"A very frank discussion"—
so President Bush described his Nov. 7 telephone conversation with
Pervez Musharraf, four days after the Pakistani general imposed
a state of emergency and dissolved the high court expected to rule
his continued presidency unconstitutional. And frank the discussion
probably was: In the face of spirited protest in Pakistan, and a
querulous press in Washington, back-channel pressure succeeded in
persuading Musharraf to promise parliamentary elections. Yet the
generous U.S. aid earmarked for Pakistan — on top of nearly $10
billion since 2001 — is quite evidently not at risk.
What may be at risk is Musharraf's tenure as head of the military
government. According to The New York Times, U.S. policymakers are
building up Musharraf's deputy, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, as the preferred
replacement for the increasingly unpopular president. Clearly, Washington
wants to retain at the center of Pakistani politics a powerful military
figure who will help wage the U.S.-led "war on terror"
in the region.
It's an old story. Pro-democracy rhetoric notwithstanding, U.S.
presidents have backed military regimes in Pakistan in the service
of larger strategic goals.In the 1960s, Gen. Muhammad Ayub Khan's
junta was at the forefront of US-sponsored anti-Communist efforts
in South and Southeast Asia, playing host to a high-tech surveillance
post spying on the Soviet Union. In 1979, after the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan, the United States bailed out Gen. Muhammad Zia ul Haq,
whose regime began training the radical Islamist "freedom fighters"
from whose ranks al Qaeda later emerged. In 2001, the United States
started counting on Musharraf and his generals to help wage the
war on terror, giving a regime that was under sanctions (because
of Pakistan's nuclear tests) a new lease on life.
Each of these short-term security fixes has come at the expense
of long-term stability in Pakistan itself.
The military has left the country in political and social disarray
whenever it has ruled for an extended period. In 1971, the army
junta, rejecting the results of the 1970 elections, embroiled Pakistan
in a brutal civil war leading to the division of the country.
Among the results of Zia's support for the anti-Soviet insurgency:
the proliferation of small arms and drugs; the radicalization of
Islamic schools to produce fighters for the "holy war"
in Afghanistan (and then Kashmir); a drain on resources because
of the influx of Afghan refugees; and increased ethnic and sectarian
violence. Pakistan is still struggling to cope with the consequences.
We already have more than a hint of where today's military rule
may take Pakistan. The army has displaced hundreds of thousands
of people fighting an ongoing insurgency in Baluchistan. Poverty
and unemployment are up, and the state is unable to check rampant
criminal activity in the cities.
Pakistan is again at a crossroads. The military, it is evident,
will not risk civilian scrutiny until it can entrench its power
in Pakistani society. Secular-minded, pro-democracy lawyers, political
activists and the increasingly independent media are bearing the
brunt of the military crackdown. Should this dangerous trend persist,
the democratic forces in the country could be silenced, leaving
only two actors in the political arena, the military and its allies,
on one side, and Islamist radicals, on the other.
The United States, as Pakistan's main ally, should show greater
respect and empathy for Pakistanis' aspirations for a more open
and just society. It should exert pressure on Musharraf to lift
the state of emergency and restore civic and political rights. In
particular, U.S. aid to Pakistan should be used as a lever, made
conditional upon adherence to democratic practices and not a mere
reshuffling of elites. Only a prosperous, democratic and educated
Pakistan can be a bulwark against violence and extremism in the
long term.
A frank Pakistani would tell President Bush that Pakistan deserves
more from the United States than backing for the generals who, for
all their talk of moderation, are pushing their country toward extremism
and keeping it on course for still more disasters.
---
Kamran Ali is an associate professor of anthropology at University
of Texas-Austin and an editor of Middle East Report.
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