocker before Congress, right up until her belated
bow to the inevitable in early June. The spectacle of the primary
was sordid enough without considering its larger political consequences,
one of which is that the Bush administration's narrative that “the
surge is working” remains essentially intact.
There are ample grounds for challenging
this tale of success. Now that the former First Lady has finally
stood down, Obama can begin to do so. One reason why Iraq faded
from the front page during the Democratic primary is that both he
and Clinton pledged to begin withdrawing “combat brigades” from
Iraq immediately upon assuming office, meaning that journalists
had no conflict between the candidates to report on that score.
The general election campaign should provide plenty of that conflict.
But there is reason to worry, nevertheless, that Obama will not
be able to fulfill his promises to wind down the war—even in the
event that those promises are sincere.
Quietly, the Bush administration is
negotiating with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki over an agreement
that could keep tens of thousands of US troops in Iraq for years
after the surge is over. On November 26, 2007, President George
W. Bush and Maliki signed a statement of principles for such an
agreement, to be concluded before December 31 of this year, when
the UN mandate for the so-called Multinational Force in Iraq will
expire. Because it will not be a “treaty,” this accord may not be
subject to Congressional approval, but it is expected to make the
US military presence contingent upon the wishes of the Maliki government,
which likely depends on that presence for its political survival.
The Iraqi defense minister told CNN that Iraq could “need” a US
garrison until 2018. According to Crocker, the agreement may be
ready in July. [Ed. note: As this article went to press, negotiations
had stalled, but leaders both sides continued to express confidence
that differences would be worked out by July.]
In Iraq, this proposed arrangement
is a major rallying point for the political opposition. Sadr's followers
are among the thousands of Iraqis who have taken to the streets
in protest against what they see as Iraqi acquiescence in permanent
foreign occupation. The demonstrations frighten the Maliki government
enough that its spokesmen have taken to denouncing alleged US negotiating
positions in the Iraqi press, if only to create the appearance that
they are fighting for Iraqi sovereignty.
Yet in the US, at least among the political
class, there is unseemly resignation to the determination of the
Bush administration to bequeath the occupation of Iraq to its successor.
Certainly, the “mainstream,” Democrat-identified anti-war organizations
like MoveOn and Americans Against the Escalation in Iraq are so
resigned. At a leadership summit in Washington in mid-January, they
agreed to cease pressing Congress to stop funding the massive Iraq
deployment. It was a form of unilateral disarmament. Since taking
over Congress after the 2006 elections, to be sure, the Democrats
have been cowed by the “support the troops” bromide into swallowing
their supposedly passionate anti-war feelings. The proper strategy
in these circumstances is to keep up the pressure: Democrats should
not only be using their legislative majority to curb Bush's freedom
of action, they should be using their bully pulpit to make winning
ideological arguments against the war, so that the “support the
troops” slogan loses its power to intimidate. But the ideological
field has been abandoned, and with it, the chances of affecting
the outcome. Another $165.4 billion for the war sailed through the
Senate in May, and will probably pass the House of Representatives
as well.
The irony of this latest preemptive
surrender by the Democrats is that the public would listen to alternative
prescriptions for the Iraq impasse, if only the Democrats would
advertise them, instead of relying solely on old-fashioned Bush
bashing. It is no longer news that the Bush administration was duplicitous
in selling the war and lazy in planning for the aftermath. When,
in January, the highly regarded Center for Public Integrity issued
a study documenting 935 false statements made by top Bush administration
officials in the leadup to the war, the media just noted it and
moved on. The litany of errors during the direct US misrule of Iraq
in 2003-2004 is likewise material for the history books. For many
Americans, the question has long since ceased to be why the US invaded
Iraq, or whether invading Iraq was the right thing to do, but how
the US can get out of Iraq in a way that is responsible and minimizes
further spilling of blood.
It is the Republicans, oddly enough,
who have moved most boldly to speak to Americans looking for the
answer. In May, John McCain predicted what the country would look
like at the end of his hoped-for first term. “By January 2013, America
has welcomed home most of the servicemen and women who have sacrificed
terribly so that America might be secure in her freedom,” he said.
“The Iraq war has been won.” A few pundits scoffed that, in positing
a “timetable” for withdrawal, McCain was effacing the bright line
between himself and the Democrats, but they completely missed the
point. The septuagenarian senator's speech exemplified the classic
Republican gambit: Position the GOP as the party of victory on the
battlefield, and the Democrats—by default—become cast as the party
of defeat. He is counting on the media to do its part in insinuating
his framing of the question into voters' minds.
In the general election campaign, Barack
Obama can choose one of two basic lines of counter-argument. One—the
object of McCain's fervent desires—is that the Republican is being
irresponsible in forecasting what Iraq will look like in 2013 and
has no credible plan for ensuring that US troops will be able to
leave by that date. That choice will entrap Obama on McCain's home
turf of endless debate over who is best qualified to manage the
war so that it produces a “success” for the United States. It is
worrisome that the National Security Network, one wing of the Democratic
administration in waiting, immediately attacked McCain's speech
on these grounds of competence. As a man who served and suffered
horribly in US uniform, McCain has the upper hand in this type of
Iraq debate.
The second possible choice, and by
far the more promising one for peace and stability, would move past
the notion that the US can somehow withdraw from Iraq without significant
consequences for both its strategic position in the Persian Gulf
and for Iraq. In this scenario, Obama would disavow the hubris that
posits that, having done so much to break Iraq, the US can fix it.
Rather, Obama would advocate that the US act to minimize the consequences
of its inevitable withdrawal and, in the long term, be generous
in assisting Iraq in its recovery from 40 years of war, sanctions
and dictatorship. Obama has shown signs of having the courage to
choose this course and the rhetorical skill to make the necessary
case.
Recent American political history teaches,
however, that Obama, terrified of appearing weak, will skate around
both of these two options and settle on neither. Should that come
to pass, McCain's electoral chances will be greatly enhanced. In
the event that Obama wins the White House nonetheless, the win will
not be viewed as a popular mandate for the tough decision to withdraw
completely from Iraq, and the Republicans will be emboldened in
their certain strategy for turning Iraq into the Democrats' war.
Past GOP behavior suggests the blueprint for besieging President
Barack Obama: Block, through all available means, any genuinely
alternative plan for Iraq. Then goad the new commander-in-chief
with accusations of defeatism and fecklessness into proposing his
own strategy for “victory.” In these cicumstances, Obama will be
tempted to test out newly elastic definitions of “combat brigades.”
For these reasons, and more, the US occupation of Iraq is poised
to be a campaign issue in 2012.
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Chris Toensing is editor of Middle
East Report, published by the Middle East Research and Information
Project in Washington, DC.
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