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Dubai
in a Jagged World
Ahmed Kanna
Ahmed
Kanna is a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Iowa

A
construction worker on site in Dubai. (Tamara Abdul Hadi/Reuters/Landov) |
Surprisingly,
what first strikes one upon landing in Dubai is not the skyscrapers
going up at a dizzying pace. It is the sheer bustle of humanity.
Even
in the wee hours of the morning, when larger airports like Heathrow
would be fairly empty, Dubai International, or DXB as it is known
to admiring locals, is thronged with thousands of tourists, businesspeople
and migrant workers, a diverse array of people with equally diverse
agendas, all knocking at the doors to the most famously booming
city-state in the Persian Gulf. Travelers arriving at the main
terminal usually meander for the better part of ten minutes through
its convoluted bowels before being deposited in one of two processing
organs. The first and literally higher of these is an elegant
atrium organized into about 40 orderly queues leading to passport
control counters manned by men and women wearing the Emirati
national dress. Holders of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) passports,
as well as Americans, Canadians, Europeans and citizens of a
few other affluent nations, proceed directly there. At the bottom
of an escalator a short distance before the atrium is a grimmer,
tighter reservoir for passengers who had to apply for a visa
before flying to Dubai. Here, citizens of South Asian, African
and non-GCC Arab countries, as well as China and the former Soviet
Union, contend with an unchanneled crowd for the privilege of
receiving an entry stamp and being permitted to wait above, with
the beautiful people, for final recognition of their right to
enter the United Arab Emirates.
The
mundane experience of Dubai passport control is instructive at
a time when many are bedazzled by the speed at which capital,
commodities and people whoosh around the globe, making it seem,
as Thomas Friedman believes, that “the world is flat.” For all
the triumphalist fixation on flows and mobility, the jagged edges
of a more archaic order, carved into the grid of nationality,
endure. The Gulf states, notoriously stereotyped as “tribes with
flags” and countries without history, have long been places where
the powerful have forgotten about history’s vexing tendency to
bind them into an ethical and political relationship with the
less powerful. This tendency to forget history—the legacies of
power, of territories cut up into nation-states and of unsentimental
economic calculations—lives on in contemporary accounts of the
Gulf’s staggering prosperity.
There
is no better example than Dubai. According to Friedman, Dubai
is “where we should want the Arab world to go,” a place that,
though “not without its warts,” embodies the narrative of globalization
as progress.[1] In
this reading, Dubai is a self-effacing pupil, the West a wise
tutor and the rest of the Arab world a willfully ignorant problem
child. From the left, Mike Davis tells us that Dubai is no model
at all. Rather, it is a horror show, exemplifying the coarseness
of hyper-capitalism. Reading the global economy through a Marxist
lens, he says that in Dubai “all the arduous…stages of commercial
evolution have been telescoped or short-circuited to embrace
the ‘perfected’ synthesis of shopping, entertainment and architectural
spectacle, on the most pharaonic scale.”[2] The most visible (or superficial)
aspects of Dubai have become the focus of so much polemic that
the political economy has become invisible. Globalization has
made all that is solid, such as national borders and the constraints
they impose, melt into air.
The
Dubai Spectacle Demystified
Capital
enters Dubai and disappears—or, in what amounts to the same thing,
it is reborn in phantasmagorical form. Those who possess capital
can expect non-interference from the state. They enter the city
as lords of a frontier where the rules are checked at the border.
Capital and its owners become, in the term of political scientist
James Scott, “illegible,” where legibility is the necessary condition
for centralized control.[3]
The
state in Dubai began cultivating an image as the business-friendly
emirate from very early on. In the first decade of the twentieth
century, the ruler provided tax and rent incentives to Iranian
merchants escaping the Qajar shah’s new import duties—probably
the city’s first case of capital flight. Between Dubai’s founding
in the 1830s and its incorporation into the UAE at independence
in 1971, it was a backwater sitting along the sea routes connecting
Iran, Iraq and India, as well as the ports of Zanzibar and Aden.
Even a subsistence income was not always assured for the population,
as in the 1930s, when the twin blights of the Great Depression
and the collapse of the pearling economy owing to the invention
of Japanese cultured pearls caused mass starvation and nearly
wiped out the village. With a combination of cynicism and foresight,
in 1938 Dubai’s ruler Sa‘id bin Maktoum allied himself with,
and fused the state to, the merchant class.

A
worker walks through one of the sveral labor camps near
Dubai. (Julian Warnand) |
The
stakes became much higher in the 1970s, as a number of events
of global consequence began to integrate the UAE more thoroughly
into the world economy. Oil was discovered in Abu Dhabi in 1958
and in Dubai in 1969. By 1971, Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayan, who
had deposed his brother Shakhbout as president of the UAE in
1966, had nationalized the UAE oil industry. The Dubai economy
expanded sevenfold between 1968 and 1973.[4] The
1973 OPEC embargo initiated a boom across the Gulf, and brought
a windfall of revenues into Iraq and Iran as well. Two years
later, the civil war in Lebanon began, sending that country into
a precipitous decline as a center of banking, high finance and
tourism in the Middle East. Islamist politics shook the region,
toppling the Shah and nearly doing the same to the Al Saud in
1979. The Soviet Union entered a protracted and catastrophic
engagement in Afghanistan in the same year, and then Iraq and
Iran went to war in 1980.
These
events were behind the great reversal of Dubai’s fortunes. Before
the 1970s, trade in the village was largely limited to re-export
of petty commodities like watches, house appliances and gold.
After the oil boom and the ensuing events, Dubai became a veritable
island of stability in an ocean of political turmoil. By the
1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and neoliberal restructuring
in India and various African nations was guiding the capital
“freed” from these countries, increasingly, to Dubai.[5] More
capital—financial and human—arrived by way of Iraq, owing to
that country’s hideous experiences since 1991.
It
was not a coincidence, therefore, that Dubai commenced an ambitious
campaign to revolutionize the cityscape under Sheikh Muhammad
bin Rashid Al Maktoum in the early 1990s. Cash unmoored and trying
to conceal itself from collapsing or restructuring states tends
to go in the direction of real estate. The city was like a tabula
rasa onto which massive buildings, wild, themed architecture
and clusters of free trade zones could be etched, creating the
visible city of business-friendly Dubai. Speculation and money
laundering, as well as legitimate rent, fueled the boom.[6] Capital
and the state reaffirmed the agreement of 1938—non-interference
of the latter in the movement and workings of the former. The
agreement was made easier by the fact that the state itself,
in the person of Sheikh Muhammad, became an enormous stakeholder
in the private sector.
The
Invisible City

Workers
make phone calls in one of the sveral
labor camps near Dubai. (Julian Warnand) |
If
capital is illegible in Dubai, other migrants to the city—the
ones who build the visible city—are all too “legible” and all
too manipulated. With the construction boom of the 1990s came
hundreds of thousands of migrants from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka and further afield in Southeast Asia.[7] All these migrants, clearly visualized and regulated by the
state as “guest workers,” are restricted in their off hours to
the invisible parts of the city. This might be neoliberalism’s
central irony: Categorical simplification and visibility for
the purposes of control result in invisibility in the moral sense.
The
Sonapoor labor camp, where most of the migrant workers are housed,
lies outside the main city limits, about a ten-minute drive from
Dayra, in the eastern part of the city. The landmark at the outer
edge of the visible city is the al‑Mulla center, which, having
been built in 1979, is the city’s oldest shopping mall. Al-Mulla
is now considered a gateway of sorts, past which no respectable
European or local Arab person would venture. Perhaps aware of
this, the workers have given the camp an unrespectable name.
“Sonapoor is a very bad word,” said my guide, adding that it
is Malayalam (the language commonly spoken in the Indian state
of Kerala) for a woman’s sexual organ. In fact, the camp’s name
is a Hindi term meaning “city of gold.” My guide, who is not
from Kerala, may have been honestly mistaken. Yet his belief
about this word’s meaning, as well as its real meaning, encompasses
the range of sentiments that workers feel for Dubai. For many
Pakistanis and other South Asians preparing to emigrate to Dubai,
the place is very much a dream city where fortunes can be made
instantly, ending years of penury in the home country. And yet,
it is also undeniable that the actual experience of the city
can be painful and darkly ironic.[8]
Squat
buildings mark the spot where we turned off the main, paved road
and drove along unpaved roads crowded with men in the uniforms
of different companies, returning from or going to their shifts.
Large buses emptied their human contents and were refilled. We
passed a couple of camps. “That one is al‑Habtour,” said my guide,
naming a Dubai construction firm. “That one is al-‘Abbar.” These
are both large companies, with uncooperative security personnel
and, presumably, stricter surveillance of workers. They are too
dangerous to attempt entry. We turned off and reached our destination.
The guard was not even at the security kiosk. We proceeded into
a walled compound, past communal toilets. There were six or seven
bedrooms on either side of the compound, a communal kitchen and
a TV area with easy chairs and sofas.
The
bedroom we entered, which has two single and two bunk beds, is
about 40 square feet. It has its own kitchen and toilet, a relative
luxury at labor camps, as well as a TV connected to a satellite
dish and a stereo box. We were greeted heartily by an Arab worker,
who offered us tea. “This is a very good room, relative to other
worker accommodations” both at this company and at others, said
my guide. Usually, a room like this houses 20 workers, but this
one houses only four. Our host, Ma’moun,[9] has
been in Dubai a little over three years. He found out about the
job from an agent in his home country. For approximately $655,
he obtained a visa and paid his airfare, with the company paying
for the remaining expenses. Every three years, he is required
to renew the visa, at a rate of about $260. Every two years,
he gets two months’ paid vacation, and the company allows trips
home for emergencies. The company took his passport, but gives
it back to him when he needs to travel. His monthly salary is
$300, paid always in cash. Sometimes he does not get paid for
one or two months, sometimes longer.

Two
workers
in their quarters make phone calls in the camp of Sonapoor.
(Julian Warnand) |
In
the UAE, the owner of the construction company, who is Emirati
(sometimes in partnership with an expatriate), is called the
kafil (sponsor), in Ma’moun’s case a small construction company
with 25 or 30 workers. Ma’moun and my guide described it as a
relatively “good” company. Normally, however, working for such
a small employer would put the worker at a relative disadvantage.
When it comes to non-payment of workers and substandard accommodations,
smaller companies, as opposed to the ‘Abbars and the Habtours,
are disproportionately the worst offenders. What does Ma’moun
want to get out of Dubai? “I don’t have a big, definite goal.
I dream step by step (ahlam
daraja fi daraja).” He doesn’t know how long he wants to
stay in Dubai. He is here indefinitely.
The
second worker, Hamid, is from Pakistan. Unlike Ma’moun, who is
a site supervisor, Hamid works in construction. He himself paid
the labor agent in Islamabad for travel and visa, at a total
of 130,000 Pakistani rupees ($2,138). When he arrived in Dubai,
the company took his passport and a $272 deposit. In Arabic,
the deposit is called ta’min, or insurance, for it insures
that Hamid does not “abscond.” Absconding was a big problem,
especially in emirates such as Sharja, “where the accommodations
are much worse, because they are not under the scrutiny from
international organizations the same way that Dubai is,” as someone
else familiar with the workers’ movement told me. Hamid’s monthly
salary is $163 per month, and he works about 48 hours a week
plus about 2-3 hours overtime every week, which increases his
income to about $218. Whereas the government requires that the
sponsor pay for accommodations and electricity (and this company
does seem to follow the rules), workers are required to pay for
food and cooking gas. In Hamid’s case, this leaves him with a
net monthly income of $136, all of which goes to his family in
Pakistan.
There
is a canteen at the camp, or “company accommodation,” to use
the sponsors’ euphemism, “but it is very expensive,” said Ma’moun.
It is pricier than Spinney’s or Carrefour, two European chains
that can be found in the stylish shopping malls on the other
side of the city. “If a carton of milk costs three dirhams at
Spinney’s, it will cost three and a half here,” said my guide.
“But the workers have no choice. The canteen has a monopoly.”
“There
is a much worse company,” he continued, naming a firm in nearby
Sharja, where the 35 workers—all of them illegal—are sleeping
on the roofs for the heat. There is no plumbing, no electricity,
no food and no work. The partners in the company were an Emirati
sheikh and a Lebanese-Canadian. They dumped the company when
it went bankrupt, and left the workers hanging out to dry. The
sponsor has not returned their passports for two years and owes
them about $68,075. About ten workers went to their embassies
to get replacement papers, and have left the UAE.
The
third worker, Ahmad, an elderly Pakistani, has been with the
company for 15 years. He told the same story about how he found
the job in Dubai. “Work in Pakistan was too little, and the government
does not care about its people. I used to make less than $2 per
month. How can you live on that? How can you support a family?”
His working conditions are the same as those of the other workers,
though, since they are younger and newer here, they might be
shocked to discover that building a nest egg in the Gulf might
take a good deal longer than they expected. How many of them
comprehend that being a migrant can last longer than settlement
in their home country? “The agencies lie,“ said Ahmad of the
labor recruiters in Pakistan. “They say, ‘Go to Dubai. The work
is easy; the life is easy. You will do light work like lifting
crates. Small work, little work.’” The workers, illiterate in
Arabic and English, sign contracts that they cannot read, he
claimed. The companies, added my guide, use this as a pretext
to escape responsibility when workers make complaints. “The Dubai
government is good, better than the Pakistani government,” says
Ahmad. “It cares more about workers. But the companies are not
good.”
Below
the Surface
On
the one hand, workers such as Ma’moun, Hamid and Ahmad live in
a remote part of the city, which until only recently consisted
of far humbler, often improvised dwellings. To most Emiratis
and wealthier expatriates, these workers do not exist, either
physically or in the moral sense. One need only note the similar
position of domestic servants in the UAE, also predominantly
South and Southeast Asian. Domestics are permitted into intimate
parts of locals’ houses—bedrooms and kitchens—that are not open
to other outsiders. The reason is that exposure of private areas
within the household only matters when social equals or superiors
are involved. Social subordinates, such as children and domestics,
are not to be feared because their opinions are not socially
admissible. This social position is reflected, as well, in the
local (and expatriate) practice of referring to domestics, who
are always adults, as “tea boy” or “house girl.”
Construction
workers are similarly invisible. Such invisibility may explain
why the denial of workers’ human rights, as recorded in meticulous
detail by a 2006 Human Rights Watch report, is routinely minimized,
if even acknowledged, by Emiratis. Abuses, which the local English-language
press also covers pretty well, are for locals merely “a few isolated
incidents,” as one Emirati told me. Organizations like Human
Rights Watch are also often considered part of a US plot to shame
and subdue the Arab world. As another Emirati told me: “When
you look at the Arab world, who is the only one doing anything
[forward-looking and modern]? Only Dubai! The Americans can’t
stand an Arab country [succeeding].” Better, then, to focus on
the aesthetically pleasing aspects of the city and look away
from, as Thomas Friedman puts it, “the warts.”

Boarding
the bus after a day's work in Dubai.
(Caren Firouz/Reuters/Landov) |
Looked
at from another perspective, however, workers such as Ma’moun,
Ahmad and Hamid are all too visible, if visibility is a condition
for the merchant-state’s ability to control workers. Their passports
are expropriated the moment a company hires them. After this,
they are warehoused in closely watched camps, sorted into wage
categories that seem to parallel their nationalities and shipped
from these “company accommodations” to their work sites in cramped
company buses, their only means of transportation outside the
camps. The merchant-state’s knowledge of them—their country of
origin, their health, their capacity for work, the extent of
their geographical mobility within the boundaries of the state—is
thorough and sufficient to the task of control.
None
of this is to say that Dubai or the UAE are peculiar in their
exploitation of migrant workers or in the use of nationality,
ethnicity and even race to categorize and manipulate the workers.
One sees exactly the same arbitrary discrimination and selective
imposition of “legibility” on various groups in the supposedly
advanced countries of Europe and North America, including in
the backlash among many Americans against “illegal immigrants”
from Latin America. And much worse than the Emiratis’ resistance
to supranational oversight of workers’ rights can occur under
the rubric of national sovereignty.
The
point is simply that the world is not flat. Accounts of Dubai
as either a beacon for the Arab world, or, alternatively, a laboratory
of capitalist phantasmagoria ignore the persistence of national
identity and boundaries, and their intersection with exploitation
and class, as a means of rendering the world quite jagged. These
accounts neglect how nationality and class continue to determine
the level of mobility that a group or an individual has in the
global economy. In both liberal and Marxist narratives, the power
of capital pours forth unencumbered from the center to the periphery,
either dragging the latter along the road of progress, or utterly
flattening it and imposing the center’s civilization. Both stories
are insensitive to the concrete ways in which the local and the
global interact.
Accounts
of Dubai should scratch below the surface of the literally visible
city to hit the less obvious but, from the state’s perspective,
equally visible parts of the city. The organization of labor
and the expropriation of standardized workers’ rights, the contraband
coursing through the ports and the astounding buildings that
present a futuristic vision while concealing their sources of
financing are all logical elaborations on the original pact of
1938. They also represent the fruits of a rather prescient strategic
choice that has situated Dubai as banker, developer and launderer
for the wealth of the restructuring and collapsing world surrounding
it.
Author’s Note: Thanks
to the International Programs at the University of Iowa and the
Stanley Foundation for funding part of a research trip to Dubai
in December 2006 and January 2007. Thanks also to members of
the Department of Anthropology at Yale University, especially
Kamari Clark and Annie Harper, for a stimulating discussion which
inspired much of this paper.
Endnotes
[1] Thomas
Friedman, “Dubai and Dunces,” New York Times, March 15,
2006.
[2] Mike
Davis, “Fear and Money in Dubai,” New Left Review 41 (September-October
2006), p. 54.
[3] See
James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve
the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1998).
[4] Rosemarie
Said Zahlan, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political
and Social History of the Trucial States (London: Macmillan,
1978), p. 185.
[5] P.
Sainath, “Net Worth of India’s Billionaires Soars,” Counterpunch,
November 26–27, 2005; Roland Marchal, “Dubai: Global City and
Transnational Hub,” in Madawi al‑Rasheed, ed., Transnational
Connections and the Arab Gulf (New York: Routledge, 2005),
pp. 93–110.
[6] Observer, February
13, 2005.
[7] Human
Rights Watch, Building Towers, Cheating Workers: Exploitation
of Migrant Construction Workers in the United Arab Emirates (New
York, November 2006), p. 25.
[8] Thanks
to Annie Harper and Smriti Srinivas for an illuminating discussion.
[9] All
workers’ names are pseudonyms.

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