The
Collateral Damage of Lebanese Sovereignty
Jim Quilty
June 18, 2007
(Jim Quilty
is a Beirut-based journalist.)
For
more on Lebanon’s political stalemate, see Jim Quilty, “Winter
of Lebanon’s Discontents,” Middle East
Report Online, January 26, 2007.
For
background on the condition of Palestinians after the
Syrian withdrawal, see Laleh Khalili, “A Landscape
of Uncertainty: Palestinians in Lebanon,” Middle
East Report 236 (Fall 2005). |
Residents
of Lebanon might be forgiven for wanting to forget the last 12
months. The month-long Israeli onslaught in the summer of 2006,
economic stasis, sectarian street violence, political deadlock
and assassinations -- most recently that of Future Movement deputy
Walid ‘Idu, who perished along with ten others in a June
13 car bomb explosion -- have weighed heavily upon the country.
It is as if the dismembered corpse of the 1975-1990 civil war
-- assumed to be safely buried -- has been exhumed and reassembled,
all the more grotesque. Since May 20, the Palestinians in Lebanon,
too, have been made to relive past nightmares.
On May 19,
in an alleged bank heist at a branch of Banque de la Méditerranée
in Amyoun, not far from the northern coastal city of Tripoli,
several armed men made off with a sum estimated at between $1,500
and $100,000. Early the next morning, units of Lebanon’s
Internal Security Forces (ISF) moved against several buildings
in Tripoli where they thought the villains were holed up. The
ISF, under the command of Lebanon’s Interior Ministry,
has been associated with the Future Movement founded by the late
ex-premier Rafiq al-Hariri since the election of the government
of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora, also of Future, in June 2005.
When the ISF encountered stiff resistance in Tripoli, they called
in the Lebanese army.
Shortly after
the ISF assault began, militants based in the Palestinian refugee
camp of Nahr al-Barid, about nine miles north of Tripoli, overran
four Lebanese army positions outside the camp. They killed several
soldiers and took more hostage, reportedly torturing and beheading
them. It was later said that for some weeks the ISF had been
monitoring Sunni Islamist activities in Tripoli, and that the
bank robbers were militants belonging to a salafi organization
called Fatah al-Islam. Since there was no liaison between the
intelligence units of the two security services, the army was
not informed of the ISF’s activities and so did not alert
its men around the camp.
The Lebanese
army responded by cutting off water and electricity to the entirety
of Nahr al-Barid, and pounding the camp with tank, artillery
and heavy machine gun fire, inflicting heavy damage. Palestinian
refugees inside Nahr al-Barid got no warning of an impending
assault, and so no opportunity to avoid it, resulting in a humanitarian
crisis among the sector of the population least equipped to sustain
it. Four days into the bombardment, those Palestinian refugees
who were able to leave -- over two thirds of the population of
31,000 to 40,000 people -- left. According to UN figures, 4,487
Nahr al-Barid families have sought shelter in the nearby Baddawi
camp. Another 895 families have turned to friends and family
in Tripoli or else points further south. At least 20 civilians
have been killed in the Tripoli camp, though limited access to
the camp has made it difficult to verify the figures. Fatah al-Islam
appears dug in for the duration.
On June 3,
the violence in Nahr al-Barid reverberated in the ‘Ayn
al-Hilwa camp in the southern coastal city of Sidon, when gunmen
from the militant Jund al-Sham group attacked a nearby army checkpoint.
The two-day exchange of fire that ensued left two more Lebanese
soldiers dead. The reinforced UNIFIL contingent that has been
guarding Israel’s northern border since the end of the
34-day war in August 2006 was nervous about its security even
before this violence. An unclaimed Katyusha rocket attack into
northern Israel on the afternoon of June 17 has only added to
ambient anxieties about the ramifications of the country's deteriorating
security situation.
If past precedent
is anything to go by, most of the questions surrounding the immediate
causes of this crisis will remain unanswered. One thing that
can be said for certain is that the violence in Nahr al-Barid,
and thus in ‘Ayn al-Hilwa, is embedded in the Lebanese
state’s struggle to fill the vacuum caused by the termination
of its relationship with the Syrian security apparatus following
the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri and the departure of Syrian
troops from Lebanon in the spring of 2005. The Syrian pullout
fulfilled one major stipulation of UN Security Council Resolution
1559 passed in September 2004, the other being the “disbanding
and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.” The
refusal of Hizballah to dissolve its Islamic Resistance, a refusal
reinforced by the fight with Israel in 2006, is one issue underlying
the Lebanese political stalemate. But another explosive question
raised by UNSC 1559 was how the state might seek to apply it
to Palestinian and other armed groups operating in Lebanon’s
refugee camps.
For all the
deep-seated differences between the Siniora government and the
Hizballah-led opposition, the Lebanese political class has been
united behind support for the army in its drive to root out Fatah
al-Islam from Nahr al-Barid. The Siniora government called upon
Washington to redouble its commitment to resupplying the army,
and Washington responded with alacrity, airlifting materiel to
Beirut in a military transport. In his highly anticipated May
25 speech on the crisis, Hizballah Secretary-General Sayyid Hasan
Nasrallah condemned the airlift as a marker of widening US intervention
in Lebanon. He was nevertheless careful to draw two red lines
at Nahr al-Barid, warning against any attack upon the Palestinians,
whom Hizballah has so often claimed to champion, and condemning
any attack upon the army, with which the Shi‘i party has
had a warm working relationship over the years.
If Lebanese
politicians on both sides of the government-opposition divide
have emphasized support for the army over empathy for human suffering
in the camps, their rhetoric betrays the marginality of the refugee
community. It also reflects the centrality of the Lebanese army
in the ongoing contest over the future direction of state policy.
At the end of the day, it is entirely likely that the Palestinians
in Lebanon will be three-time losers in this bloody episode:
enduring the humanitarian crisis that grows out of it, shouldering
the burden of containing it and suffering a backlash in Lebanese
political opinion for being seen as somehow responsible for it.
The anti-Palestinian feeling in Lebanon is all the more bitterly
ironic since so few of the radical Sunni Islamists battling the
Lebanese army in Nahr al-Barid are themselves Palestinian.
ONE “SECURITY
ISLAND” IN AN ARCHIPELAGO
There are
two complementary narratives of the Palestinian refugees’ condition
in Lebanon. The most common in Lebanese political circles is
that of the camps’ political autonomy, which dates back
to before the beginning of the country’s last civil war
in 1975.
In the late
1960s, the heavy-handed tactics of Lebanese police and intelligence
operatives in the camps clashed with the growing Palestinian
militancy there. The state’s security forces were eventually
ejected, as sanctioned by the 1969 Cairo Accords concluded between
Lebanon and the PLO. During the presidency of Amin Gemayel, who
was installed after the Israeli invasion of 1982, Lebanon unilaterally
abrogated this agreement. But the Cairo Accords were not replaced,
either with an alternative administrative arrangement for the
camps or with an effective liaison mechanism between the camps’ administration
and the Lebanese state. This informal relationship remained unchanged
throughout the Syrian “presence” of 1976-2005.
By the late
1990s, when Fatah militants reasserted that party’s dominance
in ‘Ayn al-Hilwa, there was a de facto division of labor
in Lebanon’s camps: Fatah controlled those south of Beirut,
while the Syrian security services were the power broker in Beirut
and points north. It was this system of bifurcated governance
that gave birth to politicians’ descriptions of the camps
as “security islands” -- no-go zones for Lebanese
security men that could be readily blamed for periodic acts of
brazen criminality. The term is cynical for a host of reasons.
Contrary to
much opinion in Lebanon, the Palestinian refugees there are not
by nature criminals. Their legal status in the country has merely
criminalized their condition. They share none of the civil liberties
of Lebanese citizens, or of Palestinians who fled to Jordan,
Syria or other Arab countries after the 1948 and 1967 wars. They
are forbidden from building inside the camps, owning property
or working in jobs other than the most menial. They must rely
on the dwindling resources of the UN Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA) for their children’s schooling and other basic
public services. Institutions that once helped to sustain the
refugee community have been in steady decline since the removal
of the PLO headquarters from Beirut in 1982. The 1993 Oslo agreement,
which saw the PLO divert its administrative and financial energies
from the diaspora to the parts of the West Bank and Gaza controlled
by the new Palestinian Authority, corresponded to deep cuts in
UNRWA’s budget. Faced with such obstacles, refugees trying
to scrape out the semblance of a living sometimes pay bribes
to work for sub-par wages or spend exorbitant sums to emigrate
illegally -- a practice that has made Lebanon’s the only
refugee community in the Arab world that is actually shrinking.
Nahr al-Barid
suffers problems endemic to Lebanon’s refugee camps and
informal gathering places: a lack of proper water, sewage and
electricity infrastructure, overcrowding, poverty and unemployment.
The UN estimates that over 25 percent of Nahr al-Barid’s
residents live in abject poverty, defined in Lebanon’s
2003 National Millennium Development Goal Report as expenditure
of less than $1.30 per day. It is a mark of the Palestinian condition
in Lebanon that, before the present crisis, Nahr al-Barid was
considered the most economically robust of the country’s
camps. Its market bustled with activity -- whether because it
served as an entrepot for goods smuggled from Syria or because
of the low rents that made it a natural conduit for agricultural
goods headed from the northern countryside into Tripoli and for
cheap manufactures from Tripoli destined for the hinterland.
As a result of the army’s siege upon Nahr al-Barid, of
course, this modest economic success story has been abruptly
curtailed.
The “security
islands” rhetoric is also misleading because both the Lebanese
and Syrian security apparatuses have worked informally with the
Palestinian political organizations in the camps, so that the
Lebanese could apprehend people there who were not protected
by Lebanese or Syrian interests.
Finally, speaking
of the camps as “security islands” reinforces the
fiction that the Lebanese state has forever yearned to assert
full sovereignty over the entire country. In practice, the decentralized
administration of the Palestinian camps has been just one variation
on a theme of rule whereby the Lebanese state effectively outsourced
its responsibilities and prerogatives. By this system, confessional
politicians dispense services like health care and garbage removal
to their constituents as patronage. In the period of Syrian hegemony
over Lebanon, local security was delegated to different political
groups on a case-by-case basis depending on their relationship
with Damascus. In areas where Damascus' allies held sway -- from
Druze lord Walid Jumblatt (before he shifted to the “Syria
out!” side in 2005) to Hizballah (Jumblatt's present bête
noire) -- groups minded their own turf, with or without the cooperation
of the state security apparatus. Where banned “anti-Syrian” groups
held sway, Syrian secret police were particularly overbearing.
Far from exceptional, then, “security islands” like
Nahr al-Barid were, and are, simply part of the archipelago that
is post-civil war Lebanon.
Arbitrary
in its operation, this fractured system of governance faced profound
challenges with the Syrian withdrawal. In the camps, Palestinian
organizations tried to fill the political vacuum. In Nahr al-Barid,
it was players from Hamas and Fatah who struggled to assert themselves.
Spokesmen from left-leaning Palestinian organizations report
that the struggle was inconclusive because Hamas is simply too
new a presence in the camp to be “number two,” let
alone the dominant force.
Another reason
for the persistence of the vacuum is Lebanon’s vague administrative
relationship with the Palestinian refugee community as a whole.
The Siniora government accepted the principle of reopening the
PLO office in Beirut in May 2006, but the office’s status
has remained ambiguous. “Is the PLO office merely the representative
of the Palestinian Authority in Lebanon?” muses Suhayl
al-Natour, of the Palestinian Human Development Center, aligned
with the leftist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. “Or
is it responsible for organizing the Palestinian community in
Lebanon?”
This was the
uncertain security situation Fatah al-Islam entered in late 2006.
FATAH AL-ISLAM
Insofar as
Western media are cued to labels, there is a strong inclination
to assume that Fatah al-Islam is a group of Islamist terrorists
somehow related to the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli
occupation of Palestinian land.
The organization’s
founder Shakir al-‘Absi is of this lineage, having begun
his militant career as a member of Fatah, the secular party that
is the largest component of the PLO. Potent a symbol as Palestinian
disenfranchisement is, the group ‘Absi purportedly commands
appears as representative of Palestinian national interests as
Joseph Stalin was of his native Georgia. There are contending
stories about who ‘Absi and his band work (or worked) for,
which is interesting since so many groups have disavowed him,
and ‘Absi them.
‘Absi
departed Fatah sometime after Israel’s 1982 defeat of Palestinian
fighters in Lebanon and joined the Syrian-aligned Fatah al-Intifada.
Syrian authorities arrested him in 2000 and sentenced him to
three years in prison on charges of smuggling arms to and from
Jordan. Four years later, a Jordanian court condemned him to
death in absentia for the shooting of US diplomat Lawrence Foley
in October 2002. He was sentenced alongside Jordanian-born al-Qaeda
leader Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi.
Shortly after
his release from Syrian prison in 2003, it seems ‘Absi
went to Iraq to join the resistance to the US invasion, fighting
alongside groups loyal to al-Qaeda and becoming acquainted with
its leadership there. Upon returning from Iraq, ‘Absi relocated
to Lebanon’s western Bekaa Valley, joining Fatah al-Intifada
members operating out of the village of Halwa.
‘Absi
split with Fatah al-Intifada in late 2006. He appeared on the
Lebanese radar in November 2006 as Fatah al-Islam leader after
he and his coterie of foreign jihadis had taken control of Fatah
al-Intifada’s facilities in Nahr al-Barid. Testimonies
from Nahr al-Barid refugees disavow any connection to ‘Absi’s
people, a claim that is bolstered by the absence of Palestinians
among the slain militants. It remains unclear how he and his
followers ensconced themselves in the camp.
Syrian officials
and their allies in Lebanon label Fatah al-Islam as al-Qaeda
operatives. It is not an imaginative accusation. Though Fatah
al-Islam has denied any institutional links to al-Qaeda, the
global Sunni militancy ‘Absi advocates echoes that of al-Qaeda
and Fatah al-Islam’s statements have appeared on salafi
websites. In a Reuters interview in March, ‘Absi said Fatah
al-Islam wanted to implement shari‘a law among Lebanon’s
Palestinian refugee community before confronting Israel.
The Saudi-owned
al-‘Arabiyya channel has advanced a theory that ‘Absi
is just the front man for an even murkier cabal of multinational
Islamist conspirators including one ‘Abd al-Karim al-Saadi,
aka “Abu Muhjin.” This fierce-looking Palestinian
bogeyman was cast as the mastermind behind the criminal activities
of the Lebanese-Palestinian salafi group ‘Usbat al-Ansar
before disappearing into the “security island” of ‘Ayn
al-Hilwa.
Lebanese government
and security spokesmen say Fatah al-Islam are agents of Damascus,
claiming that, in the wake of a pair of fatal bus bombings north
of Beirut on February 13, police arrested four Syrians who confessed
their links to Fatah al-Islam. ‘Absi has denied these accusations,
as has Damascus. The Lebanese version casts Fatah al-Islam as
characters in the latest installment in a saga of Syrian meddling
in Lebanon intended to remind Lebanese -- and the international
community -- of Damascus’ indispensable role in maintaining
Lebanese security. This version of events resonates among supporters
of the Siniora government because it seems so amply confirmed
by Lebanon’s recent history.
Logistically,
someone in Syria must have played some role in facilitating the
militants’ movement into Lebanon -- ‘Absi having
been in Syria beforehand and many of his men reportedly having
come from Iraq. The debate rests on whether they secured free
passage through Syria or were actually paid to stir up trouble
in Lebanon. Those who “know” the latter to be true
argue less from verifiable fact than from assumptions of the
Syrian state’s pervasive malevolence.
Sensitive
to their hosts’ custom of blaming others for their troubles,
Lebanon’s various Palestinian organizations have all denounced
Fatah al-Islam, too. Their spokesmen have pointed out the Lebanese
government has its own share of responsibility in this matter.
Nahr al-Barid does not exactly straddle the Lebanese-Syrian border,
and these militants had to cross Lebanese territory to get to
the camp. There are those, however, who would step beyond deriding
the Lebanese state’s incompetence in permitting Fatah al-Islam
to set up shop, and accuse it of complicity.
SINIORA AND
THE “SHIITE CRESCENT”
In March, The
New Yorker’s Seymour Hersh published an article suggesting
that the Siniora government has been a party to Fatah al-Islam’s
establishing a toehold in Lebanon. Hersh argues that Fatah
al-Islam was one salafi organization among many that received
funds from the Hariri family, whether acting on its own account
or as an executor of Saudi wishes.
Hersh’s
Lebanon-based sources reproduced a scenario that has been applied
to the course of Lebanese politics since the start of the summer
2006 war. In one anecdote to emerge since the Nahr al-Barid crisis
began, Fatah al-Islam did not go to the Hariri-owned Banque de
la Méditerranée on May 19 to rob it, but to cash
a check (or checks) made out in their name. The masks and guns
came out only when they found someone had stopped payment.
No evidence
has been presented to prove Hariri entanglement in the origins
of the Nahr al-Barid fighting. Unfortunately, the theory is not
entirely baseless, either. It draws upon growing fears among “moderate” Sunni
regimes like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt of a resurgent “Shiite
crescent” in the Arab east, the Hariri family’s close
business and personal ties to the Saudi royal family and the
evident community of interests among these regimes and the Siniora
government in its ongoing struggle with Hizballah. Hizballah
supporters point, for instance, to the initial timidity with
which the Siniora government condemned Israel’s summer
2006 bombing campaign.
The Future
Movement’s relationship with Sunni Islamism goes back further
than the summer war. Since the civil war, Lebanese Sunnis have
been regarded as a sect without a militia. Rafiq al-Hariri cultivated
this image, distancing Future from organizations like al-Jama‘a
al-Islamiyya -- which, if thuggish, is ideologically closer to
the Muslim Brotherhood than the salafis. The realities of Lebanese
society, and the clientelist electoral politics that reflects
it, made it impossible to ignore these groups, however, and their
marginal constituency.
At the start
of Lebanon’s 2005 parliamentary elections, Future and al-Jama‘a
al-Islamiyya declared there would be no electoral alliance between
them. Since the first two rounds were virtually uncontested wins
for Future and Hizballah, respectively, this was a simple matter.
When, a week later, Michel Aoun emerged a victor in the third
round and threatened to repeat his performance in the fourth
(northern Lebanon), though, Future swung into action. Saad al-Hariri
spent lavishly to support the Future list in the north, and,
by all accounts, the poor Sunni villagers there turned out in
droves. A portion of this largesse certainly went to al-Jama‘a
al-Islamiyya. Some of it likely ended up with more extreme Islamist
groups.
Hariri’s
ticket took all of northern Lebanon’s 28 seats and his
allies won the majority of seats in Parliament. The new legislature’s
first order of business was to keep certain political promises
to Hariri’s partners in the “Syria out!” demonstrations
following the assassination of his father. The most prominent
of these promises was the release of Lebanese Forces leader Samir
Geagea, serving a life sentence for the murder of then-prime
minister Rashid Karami, among others. The parliamentary pardon
of Geagea on July 18, 2005 overshadowed another amnesty to a
group of Sunni Muslim militants charged with being involved in
Islamist cells connected to subversive activities.
In their number
were 26 men tried for involvement in the Diniyya insurgency of
1999-2000, which saw more than 40 people killed, including 11
Lebanese soldiers. Another seven detainees, from Majdal Anjar
in the Bekaa, had been held since September 2004, accused of
plotting to attack Western diplomats, embassies and Lebanese
security facilities. The 2005 International Crisis Group report
Hersh cites in his article notes that Saad al-Hariri paid $48,000
to bail out the Diniyya Islamists before obtaining parliamentary
pardon for them.
More recently,
a couple of months before the present crisis developed, salafis
associated with Sidon’s Jund al-Sham group were in conflict
with their neighbors in a quarter adjacent to ‘Ayn al-Hilwa.
Sidon deputy Bahiyya al-Hariri (Saad’s aunt) defused the
problem by paying Jund al-Sham members some thousands of dollars
to leave the neighborhood. Various Palestinian sources agree
several of these militants decamped to join ‘Absi in Nahr
al-Barid.
The events
of June 3 suggest some Jund al-Sham did remain in ‘Ayn
al-Hilwa. When the violence flared up there, the badly taxed
Lebanese army fought alongside gunmen loyal to Sultan Abu al-‘Aynayn,
the long-time PLO military commander in Lebanon. Since then,
a tense calm has returned to the Sidon camp, and a security force
has been set up to act as a buffer between Jund al-Sham and the
army. It is comprised of Islamists toting M-16s, reportedly from
the ‘Usbat al-Ansar, the group from which Jund al-Sham
split.
Whether or
not the Hariris and their Saudi supporters have a soft spot for
salafis is not the point. Rather, it is the culture of cooptation
that has marked the Lebanese government’s approach to the
challenges confronting the country since the Syrian withdrawal.
Rafiq al-Hariri deployed his financial resources to great effect
during his political career, but his purchase of loyalties was
embedded in the Syrian occupation’s security regime. With
the Syrians gone, and with Sunnis set against their Shi‘i
countrymen -- and with them the specter of Hizballah, the militants
who stopped the Israeli army, Lebanese find the line between
purchased loyalties and militant outsourcing a fuzzy one.
“ANOTHER
DISASTER”
None are touchier
about the issue of outsourcing than the Palestinians themselves.
Early in the Nahr al-Barid fighting, the Palestinian political
organizations were told they had to take a stand on Fatah al-Islam,
despite the fact that its membership is not exclusively Arab,
let alone Palestinian. When the crisis was ignited in Tripoli,
it was obvious Abu al-‘Aynayn would have liked nothing
better than to dispatch Fatah men to Nahr al-Barid to consolidate
PLO influence there.
Speaking before
the violence in ‘Ayn al-Hilwa, the DFLP's Suhayl al-Natour
expressed grave misgivings about Palestinians being contracted
to fight for the Lebanese government. “Who has the authority
to use arms in the camps? The Lebanese government has mandated
no one. They say, ‘You are like our security elements and
you have the capacity to bring these people to justice,’ but
it’s not the case. Carrying a gun is a common habit in
Lebanon, but any civilian that carries a gun is doing so to protect
his family and his house if he’s attacked. To ask him to
[assume a policing role] is to ask him to assume the responsibilities
of the state.”
For Palestinians
who survived the repeated destruction and siege of their camps
during the civil war, the Nahr al-Barid crisis brings back many
bad memories. Some of those who fled the Tripoli camp after hostilities
began say they have already been displaced five times in their
lives. Natour is wary of the scapegoating of Palestinians made
likely by the overall political climate, where concern for the
thousands of refugees rendered homeless once more is completely
drowned out by paeans to the Lebanese army, whose symbolic power
as the repository of pined-for national unity has long been greater
than its combat effectiveness. Called upon to actually fight,
the army has sustained serious losses -- as of mid-June, 69 soldiers
had lost their lives. “I think a lot of Lebanese will say, ‘Fucking
Palestinians killed our sons and brothers in the army,’” says
Natour, “even if they know it wasn’t Palestinians
who did the killing and that many Palestinians were killed because
of them.”
Indeed, some
Lebanese politicians have already spoken in similar terms. Former
President and Lebanese Forces leader Amin Gemayel explicitly
wed the camps to al-Qaeda, suggesting the presence of “evil
terrorist forces” necessitated the “cleansing of
the camps.” “No matter how much the Palestinians
may deny their relationship with these destructive elements,” the
Maronite elder statesman continued, “the certain truth
is that they have found themselves a place inside the camps without
Palestinian opposition.” Such remarks raise questions in
Palestinian circles about the means Lebanon and its Western allies
might employ to implement the disarmament of “non-Lebanese
militias” called for in UNSC 1559. Upon leaving Nahr al-Barid,
one displaced Palestinian refugee reported a Lebanese soldier
promising that the army would soon clean out all the camps in
exactly this manner.
Natour expresses
the fear that the Palestinian condition in Lebanon as a whole
will wind up as collateral damage of the Lebanese state’s
forcible assertion of sovereignty in Nahr al-Barid. “It’s
a disaster. Another disaster. You have to pay the price for no
reason, without any possible gain in the future. When you fight
the Israelis, you may make national demands, but with the Lebanese
it’s only a matter of human rights. You can’t win
human rights through military action.”

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