Birth
Pangs of a New Palestine
Mouin Rabbani
January 7,
2009
(Mouin Rabbani
is an independent analyst based in Amman and a contributing editor
of Middle East Report.)
For
background on the Gaza siege, see Darryl Li, “Disengagement
and the Frontiers of Zionism,” Middle East Report
Online, February 16, 2008.
For
background on Israeli-Palestinian talks, see Robert Blecher
and Mouin Rabbani, “In
Annapolis, Conflict by Other Means,” Middle East
Report Online, November 26, 2007. |
Shortly after
11:30 am on December 27, 2008, at the height of the midday bustle
on the first day of the Gazan week and with multitudes of schoolchildren
returning home from the morning shift, close to 90 Israeli warplanes
launched over 100 tons of explosives at some 100 targets throughout
the 139 square miles of the Gaza Strip. Within minutes, the near
simultaneous air raids killed more than 225 and wounded at least
700, more than 200 of them critically. These initial attacks
alone produced dozens more dead than any other day in the West
Bank and Gaza combined since Israel’s occupation of those lands
commenced in June 1967.
After a week
of sustained aerial and naval bombardment encompassing the length
and breadth of the Gaza Strip, Israel on January 3 escalated
its unprecedented onslaught with artillery barrages and a ground
invasion. As expected, this new phase produced an immediate and
horrific increase in casualties, particularly among Palestinian
civilians, in both absolute and proportional terms. The Palestinian
death toll now tops 625. In a number of cases, entire families
were wiped out in neighborhoods transformed into free-fire zones.
On January
6, hours after three cousins were killed when Israel bombed the
UN-run Asma Elementary School in Gaza City, 46 Palestinian civilians
were killed and 100 wounded when Israel shelled the al-Fakhoura
school -- also operated by the world body -- in the Jabalya refugee
camp. “Shortly after,” the Financial Times reported the
following day, “the Israeli military e-mailed journalists a link
to a YouTube video purportedly showing militants firing mortars
from a UN-run school in Gaza -- but it was dated October 2007.”
Protesting “the complete absence of accountability” and calling
for an independent investigation into the bloodbath, the UN was,
according to the Guardian, “particularly incensed over
targeting of the schools, because Israeli forces knew they were
packed with families as they had ordered them to get out of their
homes with leaflet drops and loudspeakers. It said it had identified
the schools as refugee centers to the Israeli military and provided
GPS coordinates.”
Meanwhile,
Israel’s political objective remains to be clearly enunciated.
Under the rubric of achieving a transformation of the security
equation in the south of the country, Israeli cabinet members
have promoted outcomes ranging from a new ceasefire agreement
with Hamas that reflects Israel’s terms, to regime change in
the coastal territory, to the outright eradication of the Islamist
movement. Similarly, Israeli leaders have wavered between predicting
a short, sharp campaign resulting in decisive victory and a long,
difficult slog that would bear fruit only with the passage of
time.
Fresh memories
of Israel’s failed 2006 war on Lebanon have meant that -- across
the political spectrum -- the last war is the standard against
which virtually every aspect of the current one is being measured.
Yet closer examination suggests that the more apt comparisons
are with Israel’s 2002 invasion of West Bank cities and the 1982
invasion of Lebanon. These operations may also provide better
indicators of what is to come in Gaza.
A Deceptive
Calm
The six-month,
Egyptian-mediated ceasefire between Israel and Hamas that began
on June 19, 2008 was a significant political milestone. Previously,
Israel had dismissed unilateral Palestinian ceasefires in which
Hamas and other Palestinian militant organizations participated
as irrelevant “agreements among terrorists” that would have no
bearing on its conduct. Alternatively, Israel had agreed to temporary
lulls in the conflict by negotiating only with Palestinian interlocutors
who accepted the gamut of Israeli preconditions for any dialogue.
The June 2008 agreement, termed the tahdi’a (“calming”),
was by contrast concluded indirectly with a movement that refused
to recognize Israel, rejected the Oslo “peace process” of the
1990s and proclaimed resistance as a viable alternative. Similarly,
Hamas preferred to endure a punishing US-led boycott, a devastating
Israeli-Egyptian siege and increasingly bloody Israeli incursions
rather than capitulate to US and European demands (backed by
the UN and half-heartedly by Russia) that it accept the various
strictures of the defunct 1993 Oslo agreement and the stillborn
2003 “road map.” In accepting those documents, Hamas believed,
it would effectively become an adjunct member of the “new Middle
East” whose “birth pangs” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
discerned in the 2006 bombardment of Lebanon.
For Israel,
the tahdi’a was no less of a political blow than its 1981
ceasefire -- brokered by the US and UN -- with its previous Palestinian
arch-nemesis, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Once
again, it was making agreements with a foe it had assiduously
worked to delegitimize and place beyond the pale of permissible
engagement by others. This foe, much like the PLO in the early
1980s, stridently rejected Zionism while -- in its own contorted
style -- making it increasingly clear that it was prepared to
accept a two-state settlement.
The tahdi’a was
also concluded for broadly similar reasons. Where the 1981 ceasefire
was required to put an end to PLO artillery and missile barrages
that, during the 1981 “mini-war,” paralyzed life in northern
Israel at the peak of the tourist season, leading to major economic
losses, Israeli military analysts in early 2008 began to speak
of a real change in the capabilities of the ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam
Brigades, the Hamas military wing. The analysts described the
Qassam Brigades as an increasingly coherent, disciplined and
effective force with growing command and tactical capabilities.
It less and less resembled the rival al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades,
which emerged in 2000-2001 during the second uprising in the
Occupied Territories and are nominally loyal to Fatah, the main
constituent party of the Palestinian Authority (PA). More and
more, the Qassam Brigades exhibited characteristics reminiscent
of Hizballah, Israel’s formidable adversary to the north.
An added complication
was that PA President Mahmoud Abbas was no longer available to
conclude the agreement on the Islamists’ behalf. After Hamas
seized power in Gaza in June 2007, the president’s agenda was
dominated by and, to a large extent, limited to a rollback of
the “coup.” Key Abbas aides and officials of the loyalist Ramallah-based
government were prone to describing Israel and the Ramallah PA
-- sometimes on the record, more often in private -- as members
of a coalition confronting a “common enemy” that was furthermore
acting at the behest of Iran and Syria. Many in the Abbas camp
looked at matters this way: Fatah and other threats to Hamas
rule in Gaza, whether real or perceived, were effectively disarmed
and neutralized; the prospects of an anti-Islamist popular uprising
were less than slim; and boycott and siege had failed to dislodge
their Palestinian rivals. Hence the Israeli military represented
their best and perhaps last hope for a reversal of fortune.
Israel, however,
was not yet ready to consummate the alliance. Determined to erase
the stain of its 2006 Lebanese debacle and desperate to avoid
a repetition, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Chief of Staff
Gabi Ashkenazi and other senior officials believed that more
time was required to prepare for the reckoning, even if this
meant that Hamas too would strengthen in the interim. As recounted
in the Israeli press in late December 2008, planning began in
early 2007, with operational preparations commencing during the tahdi’a negotiations
and accelerating after the truce was concluded. The blueprint
was finalized in early November, approved by Barak on the nineteenth
day of that month, and submitted for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s
authorization on December 19.
Although it
is unwritten, the tahdi’a’s contents have been specified
by its Egyptian midwife and leave little to the imagination:
an immediate, comprehensive and reciprocal cessation of hostilities
between Israel and the Gaza Strip, leading to a scheduled and
full termination of the Israeli blockade (excepting materials
used to produce projectiles and explosives), as well as a resumption
of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on a prisoner exchange and
Palestinian-Egyptian talks on regulating the Rafah crossing.
According to the Egyptians, the agreement makes no mention of
restrictions on Palestinian arms smuggling. At Annapolis, Maryland
in November 2007, President George W. Bush had heralded the dawn
of a reinvigorated peace process that was expressly designed
to exclude Hamas. Yet notwithstanding the thousands of hours
Abbas and his serial negotiators spent with their Israeli counterparts,
the most significant Israeli-Palestinian agreement since the
Annapolis conference has been concluded with the Islamists.
The tahdi’a was
violated by both Israel and various Palestinian organizations.
While these infractions produced occasional fatalities -- all
28 of them Palestinian -- Israeli sources concur that Palestinian
violations were few and less frequent as time went on. According
to a December 2008 publication by the Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration
Center, for example, the number of Palestinian projectiles launched
from Gaza into Israel decreased from 2,278 during the six months
before the tahdi’a to 329 during it, with most of the
latter being fired after hostilities resumed on November 4. A
good proportion of the remainder, furthermore, were fired during
the first 10 days of the truce while Hamas acted to establish
control over organizations that did not countenance an agreement
limited to the Gaza Strip or had other reasons for undermining
the tahdi’a.
Thus, according
to statistics disseminated by the Israeli consulate in New York,
the sum total of Palestinian projectiles launched between July
1 and November 1, 2008 stood at 15 mortar shells and 11 rockets
with no fatalities recorded. While by no means 100 percent secure,
the southern Israeli town of Sderot was hardly living under a
ceaseless rocket barrage.
Nevertheless,
Israel and Egypt refused to lift the siege, spurning Hamas’ key
demand and primary incentive to enter into the deal. Indeed,
although the blockade was eased for many (but by no means all)
basic goods, imports consistently fell below Palestinian requirements
and exports remained non-existent. More to the point, according
to the International Crisis Group, Israeli officials said that
“they did not intend to open the crossings fully and anticipated
this would be a serious bone of contention.”
The Long
Prelude
The countdown
to conflict began not with the expiration of the ceasefire on
December 19, but rather on November 4. With the world fixated
on the drama of the US presidential election, Israel launched
an unprovoked incursion into the Gaza Strip that left six Palestinians,
all members of the Qassam Brigades, dead. Israel claimed that
the army had successfully foiled an imminent attempt to provide
Gilad Shalit, the Israeli corporal captured by Palestinian fighters
in June 2006, with some company. But these claims were widely
ridiculed by Israeli military correspondents. Greater credence
was given to the view that this was a premeditated and purposeful
raid intended to elicit a response from Hamas that would furnish
a pretext to dismantle the ceasefire.
Indeed, the
period between November 4 and December 19 -- during which, again,
all fatalities were Palestinian -- was characterized by growing
escalation by both sides, including an unprecedented tightening
of the blockade by Israel and Egypt. Poverty levels climbed further
into the stratosphere, malnutrition skyrocketed and essential
supplies of every sort ran out. Even before the latest emergency
spurred UN agencies and the Red Cross to warn of imminent collapse,
former UN human rights commissioner Mary Robinson had on a November
4 visit denounced international indifference to the “shocking
violation of so many human rights” of Gaza’s population as “almost
unbelievable.” “Their whole civilization has been destroyed,”
she concluded. “I’m not exaggerating.”
Finally, on
December 18, Hamas announced it would not unilaterally extend
the truce upon its expiration and would only resume the arrangement
if Israel adhered to its previous commitment to lift the siege.
Absent the cycle of violence initiated by Israel in early November,
it is readily conceivable that Hamas would have continued to
hold its rocket and mortar fire, while refusing to extend the tahdi’a in
name, and using the absence of a ceasefire commitment as leverage
to remove the blockade.
While there
was significant agitation within Islamist ranks to reject the
unilateral extension of an arrangement that had yet to be implemented
by Israel (and during which the parties also failed to reach
agreement on a prisoner exchange), perhaps the more significant
factor is that popular opposition to the tahdi’a was becoming
increasingly widespread, expanding the ranks and strengthening
the hand of like-minded members within the movement. For much
of public opinion, Hamas had achieved only a cessation of hostilities,
whose benefits were outweighed by the costs of the continued
siege. Duly noted by Hamas was grumbling that Gaza’s new rulers
were prepared to see Palestinians drown in poverty and starve
to death in order to maintain an agreement with Israel that kept
them in power.
By acting
as it did, Israel was responding to intolerable shelling of its
territory only insofar as -- exactly as in June 1982 -- it knowingly
and deliberately produced this situation in order to explode
the tahdi’a and in so doing manufacture a pretext for
war. Rather than putting an end to rocket fire, which, again,
prior to November 4 was both negligible and limited to the immediate
border region, the main military rationale for Operation Cast
Lead was to reverse Hamas’ military development and prevent the
regeneration of its existing capabilities after the conclusion
of hostilities.
The above
notwithstanding, the primary rationale for the onslaught on Gaza
was political rather than military. Specifically, Hamas’ demonstrated
capacity to make and uphold agreements with Israel put Israel
in a quandary, in light of the Islamists’ growing willingness,
particularly since 2005, to coexist with and even support a two-state
settlement. A new agreement -- particularly if augmented by one
between Hamas and Abbas (the prospects of which would have been
enhanced) -- would have been utilized by European states and
others, who had painted themselves into a corner by singing for
too long and too loudly from Washington’s neo-conservative hymn
sheet, to find ways to engage with Hamas. That the movement has,
according to the Israeli Foreign Ministry website, carried out
a grand total of one suicide attack in Israel since March 2005
(shortly before a previous ceasefire -- most others were claimed
by Islamic Jihad) would only have facilitated such engagement.
Indeed, throughout
the spring and summer of 2008 European diplomats and officials
had been discussing with increasing openness how, when and under
what circumstances they would begin to revise their bankrupt
policy of hiding the sun with Javier Solana’s finger. As in 1982,
the main impact of the Islamists’ integration into the regional
and international political calculus would have been a renewed
focus on Israel’s settlement enterprise; unlike with Abbas and
his serial negotiators, the chances are slight, at least for
the time being, that the Islamists and their constituents could
be kept permanently on board with illusory promises of an eventual
entity masking the reality of longer walls and bigger settlements.
The prospect that they would accept, and additionally be able
to deliver, a permanent status agreement of the sort proposed
by Bush -- rejected by the late Yasser Arafat but long since
internalized by Abbas -- seems equally unlikely. Most importantly,
where Bush envisions a future Palestinian leader applying for
an Israeli visa to visit settlements such as Ma’ale Adumim or
Ariel that would collectively slice the West Bank in three, Hamas
has thus far insisted that only a full Israeli withdrawal to
the 1967 boundary -- and therefore the removal of all settlements
and a complete Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem -- would
be acceptable. So a hammer blow that shattered the movement,
launching some of the resulting splinters in directions that
once again put all of them beyond the pale, was the most effective
way to keep at bay those third parties reaching the conclusion
that engaging rather than excluding Hamas could enhance the prospects
of peace. And if, having taken their punishment, Hamas leaders
were to become accustomed to the concept of the “new Middle East,”
and begin spawning serial negotiators rather than armed fighters,
so much the better.
As for the
assault’s timing, the Israeli elections scheduled for February
10 offer only a partial explanation, since in addition to providing
an opportunity for electoral gain they also impose an artificial
deadline that may complicate Israel’s military effort. Rather,
it appears that the key date was December 19, 2008, when the tahdi’a would
run out and Israel would confront the specter of a new agreement.
Secondly, it seems likely that a strike to weaken Hamas before
January 9, the date on which the Islamists insist Abbas’ presidential
term expires and they will no longer recognize his mandate, was
seen as an added benefit. Finally, concluding the campaign before
Barack Obama’s inauguration -- thus enabling him to keep the
Arab-Israeli file on the back burner rather than confronting
him with a crisis that cannot be avoided as he enters the White
House -- may also have entered into Israeli calculations. Alternatively,
some may have advocated one last effort to change the parameters
of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship before Bush departs,
which would simultaneously test the sincerity of Obama’s obeisance
to Israel on the campaign trail by putting him between the Jewish
state and demonic terrorists prepared to kill his daughters in
their sleep early in his term.
Israel’s
Way of Warfare
The opening
salvo of Israel’s assault on the Gaza Strip was neither an indiscriminate
bombing run on its 1.5 million residents nor a concentrated attack
on Hamas’ leadership, chain of command, military capacity and
organizational infrastructure. Rather, like the initial phase
of Israel’s March-May 2002 West Bank campaign (and very unlike
the 2006 Lebanon war), the bombings were focused on government
infrastructure and particularly the security forces, with the
aim of crippling them.
Israeli leaders
had indicated as much beforehand, threatening that, in addition
to Hamas, any structure, institution, facility or person linked
to the Islamist movement would be considered fair game. Given
that Hamas has been in sole control of Gaza since June 2007,
this threat effectively put the entire territory and its inhabitants
in the crosshairs. Indeed, most of those killed in the initial
air attacks were members of the civilian police force (in many
cases, new cadets attending graduation ceremonies) rather than
fighters in the Qassam Brigades. The most senior official killed
that day, police commander Gen. Tawfiq Jabr, was a member of
Fatah who switched his loyalty to the Islamist government in
2007.
A further
indication of the nature of Israel’s methods was provided in
press coverage of Israeli contingency planning for war with Hizballah,
Syria or Hamas. On October 5, 2008, the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz cited
Gadi Eisenkot, commander of the Israeli military’s northern sector,
explaining the “Dahiya Doctrine,” named after the extensive destruction
Israel inflicted on Beirut’s southern suburbs in 2006: “We will
wield disproportionate power against every village from which
shots are fired on Israel, and cause immense damage and destruction.
From our perspective, these are military bases. This isn’t a
suggestion. This is a plan that has already been authorized.”
Similarly, Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai in February 2008
threatened Gaza with “a shoah” if Palestinians continued firing
rockets across the boundary with Israel.
The Ha’aretz article
additionally quoted a pre-publication copy of a report authored
by Gabriel Siboni, a colonel in Israel’s reserves, calling for
“a disproportionate strike at the heart of the enemy’s weak spot,
in which efforts to hurt [rocket] launch capability are secondary.
As soon as the conflict breaks out, the [air force and army]
will have to operate in a rapid, determined, powerful and disproportionate
way against the enemy’s actions.” What this might entail is suggested
in a companion report by Giora Eiland, a former head of Israel’s
National Security Council, which calls for the wholesale destruction
of the military, government and civilian infrastructure of the
enemy entity.
Quite apart
from the impact a ton of high explosives precisely guided toward
targets within residential areas of one of the world’s most densely
populated territories necessarily has upon its surroundings,
the enunciated policy reveals a more fundamental reality about
where such munitions are being aimed. Indeed, during the first
week of the conflict the Israeli air force, in addition to its
painstaking destruction of every PA security installation in
the Gaza Strip, leveled numerous government facilities that can
by no stretch of the imagination be characterized as part of
any Palestinian military effort. These include the Palestinian
Legislative Council; the office of the president, prime ministry
and presidential guest house (used to accommodate foreign dignitaries);
ministerial headquarters, including those of culture, education,
justice, labor and public works; municipalities and governorates;
and numerous other vacated public buildings whose destruction
produced neither secondary explosions nor -- with the notable
exception of prisons -- casualties inside the premises.
The same might
be said for the homes of political leaders and military commanders,
whether of Hamas or other Palestinian organizations. Almost all
of these figures had gone underground several days before Israel
struck, and the possibility of successful assassination was further
reduced by numerous Israeli warnings of impending attack delivered
by phone and text message. (The primary exception in this regard,
Hamas leader Nizar Rayyan, had made a point of maintaining public
visibility, proclaimed his intent to remain in his house and
is said to have been obsessed with achieving martyrdom.)
Similarly,
the systematic attack on Hamas institutions and others affiliated
with the Islamist movement -- including the Islamic University
of Gaza, schools, clinics, mosques and welfare organizations,
as well as a television station, radio station and newspaper
-- bear scant relation to any military objective as conventionally
defined.
As Israel,
during the first week of Cast Lead, reduced widening swathes
of the Gaza Strip to rubble while pushing the casualty toll past
400 dead and 2,500 wounded -- with the proportion of civilians
among them consistently escalating -- its seemingly limitless
impunity exceeded even the wholesale exemptions from accountability
conferred in past campaigns. The tactics of the ground invasion
were described thus by an Israeli officer on January 7:
[F]rom our
point of view, being careful means being aggressive…. It will
take many years in order to restore this area to what it was
before.… When we suspect that a Palestinian fighter is hiding
in a house, we shoot it with a missile and then with two tank
shells, and then a bulldozer hits the wall. It causes damage
but it prevents the loss of life among soldiers.… We saw homes
where the meals were left uneaten. We see columns of women
and children with white flags, and of course we let them pass
toward Gaza City. On the other hand, every two hours there
are intelligence warnings about a female suicide bomber in
the area, so most of the soldiers also regard a convoy of civilians
as a real threat.
Israeli officials
have seen no need to go beyond the routine repetition of pro
forma statements about terrorists hiding behind civilians, and
of homes and mosques being used as arsenals and command centers,
for the simple reason that they have only rarely been challenged
to produce more imaginative rationalizations.
In the present
crisis, even the cynical declarations issued by various capitals
in previous conflicts that Israel should heed the laws of war
while engaging in legitimate self-defense have been jettisoned,
the Fourth Geneva Convention that governs the conduct of an occupying
power having already been consigned to the rubbish heap during
the Clinton years. As the first Israeli tanks rumbled into Gaza
in early January, the Presidency of the European Union instantaneously
proclaimed that the incursion was “a defensive, not offensive
action” -- a claim not even made by Israel, whose defense minister
that same evening termed the action an “offensive.” True to form,
American organizations like Human Rights Watch have saved their
harshest condemnations for the Palestinians, accusing them of
war crimes while equivocating as to the legality of Israeli actions.
The December
31, 2008 assassination of Nizar Rayyan is, in this respect, revealing.
The attack, which was carried out with a one-ton bomb on a residential
building and additionally killed over a dozen women and children,
was virtually identical to one conducted by Israel in July 2002
that liquidated Hamas military commander Salah Shihada and 14
civilians. Yet while the latter bombing -- hailed by the ex-premier
Ariel Sharon as a “one of our biggest successes” -- elicited
widespread international denunciation, the former was merely
noted to have transpired.
Methods
to the Madness
It is true,
as commonly observed, that Israel’s initial aerial campaign failed
to decapitate either Hamas or Islamic Jihad, vanquish them militarily
or even prevent the intensification of Palestinian rocket fire.
But the observation misses the point. As in 2002, Israel’s first
objective was to incapacitate public administration, sever the
link between government and people, and isolate the leadership,
rather than deal an immediate body blow to militant groups. And
as in the West Bank at the height of the second uprising, Israel
recognizes that smashing armed groups goes only so far; a sustainable
victory requires that the population be cowed into submission
and lose faith in its leaders and militants, with its energies
redirected toward more mundane projects such as obtaining basic
needs and services that the crippled government can no longer
provide, and protecting itself from the ensuing chaos in an increasingly
competitive environment.
In the case
of Hamas, this goal has additionally meant dismantling -- with
bombs and missiles launched from land, sea and air -- the network
of Islamist social, religious and charitable institutions that
preceded and laid the foundation for the emergence of the movement
as a political and military force in the late 1980s, and have
been vital to its ability to establish and maintain a support
base in every sector of Palestinian society. Israel concluded
that because the movement controls the PA in Gaza and has an
autonomous web of institutions that can provide services independently
of the government, both types of installation had to be destroyed.
Israel has,
to be sure, hardly neglected the task of decommissioning Hamas
and the Qassam Brigades, as well as smaller militant groups such
as Islamic Jihad and its Jerusalem Brigades or the Popular Resistance
Committees and their Saladin Brigades. With even the month-long
2002 battle for the Jenin refugee camp paling by comparison,
it is the most serious armed confrontation between Israel and
the Palestinians since the 1982 siege of Beirut.
The reasons
for the Palestinians’ comparatively high level of military preparedness
and strengthened capabilities are not so difficult to fathom.
In contrast to the West Bank, which the Oslo process transformed
into a series of fragmented Palestinian enclaves -- each wholly
surrounded by Israel and together constituting less than a fifth
of the entire territory -- Israel’s 1994 “redeployment” from
the Gaza Strip transformed the latter into a single, largely
contiguous Palestinian territory encircled by a combination of
small Israeli garrisons and ever more stringent border controls.
Even at the
height of the second intifada, Israel was never able to
fragment Gaza into more than three or four comparatively large
enclaves, and on account of its 2005 “disengagement,” these internal
controls were removed altogether. For 15 years, therefore, Gazans
of all stripes and colors have had almost unimpeded access to
every corner of their territory and to each other. Several, such
as Hamas military leader Ahmad Dayf, have managed to elude Israel
(and the PA) since the 1987-1993 intifada. Additionally,
on account of the closure first introduced during the 1991 Gulf
war and tightened with every passing year since, there has been
progressively less interaction between Israel and Palestinian
society in the Gaza Strip. Given that Israel also has not reestablished
direct control there since Oslo’s collapse (quite the contrary),
Palestinian society in Gaza is less penetrated by Israeli intelligence
than its West Bank counterpart.
Second, Hamas
has achieved immunity from the PA crackdowns that characterized
much of the 1990s, first on account of the eruption of the fall
2000 uprising (which also resulted in the release of its detainees),
and thereafter by virtue of the PA’s weakening at the hands of
Israel. Mahmoud Abbas, who from the very outset of the second
uprising denounced the Palestinian resort to arms and has consistently
been a fervent proponent of disarming paramilitaries, was unable
to make good on his promise of “one law, one gun and one authority”
-- least of all vis-à-vis Hamas. Rather, under his watch the
Gaza Strip descended into levels of chaos, fomented by Fatah
chiefs, so severe they would have shocked even Arafat.
Since 2006,
moreover, this immunity has been transformed into hegemony. The
Islamists’ victory in the PA parliamentary elections and entry
into government, despite the enervating international boycott,
Egyptian-Israeli siege and ceaseless sabotage by Abbas and Fatah
that ensued, gave Hamas access to PA resources and facilities.
And for the 18 months since its June 2007 seizure of power, Hamas
has had sole control within Gaza, during which it has ruthlessly
tracked down Fatah and eliminated other rivals, while the Qassam
Brigades have been armed and trained unfettered by leaders under
the spell of Bush’s visions or Fatah warlords widely despised
as collaborators with Israel and the CIA.
Hamas’ ability
to import, store and deploy more -- and more powerful -- weapons
through the tunnel network under the Palestinian-Egyptian border
and more recently by sea, as well as expertise, cash and other
resources needed to improve its fighting abilities, grew commensurately,
and helps to explain Israel’s willingness to enter into the Egyptian-mediated
truce of June 2008.
Ironically,
the constant pressure on the Islamist movement from Israel and,
later, the PA appears to have had beneficial side effects as
well. Over the course of two decades, Hamas and particularly
its military wing became accustomed to operating clandestinely,
their cadres experienced in maintaining anonymity and coping
with deprivation. Those who emerged from the shadows in 2006
and 2007 did not face a steep learning curve when they began
preparations for the Israeli onslaught.
That Hamas
and other groups are significantly better organized and better
armed than in 2007 has also been demonstrated in early January.
Rather than immediately committing their biggest guns to battle,
they are conserving forces to maintain the ability to stage a
lengthy defense of Gaza under conditions of (at best) minimal
mobility, and escalate their response as Israel’s attacks increase
in ferocity. Almost all of the leaders have not only eluded Israel’s
intelligence apparatus and overwhelming force, but have also
avoided being entirely cut off from their movement and the outside
world. On the ground, it is clear that significant investments
have been made in weaponry, tactics and other measures that have
forced Israel’s tanks and infantry to advance yard by yard --
with an increasingly high price paid for each advance -- rather
than city by city.
Test of
Wills
Hamas’ own
military strategy is relatively clear. First, the Islamists seek
to demonstrate the inability of Israel’s air campaign to halt
or even prevent an escalation of Palestinian rocket fire, thus
forcing Israel into ground combat in urban areas, producing the
prospect of losses large enough to demoralize Israel’s army and
society, and perhaps compel a wincing internal investigation
like that conducted by the Winograd Commission after the 2006
Lebanon campaign.
Although Palestinian
rocket fire has resulted in negligible Israeli casualties (since
2002, an average of three killed per year for a total of 18),
sowing death and destruction is not the projectiles’ primary
purpose. Rather, their value to Hamas lies in sending the message
of an unbroken will and capacity to resist, of an ability to
interrupt normal life for greater numbers of ordinary Israelis,
and since December 27 -- in light of Israel’s repeated public
commitment to end such attacks -- to frustrate the possibility
that Israel will surround and besiege individual Gaza population
centers from without. Almost certainly, Hamas is now also doing
its utmost to resume attacks within the West Bank and upon Israel’s
cities.
The Palestinian
hope, apparently, is that Israel’s perceived need for a quick
and decisive victory and aversion to significant casualties,
and its leaders’ need to conclude matters before the Israeli
elections if not Obama’s inauguration, will induce it to act
rashly or terminate hostilities rather than getting bogged down
in a war of attrition. The destruction of the PA in Gaza is largely
immaterial to Hamas’ ability to proclaim victory in this confrontation.
Rather, it needs only to survive as an organization, maintain
the will and ability to fight until the conclusion of hostilities,
and refuse new political concessions in exchange for an end to
the onslaught. If, furthermore, the confrontation ends with the
siege of Gaza lifted by Israel and Egypt, it can at least claim
it achieved what it set out to do on December 19 when it refused
to extend the ceasefire unilaterally.
That said,
Hamas and other Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip are
at the end of the day no more than lightly armed militias, with
no option of resupply, defending a miniscule and destitute patch
of land. In military terms, they are no match for Israel’s war
machine with its state-of-the-art weaponry, overwhelming firepower
and mastery of the air and sea. The question is thus not whether
Israel can defeat these bands of fighters, but rather whether
they can make the political and/or military cost of their eventual
annihilation prohibitive for Israel, and if not whether they
can survive to remain a significant force in the domestic Palestinian
and Israeli-Palestinian equations. With respect to the latter
question, much will depend on how this conflict ends; given the
enormous levels of destruction and widespread death Israel has
visited upon the Gaza Strip, Hamas will have to convince not
only its own constituents but also Palestinian society more generally
that the outcome -- in all its dimensions -- validates the decision
to stand and fight. Insistence that the Islamists were left with
no choice because of the blistering blockade, for example, will
likely find few takers if Hamas accepts a truce formula that
maintains the embargo.
Israel’s motivations
and standards of success are quite different than those of the
Islamists. Its immediate objective, in which Hamas and the Gaza
Strip are very much the foe of choice, is to restore the military’s
self-confidence and the faith of Israeli society in its armed
forces, and thereby reverse the damage inflicted by the 2006
Lebanon debacle. In this respect, Defense Minister Barak and
Chief of Staff Ashkenazi aim to show that the problem lay in
their predecessors -- the dilettante Amir Peretz and the windbag
Dan Halutz -- rather than in something rotten at the core of
the Israeli military establishment or in insurmountable hubris.
They also wish to prove that they have internalized and applied
the lessons of the Winograd Commission; and that today’s Israeli
soldier is again one able and willing to fight, advance and die
-- even in close-quarter combat with suicidal religious zealots
-- for an army again capable of crushing enemies and winning
wars. Should Israel fail in this task, the consequences could
be transformational well beyond the February 10 elections.
Secondly,
as in 2002 Israel understands that it cannot eliminate armed
Palestinian resistance in one fell swoop and so rather aims to
break the spine of militant organizations and demoralize their
cadres and constituencies at an acceptable cost to its own forces.
In this case, the methods involve unleashing the full force and
fury of the Israeli military in order to kill as many fighters
and leaders, and destroy as much of their equipment and expertise,
as possible; the physical destruction of resupply routes such
as the Rafah tunnel network and Gaza fishing harbor; and mobilizing
Arab and international support to actively obstruct Hamas and
others from regenerating and rearming their military wings. Unless
and until the international community delivers Israel an unambiguous
political triumph, the military will press on to achieve a decision
on the ground.
As in previous
Israeli wars, the premeditated and deliberate infliction of massive
civilian suffering and wholesale physical destruction is an integral
component of this campaign. If Operation Cast Lead does not produce
a popular revolt against Gaza’s present rulers, so the thinking
goes, the scale of the disaster -- including the slaughter of
entire families, the shelling of the UN school in Jabalya and
assorted other horrors -- will produce a post-war reckoning in
which Hamas’s support will atrophy while its opponents become
increasingly emboldened and popular. More importantly, once confronted
with the terrible consequences of challenging Israel, it is presumed
that no one in Gaza who lived through this assault will dare
raise his voice again; the fool who does will immediately be
drowned out by the desperate cries for self-preservation by friends,
neighbors, even comrades.
Ceasefire
Scenarios
In the growing
international diplomatic circus, the key issue for Israel is
an effective international mechanism to prevent Hamas from rearming
after Cast Lead is officially pronounced a victory. In this respect,
the dispatch of foreign combat engineers to the Egyptian side
of the Rafah border and deployment of a naval force off the Gaza
coast are being mulled over. Since these forces will not be stationed
on Palestinian territory, Hamas’ acquiescence in its own emasculation
will not be required. Similarly, Israel would very much like
to see an international and regional consensus -- for example,
one expressed in a UN Security Council resolution -- demanding
a permanent Hamas ceasefire. Then, as in 2002, it can withdraw
from the Gaza Strip unrestrained by any agreement with the Islamists,
and continue with raids and incursions at will to continuously
weaken its adversaries under the pretext of removing imminent
threats to its security. Needless to say, such scenarios are
predicated on Israel’s ability to deliver a devastating blow
to the Qassam Brigades and others before the fighting subsides.
For others,
restoring Abbas’ presidential guard at Rafah and perhaps introducing
international monitors into Gaza are seen as primary objectives,
the hope being that -- particularly with government in Gaza obliterated
-- they can function as a bridgehead for a restoration of Abbas’
rule to Gaza. It is for this reason more than any other that
Hamas has thus far rejected the introduction of third-party forces.
For some in Hamas, furthermore, governance has been more of a
restriction than an opportunity, and resuming life as a militant
resistance movement embedded in Palestinian society is hardly
the worst outcome. How Abbas’ waning fortunes fare in the coming
weeks and months are of course crucial in this respect. He appears
to have thoroughly alienated Palestinians, including growing
numbers within Fatah, and the Gaza conflict could well be his
point of no return.
Yet, when
all is said and done, two issues rise head and shoulders above
the rest: the urgency of beginning the process of reversing Israel’s
impunity in its dealings with the Palestinian people, and the
equally dire need to address the fundamental issue of occupation,
without which ceasefires, sieges and code-named calamities like
Operation Cast Lead would be unnecessary.

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